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This thesis explores how popular confidence issues in American banking were being repre-
sented within the public sphere during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. To varying extents, 
many people lacked confidence in the reliability of banks, while many others saw bankers as 
economically and politically threatening. The thesis argues that there existed an overarching 
and multifaceted confidence problem directed towards American banking institutions which 
was reflected, reinforced, and instilled through the public sphere via the media and assorted 
cultural artefacts. It further argues that bankers eventually came to appreciate this fact and in 
turn sought to challenge negative impressions and to manufacture consent for desired confi-
dence-inspiring reforms. They did this by themselves taking to the public sphere through ad-
vertising and propaganda campaigns. Together, we can see popular movements and various 
social commentators pushing people away from what were viewed as unreliable or corrupt 
institutions on the one hand, and, on the other, the efforts that were being made to pull people 
towards what bankers positioned as trustworthy, civic-minded repositories of the nation. 
What emerges in the thesis overall is a more comprehensive analysis of the role of banking 
within the civic debates of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Such issues were central to 
many Americans’ political consciousness in ways that have not been well analysed.   
 While historians have explored various aspects of banking over this period, they have 
taken confidence issues for granted, treated them in isolation, or have approached ‘confidence’ 
entirely in a quantitative manner. It has mostly been a topic for business and economic history. 
By instead taking a cultural approach, this thesis breaks new ground. Towards this end, a range 
of materials have been consulted, ranging from newspaper articles, trade journals, conference 
proceedings, magazine articles, novels, cartoons, and songs. Such an approach reveals the ex-
tent to which these issues had permeated the popular imagination.  
 Following the Introduction, Chapter I details how previous historians have approached 
confidence issues and highlights the originality of this thesis. Chapters II through V then ex-
plore the various ways that banking issues were understood and represented within the public 
sphere, including how runs and panics and the depiction thereof resonated (II); how embez-
zlement and misappropriation scandals (dubbed ‘wrecking’) permeated the popular imagina-
 
v 
tion (III); how financial monopolisation ‘othered’ certain bankers (IV); and how popular bank-
ing reform movements themselves reflect popular confidence issues (V). Chapters VI through 
VIII explore how bankers sought to respond to these issues, including how individual banks 
started turning to advertising (VI); how elite bankers engaged in a sophisticated propaganda 
campaign to instate a reserve association that they believed would end banking panics (VII); 
and how banks all over the country participated within the Bond and Savings drives of the 
First World War which in turn conveyed them as facilitators of patriotism (VIII). The thesis 
concludes with an epilogue that extends this history into the 1920s and beyond, and shows 
how relations had in fact improved by the end of the Progressive Era, albeit temporarily. It 
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Bank, n. 5. (Com.) An establishment for the custody, or the loaning, exchange, 
or issue, of money, and for facilitating the transmission of funds by drafts or 
bills of exchange; a fund from deposits or contributions; the fund of a gaming 
establishment, as of a faro-bank, and the like. 
 
Con'fi-dence, n. 1. The act of confiding, trusting, or putting faith in, as in the 
reality of a fact or the integrity and veracity of another; trust; reliance; belief. 
 
 - An American Dictionary of the English Language, 1865.1 
 
Banking in its various forms has aroused considerable intrigue – and passion – over the course 
of Western history. Fascination with the subject is captured within landmark cultural texts, 
from the Gospels to Shakespeare. Modern American history is no different. Indeed, it has 
carried the tradition with an intense devotion. Americans of yesteryear, from across the social 
spectrum, top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top, have taken a keen interest in matters pertaining 
to banking. Many Americans have not only held opinions on the topic, but also highly emotive 
ones. These have often been based upon culturally ingrained confidence issues. This was the 
case during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.  
Considered together, this period was something of a paradox. On the one hand, it was 
characterised by tremendous national and commercial development. By 1890, the ‘frontier’ 
had been officially closed. Technological innovations like the transcontinental railroads and 
the telegraph network connected the nation. The balance of trade shifted favourably. Wages 
rose and the cost of living declined. People fled from the country to urban centres. The middle-
class grew. Migrants from all over the world settled within the prospering nation, seeking to 
share in its spoils and realise the American dream of prosperous liberal independence. Indeed, 
over this time America rose as a global financial, commercial, and military power. On the other 
hand, it was also characterised by socio-economic turbulence. The economy was prone to 
collapse, as was the case in the 1870s, 1890s, and 1900s. Huge corporations and monopolies 
emerged, purposefully stifling competition, and subsequently generating animosity. Minorities 
were treated harshly. Inequalities between the rich and everyone else escalated. 
Unemployment and poverty were endemic. Labour conflicts were often vicious, and resulted 
                                                
1 Noah Webster, Chauncey A. Goodrich, and Noah Porter, An American Dictionary of the English Language, 
revised edition (Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam, 1865), 106 (‘bank’) and 271 (‘con'fi-dence’). 
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in violent and lethal skirmishes between workers and militias, sometimes state based, other 
times not. Gradually, people, including reformers and expository ‘muckraking’ journalists, 
sought to confront and curb the vices that had come to plague American society. In this 
environment, Theodore Roosevelt lambasted the ‘malefactors of great wealth’ and Woodrow 
Wilson introduced his ‘New Freedom’, intended to excise any undemocratic and inequitable 
features of the nation's new social and economic landscape. Reformers turned to the state to 
remedy such problems during the Progressive Era. Resulting from their efforts, consumer 
protection laws were passed, monopolies were broken up, redistributive measures like a 
graduated income tax were instated, and sweeping financial reforms were implemented.2 
 Banking conformed to this pattern. The Gilded Age and Progressive Era roughly 
incorporated the ‘National Banking Era’ (1863-1913) and the formative years of the Federal 
Reserve System, enacted in 1913 and created the following year. The former was a mixed 
blessing. On the one hand, with the establishment of nationally chartered banks, America had 
achieved a national currency. Deposit banking also became the prevailing business model and 
deposits soared. On the other, such banks were not alone, as state-chartered and non-chartered 
private banks of various kinds came to flourish, including commercial and savings banks, 
ultimately creating a complex and volatile banking infrastructure. Moreover, panics were 
recurrent, thousands of banks failed during the era, bank runs were common, embezzlement 
and misappropriation scandals occurred often, and the money market was tight. The Federal 
Reserve was in part the Progressive Era's attempt to solve many of these issues. Overall, with 
the good came the bad and banking very much embodied this characteristic of Gilded Age and 
Progressive Era America. Resultantly, banking was a topic that attracted widespread attention. 
  
This thesis argues that American people’s exposure to and awareness of banking 
problems, propelled by the increasing social and economic importance of deposit banking, the 
concentration of capital, and the development of a ‘mass media’, produced a persistent and 
                                                
2 For general surveys of the era, see Richard Hoftstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R. (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1955); Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920 (New York: 
Harper, 2009); Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919, second edition (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2008); Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and 
Society in the Gilded Age, second edition (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); and Robert H. Wiebe, The Search 
for Order, 1877-1920 (London; Melbourne: Macmillan, 1967). 
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multifaceted confidence issue directed towards banks and bankers. Beginning in the 1870s, 
this problem was reflected, reinforced, and instilled via the public-sphere. Middle and working 
class people were involved. So too were business people and even bankers themselves – the 
latter at times distrusted one another. In times of panic, this problem reached crisis levels. In 
reality, short-term and long-term currency hoarding were endemic. Runs could be triggered 
easily and panic could spread far and wide, as it did in 1873, 1893, and 1907. In representation, 
any and all issues relating to banks received extensive coverage. Runs, failures, scandals, and 
panics received wide press coverage spanning the nation. Additionally, rural and urban anti-
monopolists depicted some bankers as plutocrats within a host of mass-distributed mediums, 
in effect conceptually removing these bankers from ‘the people’. Further, reformers of various 
kinds began to publicly advocate people-oriented alternatives to solve banking problems, thus 
challenging the authority of bankers. Simply, banking problems resonated within the popular 
imagination and in turn many people distrusted banks in a variety of ways, which was 
conveyed openly and often. Put another way, the popularity of these problems discouraged 
many people from maintaining a steady relationship with their banks or from utilising them 
at all. 
 It is further argued that bankers, in turn, came to acknowledge this by the turn of the 
century and sought to instil popular confidence by themselves taking to the public sphere; by 
seizing control of their public image or by advancing measures they believed would alleviate 
problems. Towards these ends, many bankers eventually came to embrace advertising and 
propaganda. Such mediums were utilised to offset negative impressions or to manufacture 
consent for favoured reforms. Bankers saw these mediums to be capable of challenging deeply 
embedded sentiments and to be powerful enough to advance their interests. For one, bankers 
sought to convey that their facilities were reliable and community oriented. For another, they 
conducted or participated in major propaganda campaigns, like those associated with the push 
for a banker-controlled reserve association and the bond and savings drives of the First World 
War, in order to achieve desired ends. Between 1913 and 1922, a reserve association was 
created, people were brought into closer contact with banks, bankers became financial leaders, 
and the banking related concerns of the age declined. Over this time, people ceased to distrust 
bankers like they once had, and bankers had shifted from controversial to respectable figures. 
Though various factors extrinsic to advertising and propaganda were largely responsible for 
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this, including Governmental activism, the reduction of sensationalistic and expository 
journalism, the precedence that the First World War took within the public sphere, and the 
increasing prosperity that swept much of the nation, bankers were nevertheless extremely 
active during this period in their bid to instate confidence and win over the hearts and minds 
of the American public.  
Before proceeding, it is important to detail what is meant by the term ‘bank’, given that 
a complex array of such institutions existed throughout this period, all with differing purposes, 
functions, and patrons. The 1865 edition of An American Dictionary of the English Language 
offers a simple, though expansive and useful historical definition, describing banks as 
establishments ‘for the custody, or the loaning, exchange, or issue, of money, and for 
facilitating the transmission of funds by drafts or bills of exchange’.3 This captures the general 
purposes of banks. Still, there were numerous differences. National banks were chartered by 
the federal government and issued currency. State banks were chartered by state governments 
and generally faced fewer restrictions, particularly in terms of capital and reserve requirements 
and the types of loans they could issue, which included mortgages. Private, unchartered banks 
also proliferated over this period, which partially or completely evaded the requirements 
imposed upon national and state banks. There were also private investment banks that 
brokered and traded in securities. Further, there was a difference between commercial and 
savings banks. The former traditionally served the business community. They took deposits 
and converted those deposits into loanable capital. The latter served individuals. They accepted 
deposits and then invested them in gilt-edge securities and mortgages. Even between savings 
banks, some were trustee or mutually operated and consisted entirely of depositor capital. 
Others were stock-based, meaning they were owned by investors and profit-oriented. 
Evidently, there were important differences and care must thus be taken when using generic 
terms like ‘banks’ and ‘banking’. 
 To make it clear, then, this thesis is interested in banks that dealt with and were 
accessible to the general public - both businesses and individuals - and banks that accepted the 
public’s deposits, whether demand or time; cheque or savings. The focus extends to investment 
banks only where they relate to deposit banks and to popular confidence (such as in chapters 
                                                
3 Webster, Goodrich, and Porter, An American Dictionary, 106. 
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IV and VII). Otherwise, the focus is upon banks that directly accepted and utilised depositor 
funds, including national, state, savings, and private banks. This is because people put their 
money into these banks (or were encouraged to), and because they could observe each type of 
bank face or cause trouble, whether national or state, commercial or savings. None were 
immune to problems and thus none were immune to suspicions or doubts. 
 In exploring how confidence issues related to these banks, it may seem obvious to say 
that many people distrusted them in some way over this period. However, that there existed 
an overarching and complex confidence issue, to the extent that many did not trust bankers at 
all, is taken for granted. Historians mention that people, or at least some people, distrusted 
banks and bankers and leave it at that. 4  As a result, this history has not been explored 
comprehensively. Additionally, we do not get a sense of what that confidence issue meant or 
how it was manifested. Where ‘confidence’ has been addressed by economic historians, it is, 
as we shall see in Chapter I, typically viewed in quantitative terms, involving the comparison 
of deposit levels to the amount of currency circulating outside of banks at any one time. This 
says nothing about the qualitative aspects of confidence, and also offers a very limited 
interpretation of such a phenomenon.  
After several decades of prioritising important subjects like race, gender, sexuality, and 
class, social and cultural historians have recently started to also examine topics once firmly 
entrenched within economic history and have in turn been developing a new history of 
American capitalism.5 Taking from their lead, this thesis adopts a social and cultural approach 
that aims to broaden the concept of confidence by integrating qualitative analysis into the 
history of Gilded Age and Progressive Era banking. Though it still approaches ‘confidence’ as 
something directed outwards towards others rather than inwards towards the self (as in self-
esteem) and treats it as synonymous with ‘trust’ and ‘faith’, it expands the concept to entail 
                                                
4 An example of how casually such an assertion can be made is found in Robert Wiebe’s The Search for Order. 
While he does mention bankers and finance throughout (such as on page 97), in reference to lawyers he states 
that ‘With the exception of bankers, no group late in the nineteenth century stood in lower public repute’. Wiebe, 
The Search for Order, 116. Richard Hoftstadter has been more expansive, though his focus is limited mostly to 
agrarians and the ‘money power’. See Hoftstadter, The Age of Reform, 60-93. Sheldon Garon has noted that 
‘Workers and farmers tended to distrust the [commercial] banks, and for good reason’, which he suggests was 
related to the record of failures. Nevertheless, only three sentences are devoted to this claim. Sheldon Garon, 
Beyond Our Means: Why America Spends While the World Saves (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 
95. 
 
5 This is expanded upon within Chapter I. 
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more than the immediate and fluctuating behaviours of depositors. It will demonstrate how 
confidence issues pervaded this entire period inside and outside of times of panic, and how 
they went beyond immediate concerns with the ability of banks to repay depositors to include 
more general suspicions and doubts held against banks and bankers. It is accepted that 
measuring the amount of deposits and depositors is an important way to assess whether people 
trusted banks during this period, as this allows us to observe their willingness to place and 
leave their money within them. For this reason, much of this thesis focuses upon depositing 
instead of loaning. However, this thesis concerns how people generally assessed the economic, 
social, and political trustworthiness of banks and bankers. Overall, it aims to demonstrate that 
many American people considered privately owned or operated banks to be unreliable, 
antagonistic to their interests, or both. It explores how people evaluated the general suitability 
of bankers to safely and suitably handle and manage money, and how bankers sought to 
demonstrate that their institutions were secure and sympathetic. Indeed, approaching this 
history from a social and cultural perspective allows us to see it as a moment of attitudinal and 
representational conflict.  
To reveal this, this thesis analyses sources derived from across the social spectrum and 
utilises an assortment of materials that have been either downplayed or overlooked by 
previous historians, largely entailing cultural artefacts. Though it does utilise more traditional 
materials, like transcripts, official documentation, trade manuals, and newspaper articles, it 
favours sources such as political and reform tracts intended for popular audiences, books and 
novels, cartoons, songs, magazine articles, advertisements, and radical and reform oriented 
publications. Together, this approach aims to demonstrate just how highly conscious people 
were of banking issues, and how such materials reflected, reinforced, and instilled distrust. It 
also shows how bankers in turn became aware of this and how their publicly visible artefacts 
were tailored to respond to distrust. Thus, by combining more traditional materials with 
largely overlooked cultural artefacts, we can begin to gauge common sentiments of the era and 
explore how they were transmitted within the public sphere. 
 What this thesis refers to as the ‘public sphere’ has been theoretically informed by 
sociologist Jürgen Habermas and cultural theorist Jim McGuigan. As McGuigan highlights, 
Habermas' conception identifies a ‘literary public sphere’ and a ‘political public sphere’. 
Though different, both are considered facets of the public sphere as a whole. The former refers 
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to a ‘republic of letters’, whereby political discussions and debates are represented textually or 
symbolically via the press or other media. The latter refers to discussions and debates that 
actually occur between people in real life. When using the term, this thesis refers to both. 
However, as McGuigan observes, this conception can exclude cultural artefacts that do not 
appear on the surface to directly engage in any broader kinds of social or political discussion. 
His solution has been to develop the concept of the ‘cultural public sphere’ which does 
incorporate such artefacts.6 Although this thesis will not utilise this term, it nevertheless 
considers the cultural artefacts it addresses to belong to the broader public sphere. All such 
materials were a part of a cultural discussion, even if inadvertently so.  
 This was made possible by the increasingly interconnected nature of the American 
media and its communications systems, such as the telegraph network, the postal service (itself 
facilitated by the expansion of the railroads), and, later, the telephone lines. Historian Richard 
Ohmann has argued that the turn of the twentieth century marked ‘the inaugural moment’ of 
America's ‘national mass culture’.7 For Ohmann, this entailed the development of a structure 
that united disjointed communities into a national community. In other words, through the 
mass media came a mass culture. For instance, though newspapers had existed long before this 
period, it was over this time that they ‘became a channel of national mass culture’, which 
occurred ‘about the same time as did the magazine’.8 The ‘yellow press’, for example, emerged 
during this era which packaged news as popular entertainment to be consumed broadly. 
Overall, newspapers came to be read by millions of people, as did magazines and also books.9 
Resultantly, information and ideas could spread across the nation, from North to South, from 
East to West, and everywhere in between. Events occurring in one part of the country could 
be reported elsewhere. This was facilitated by the likes of the Associated Press. In short, people 
everywhere could access and even participate in a national public sphere, albeit one that could 
still be disjointed by regional differences and subject to varying political and commercial 
interests. 
                                                
6 Jim McGuigan, ‘The Cultural Public Sphere’, European Journal of Cultural Studies, vol. 8, no. 4 (2005): 427-43, 
esp. 429-30, and 434-5. 
 
7 Richard Ohmann, Selling Culture: Magazines, Markets, and Class at the Turn of the Century (London; New 
York: Verso, 1996), 23. 
 
8 Ohmann, Selling Culture, 21. 
 
9 Ohmann, Selling Culture, 18-30. 
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  Here it is important to distance this thesis from the notion of a single, inflexible ‘mass 
culture’, as this can imply that there existed a kind of cultural homogeneity. This may create 
the impression that most believed the same things and behaved in the same way. As a result, 
social, cultural, and political differences can be buried and erased by such a notion. While it is 
true that the public sphere was transformed, there nevertheless remained quite significant 
ideological and behavioural variations, and conflict was present. This is where Jackson Lears' 
revision of ‘cultural hegemony’ becomes useful. Lears divorces the concept from previous 
conceptions that restrict the notion to a ruling and subordinated class axis, whereby the former 
ideologically rule over the latter in an absolutist manner. As Lears notes, cultural hegemony 
does not mean ‘social control’ but rather the predominant beliefs and customs which pervade 
a society. Even those subject to this kind of hegemony can deviate from and resist it in 
significant ways. Moreover, it can stem from various social groups, from the top and also from 
the bottom.10 This approach, then, allows for the exploration of varying views from a range of 
actors and classes, and how they may have come into conflict and sought to conquer one 
another. So although a mass media of sorts emerged and expanded the national public sphere, 
views could still vary considerably. Applied to this particular history, what constituted as 
‘sound’ and ‘respectable’ banking could differ sharply between people, classes, and regions. 
Particular ideas came into conflict over this period, culminating in an attitudinal and 
ideological quest for hegemony. Simply, there was a battle over what people thought, felt, and 
expressed about banking. 
 Admittedly, by undertaking a national approach this thesis still risks homogenising the 
views of large numbers of people, when there was indeed great diversity. For one, conditions 
varied between states and regions. Those in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states 
experienced far fewer failures than the South and the West and also utilised savings 
institutions significantly more, for instance.11 Moreover, regions were in varying stages of 
development. Much of the West was still developing financially and the South was recovering 
from the Civil War. Further, state banking systems could differ dramatically from one another. 
                                                
10 T. J. Jackson Lears, ‘The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities’, The American Historical 
Review, vol. 90, no. 3 (June, 1985), 567-93, esp. 587. 
 
11 The New England states in particular experienced relatively few failures. See Jill Hendrickson, Regulation and 
Instability in U.S. Commercial Banking: A History of Crises (Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
86-8. For more on savings, see Garon, Beyond Our Means, 96-9. 
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As late as 1910, for example, Arkansas did not legally require its banks to undergo inspection 
whereas Rhode Island required two annual inspections.12 For another, it is also true that there 
existed considerable ideological differences between bankers themselves. Historian Richard 
McCulley has demonstrated that there were marked differences between ‘Wall Street’, ‘La 
Salle Street’, and ‘Main Street’ bankers. Those of Wall Street favoured Governmental 
intervention when it came to bolstering their interests, those of La Salle Street (Chicago) 
favoured an anti-interventionist, laissez-faire approach, and those of Main Street favoured 
measures which would prevent currency instabilities and also protect them from domination.13 
And many banks existed for purposes beyond merely generating business and profit. A prime 
example is Maggie Lena Walker and the St Luke Penny Savings Bank, which was operated to 
support her local black community.14 Another is the National Bank of Deseret, which began 
operating largely to finance the Church of Latter Day Saints. 15  Many banks were also 
established to serve particular ethnic communities, such as the Bank of Italy in San Francisco.16 
Adopting a macro approach, then, will inevitably bury such differences, anomalies, and 
curious cases. 
 An effort will be made to acknowledge such diversity. Nevertheless, this thesis is 
interested in popular trends and commonalities, of which there are enough to tell this history. 
This is evidenced both by the fact that many people were participating within the public 
sphere and were expressing similar views. Regarding the general public, many often saw and 
described ‘banking’ in close to unitary terms. This is understandable, given that by the turn of 
the century different kinds of banks started to assume similar functions. Many commercial 
banks, for instance, began to operate savings departments and various savings banks began 
                                                
12 Herbert G. Stockwell, ‘State and National Examinations of Banks’ in Banking Problems (Philadelphia: American 
Academy of Politics and Social Science, 1910), 192-3. 
 
13 Richard T. McCulley, Banks and Politics During the Progressive Era: The Origins of the Federal Reserve System, 
1897-1913, second edition (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 90-8. 
 
14 See Colita Nichols Fairfax, M. Sabrina Jackson, and Jerome H. Schiele, ‘Maggie Lena Walker and African 
American Community Development’, Affilia, vol. 20, no. 21 (2005): 21-38. 
 
15 See Leonard J. Arrington, ‘Banking Enterprises in Utah, 1847-1880’, The Business History Review, vol. 29, no. 
4 (December, 1955): 323-4. 
 
16 See Marquis James and Bessie R. James, The Story of Bank of America: Biography of a Bank, 1954 (Washington, 
D.C.: Beard Books, 2002), 1-20. For more on various other ethnic banks, see Ivan Hubert Light, Ethnic Enterprise 
in America: Business and Welfare Among Chinese, Japanese and Blacks (Berkley: University of California Press, 
1973), 45-61. 
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engaging in commercial activities, or were at least connected to banks that were doing so.17 
Regarding banks, there was a national infrastructure that directly or indirectly connected 
banks of various kinds together. It is also the case that many thousands of bankers were 
connected through national organs like the American Bankers' Association (ABA) and through 
the likes of the Bankers' Magazine. There was, of course, disagreement and resistance to the 
trends detailed in this thesis, from people and from bankers, but this thesis is interested in first 
exploring and exposing those trends. Regardless of where one looks, one can find recurring 
patterns. As such, this thesis will look at those which were prevalent, widespread, and visible 
within the public sphere; at those that were hegemonic among the varying groups that 
expressed, produced, and consumed these ideas. 
 Chapter I reviews the literature pertaining to the topic. In order to demonstrate the 
originality of this thesis, it does three things. First, it seeks to explain how economic and 
business approaches that stress quantitative, institutional, and behavioural analyses are 
inadequate to explain the social and cultural phenomena of the era, particularly confidence. 
Second, it examines the immediately relevant materials pertaining to the thesis' contents. And 
third, it argues that the approaches associated with the ‘history of capitalism’ are the most 
appropriate to explain such phenomena. 
 Chapters II through V explore the various ways that confidence was affected. Chapter 
II outlines the ‘bipolar’ nature of banking during much of this era. It looks at how the use of 
banks was being encouraged and was increasing, on the one hand, and on the other how 
broader problems such as hoarding, runs, and panics were also prevalent, both in reality and 
in the popular imagination. Chapter III concerns the problem of individual banking 
malfeasances during the era in the form of embezzlement or other misappropriation scandals. 
Such scandals, commonly referred to as ‘wrecking’, were fairly common and could occur 
outside of panic times. It is argued that wrecking was well understood within the popular 
imagination, and that this was a significant factor contributing to the era's confidence issues. 
Chapter IV details how agrarians and progressives alike perceived many bankers to be 
colluding against ‘the People’ and their democratic institutions, and how this consequently 
                                                
17 See Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in American (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012), 116-7, and David M. Tucker, The Decline of Thrift in America: Our 
Cultural Shift from Saving to Spending (New York; Wesport; London: Praeger, 1991), 49-50. 
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‘othered’ bankers and likely made many people reluctant to deal with them. Chapter V 
documents how such issues culminated in popular reform movements, which in themselves 
reflect a lack of confidence. Such confidence issues were a huge factor driving the push to 
democratise banking through state or popular involvement. 
 Chapters VI through VIII explore how bankers responded to this crisis and broader 
representational conflict by turning to mediums that they believed would counter any and all 
negative perceptions. Chapter VI focuses upon how individual bankers acknowledged that 
there was a problem and how they subsequently turned to advertising in order to stimulate 
confidence, both by conveying their strength and community involvement. Chapter VII looks 
at the turn towards propaganda campaigns as a means to collectively advance particular 
interests. This largely looks at the campaign to implement a banker-controlled reserve 
association under the guise of a people’s movement and how such an association was in part to 
stimulate systemic confidence. Chapter VIII continues this exploration of propaganda 
campaigns by looking at how bankers sought to connect with ‘the people’ and win their 
confidence, largely entailing how they participated within and benefitted from the bond and 
savings drives of the First World War. The thesis then concludes with an Epilogue that 








The history of capitalism is not … just an account of transaction 
costs, economies of scale, and diminishing returns, but of social 
habits, cultural logics, and the conditions of system building as 
well. 
 
 - Michael Zakim and Gary Kornblith, 2012.1 
 
 Like contemporaries, scholars too have found and continue to find America's banking 
history fascinating. Historians have been exploring this history continuously since the early 
nineteenth century. Indeed, there has been a plethora of scholarly and popular literature 
published on the subject, and there is no shortage of articles and monographs. However, until 
recently, almost all things to do with money and banking have been addressed largely through 
the lenses of economic, business, and cliometric historiographical methods. Despite the 
popularity of the past's economic issues among contemporaries, analyses that address 
phenomena like mentalités, customs, and representations are scant. Relating to this thesis, the 
representation of popular confidence issues in banking have not been comprehensively and 
systemically examined, and nor has the relationship between public views on banking and the 
rise of formalised bank advertising and propaganda. Overall, although there is an abundance 
of literature covering America's economic history, there has been a scarcity of social and 
cultural analyses generally and almost a complete absence of studies covering the cultural 
representations of banking specifically. 
 Seeking to rectify this problem, social and cultural historians have recently started to 
explore areas once dominated by these fields, culminating in a new ‘history of capitalism’. It is 
within this field that this thesis situates itself. In order to demonstrate how previous 
approaches have overlooked key social and cultural aspects of Gilded Age and Progressive Era 
banking – or, more specifically, how banks were being viewed and represented over this period 
– and how the ‘history of capitalism’ can solve this, this literature review will do three things. 
                                                
1 Michael Zakim and Gary Kornblith, ‘Introduction’, in Zakim and Kornblith [eds.], Capitalism Takes Command: 
The Social Transformation of Nineteenth-Century America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 2. 
 I. 13 
 
First, it will demonstrate this problem by critiquing some of the authoritative works covering 
this period. Doing so will highlight how the quantitative and behavioural models they have 
relied upon are inadequate to explain the social and cultural phenomena of the era. Second, it 
will offer an outline of the literature relating to the topics of this thesis. And third, it will 
succinctly show how the ‘history of capitalism’ approach can not only fill gaps in the literature, 
but also challenge that literature and offer fresh perspectives concerning the relationships 
between people and their economies. 
 
* * * 
 
 Over the last two hundred years, scores of histories have been published which concern 
American banking. Academic, popular, and commissioned historians have all produced work 
covering myriad aspects of this history, and continue to do so. From James William Gilbart in 
the early nineteenth century, Horace White at the turn of the twentieth century, Fritz Redlich 
in the mid-twentieth century, and through to Murray Rothbard and Jill Hendrickson in the 
twenty-first century, historians have shown a persistent fascination with this topic.2 However, 
much like economic history generally, the history of banking has been dominated by business, 
economic, and cliometric approaches. This is true of the works listed above, and of classics 
within the field, such as Milton Friedman's and Anna Schwartz's A Monetary History of the 
United States, 1867-1960 (1963).3 They are compartmentalised and technical, and, again, social 
and cultural aspects have been neglected or treated peripherally. It is worth illustrating this 
point by examining several of the key works associated with this historiography. Doing so will 
demonstrate how the quantitative and behavioural models historians previously relied upon 
do not adequately capture and explain people's experiences with banking. 
 Although Friedman's and Schwartz's landmark A Monetary History addresses the 
                                                
2 James William Gilbart, The History of Banking in America (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green, and 
Longman, 1837); Horace White, Money and Banking Illustrated by American History (Chicago; London: Ginn 
and Company, 1896); Fritz Redlich, The Molding of American Banking: Men and Ideas, vol. 1 (New York: Hafner 
Publishing Co., 1947) and vol. 2 (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1951); Murray Rothbard, A History of Money 
and Banking in the United States: The Colonial Era to World War II (Auburn: Ludwig Von Mises Institute, 2002); 
Jill Hendrickson, Regulation and Instability in U.S. Commercial Banking: A History of Crises (Hampshire; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
 
3  Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963). 
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history of money between 1867 and 1960, it necessarily incorporates banking into its study. 
Moreover, pertinent to this thesis, it also offers commentary on some of the political 
movements of the era, such as the ‘politics of silver’ and the push for ‘bank reform’, and does 
cover ‘confidence’ issues.4  However, these are not detailed in much depth, and they are 
included only to facilitate the monetary analysis. Regarding the former, the free-silver 
movements dominate the authors’ social and political discussion of the 1873-1900 period 
(which they reduce to little more than the outcome of conspiratorial thinking), and the 
analysis of the reform movement of the 1900-1913 period focuses largely upon the formal 
proposals debated within banking circles and within Congress. 5  Regarding the latter, 
‘confidence’ is measured entirely by figures, and not in a qualitative way. For instance, looking 
at the onset of the 1893 depression, Friedman and Schwartz state that ‘[t]here had been no 
distrust of the banks up to this time’. They arrive at this conclusion by comparing the deposit-
to-cash ratio of 1893 to the years preceding it.6 Their observation may be true in a very limited 
sense, in that those that were utilising banks continued to do so until they sought to withdraw 
their funds. However, as we shall see, this overlooks the general lack of confidence represented 
by the enormous number of people avoiding banks altogether. It also ignores the countless 
artefacts that were critical of banks before, during, and after this period. 
 Douglas Diamond's and Philip Dybvig's influential 1983 article, ‘Bank Runs, Deposit 
Insurance, and Liquidity’, has sought to explain bank runs and panics through the notion of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. They argue that banks have, by their nature as financial intermediaries, 
a liquidity imbalance. As they invest much of the deposits that they receive in financial assets 
that are difficult to immediately liquidate, it is thus difficult or impossible for them to repay 
all or even most of their deposit obligations if demanded simultaneously. Should depositors 
seek to do so by running on their bank in the belief that its failure is imminent (which may be 
triggered merely by the belief that a run is occurring or is about to), then this can have the 
tragically ironic consequence of actually harming and even destroying the bank by forcing 
liquidation and hence causing insolvency. In such a scenario, depositors actually compete with 
                                                
4 Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, 15-188. 
 
5 For the ‘politics of silver’, see Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History 113-9, esp. 114; for bank reform, see 
135-88.  
 
6 Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, 108. 
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each other in order to rescue their funds, whereas if they were to avoid such behaviour then 
they would greatly reduce the risk of loss. Government mandated deposit insurance is, they 
argue, a solution, as by guaranteeing depositors that their funds are secured their incentive to 
rescue them is eliminated.7 Rather than seeing people themselves as their own worst enemies, 
however, far more was occurring during this era than this approach allows for. Runs and panics 
could certainly compound problems, but we should not see them to be the the only cause of 
the era's banking problems. Indeed, as this thesis seeks to demonstrate, they were very often 
effects instead of causes in themselves. 
 Charles Calomiris' and Gary Gorton's article, ‘The Origins of Banking Panics’ (1991), 
offers an alternative to this approach, and has sought to account for runs and panics by 
developing on the idea of ‘asymmetrical information’. They posit that people responded to 
negative financial news, such as an ‘asset shock’ (a sudden collapse of an asset's market value), 
by seeking to rescue their deposits regardless of whether their banks were actually jeopardised. 
This was because they lacked information about the actual liquidity or solvency of their banks.8 
Although both ideas are useful to the extent that they may somewhat explain the motives of 
those that did run on their banks, this does not tell us much about why they may have been 
so eager and motivated to run on them in the very first place. Put another way, the question 
remains as to why many doubted the capacity of their banks to withstand challenging 
conditions. This suggests that many people saw them as essentially fickle institutions and that 
their trust was tenuous to begin with. Much more was operating at a cultural level which 
influenced how people thought about and approached banking.9 
 More recently, Carlos D. Ramirez has sought to expand upon historical confidence 
issues. Unlike the aforementioned scholars, who have considered confidence in a very limited 
manner and as something akin to a behavioural reflex with short-term effects, Ramirez has 
                                                
7 Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig, ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity’, The Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 91, no. 3 (1983): 401-19, and Diamond, ‘Banks and Liquidity Creation: A Simple 
Exposition of the Diamond-Dybvig Model’, Economic Quarterly, vol. 93, no. 2 (2007): 189-200. 
 
8 Charles W. Calomiris and Gary Gorton, ‘The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation’ in 
R. Glenn Hubbard [ed.], Financial Markets and Financial Crises (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 
109-74. 
 
9 George Kaufman also offers a fairly detailed account of bank runs, and has offered a brief history of them. 
However, like Calomiris and Gorton, he does not explore the possibility of underlying predispositions and their 
origins. See George G. Kaufman, ‘The Truth About Bank Runs’ in Catherine England and Thomas Huertas [Eds.], 
The Financial Services Revolution: Policy Directions for the Future (Norwell: The Cato Institute, 1988), 9-40. 
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shown that it is vastly more complex and extends beyond immediate events. Using the panic 
of 1893 as a case study, he argues that ‘distrust in the banking system increases phenomenally 
after banking crises’ and remains ‘high for an extended period of time’.10 This is an innovative 
and useful observation. Nevertheless, Ramirez focuses upon those that ‘lose trust’ in response 
to a panic (which he measures by growth rates and the statistical proliferation of newspaper 
articles mentioning money hoarding) and says nothing about pre-existing confidence issues 
nor about those that never trusted banks in the first place.11 Further, the focus is upon 1893 
and is limited to panics. Panics certainly intensified distrust, but this was, as this thesis seeks 
to demonstrate, one of a range of factors (albeit a major one) which contributed to the era's 
trust issues. 
 Elmus Wicker has noted in his concise history of Gilded Age banking panics that ‘[f]or 
the most part the general public had little or no direct experience of bank runs and bank 
failures. And what they knew, they learned from local newspaper sources’.12 In one way, this 
is very true - as we shall see, the vast majority of Americans did not have a bank account during 
this period. Even then, Wicker's statement still requires extensive exploration. Although runs 
and failures may have not have been a part of people's direct experiences, what do we make of 
the prevalence of cultural artefacts pertaining to banking issues? There does indeed appear to 
have been a great fascination with runs and failures even if most people were actually removed 
from their immediate consequences. Also, Wicker bases this conclusion upon times of panic.13 
It is true that such times observed more problems, but these problems were not exclusive to 
them. Runs and failures were experienced across the country throughout this entire period. 
Furthermore, while Wicker demonstrates that suspension and failure rates were statistically 
low, this reveals nothing about incidences of runs which turned out to be non-harmful, or 
when banks instated lengthy notification periods for withdrawals, thus thwarting runs. Finally, 
while knowledge may have been indirect, this does not tell us much about how and why this 
affected people. And for those that did utilise banks, it seems that the actual experiences of 
                                                
10 Carlos D. Ramirez, ‘Bank Fragility, “Money Under the Mattress”, and Long-Run Growth: US Evidence from 
the 'Perfect' Panic of 1893’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 33 (2009): 2193. 
 
11 Ramirez, ‘Bank Fragility’, 2193. 
 
12 Elmus Wicker, Banking Panics of the Gilded Age (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2000), 7. 
 
13 Wicker, Banking Panics of the Gilded Age. 
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runs and failures were never too far from home. 
 Rothbard has acknowledged the plethora of cultural materials pertaining to banks. Still, 
this is only briefly mentioned, and he dismisses their significance.14 According to Rothbard, 
religious and ethnic backgrounds explain people's political behaviour during this era, rather 
than their lived economic experiences. This latter view, he charges, is one held only by 
‘Marxists and other economic determinists’. Thus, Rothbard denies that actual, material 
experience may have contributed to the views, ideas, and debates of the era.15 Of all the 
arguments assessed here, this is the most unacceptable. It may certainly be true that political 
views and participation were coloured and informed by cultural backgrounds, but this does 
not mean that people were totally incapable of reacting to the immediate conditions that they 
faced. And although people may have been divided over what remedies were appropriate – 
silver or gold, deposit guarantees or postal savings banks – banking issues were on the agenda 
and resonated widely. By dismissing the capacity of people to acknowledge their problems, 
Rothbard demonstrates contempt for the intelligence of ordinary people, seeing them as 
passive and submissive dupes. He also erects a false-dichotomy by asserting that behaviour is 
either determined by ideology or by materiality. This overlooks the possibility that both may 
have been factors, and denies that independent rationality may have also been involved.   
 Hendrickson's history of commercial banking regulation and instability relies upon a 
rigid behavioural model to explain why people have and continue to instate regulatory 
measures which, Hendrickson argues, actually generate more harm than good. This model is 
dubbed the ‘Psychological Attraction Theory of Financial Regulation’, which attributes 
regulation to emotional manipulation, negativity bias, scapegoating, egalitarianism, and 
overconfidence. People, according to this view, are motivated by their prejudices and emotions 
into making decisions adverse to their material interests or at least actual financial realities.16 
In this way, Hendrickson's argument is ideologically motivated, adhering to the Austrian 
school's strand of radical anti-interventionism, and is much like Rothbard's, thus incurring the 
same problems. 17  Rather than people being totally blind to the realities that they faced, 
                                                
14 Rothbard, Money and Banking, 171. 
 
15 Rothbard, Money and Banking, 171-5 (quote from 171). 
 
16 Hendrickson, Regulation and Instability, 13-5. For her analysis on the ‘National Banking Era’, see 74-114. 
 
17 Hendrickson acknowledges that she adheres to an ‘Austrian perspective’, seeing it as a ‘more realistic approach 
to markets’. Hendrickson, Regulation and Instability, 18-20. 
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however, it seems more likely that people started to appreciate that without adequate state-
intervention within the banking sector, everyone was potentially susceptible to banking 
problems directly or indirectly, even if only in theory. Like all the examples examined here, 
Regulation and Instability demonstrates how crude economic analyses, incorporating 
quantitative and behavioural methodologies, are inadequate to explain political, social, and 
cultural phenomena, particularly relating to Gilded Age and Progressive Era banking. 
Finally, the historiography on mutual savings banks generally has been better at ex-
ploring social and cultural aspects, particularly regarding philanthropy and thrift. However, 
historians from Emerson Willard Keyes in the nineteenth century to Daniel Wadhwani in the 
twenty-first century have not sufficiently explored how they relate to popular confidence is-
sues and have tended to avoid connecting these banks to the broader history of American 
banking. 18  In fact, they have sought to demonstrate that patrons exhibited a high degree of 
confidence in these institutions and that mutual savings banks were essentially different to 
commercial and other profit-oriented banks, such as stock-savings banks. Put simply, they are 
considered exceptional. This thesis does not seek to deny that these banks were normally held 
in high esteem by their patrons. They were safer and they held just under half of the nation’s 
saving accounts by 1910.19 However, this thesis still includes them as they were not totally 
immune to confidence issues. As we shall see, it was not impossible for them to fail or to be 
subject to runs. Franklin Sherman noted in his 1934 history of these banks that savings bank 
depositors could be particularly flighty, as ‘the failure of a bank, to the minds of many, brought 
no distinction between this bank and that’.20 As we shall see, some reformers also considered 
them to be ‘aristocratic’. Louis Brandeis even claimed that they were feeding the ‘money trust’, 
as they could be directed by elite ‘capitalists’ or financiers.21 Thus, while it is important to 
                                                
 
18 See Emerson Willard Keyes, A History of Savings Banks in the United States from Their Inception in 1816 
Down to 1874 (New York: B. Rhodes, 1876); William Henry Kniffen, The Savings Bank and its Practical Work 
(New York: The Bankers Publishing Co., 1912); Franklin H. Ornstein, Savings Banking: An Industry in Change 
(Reston: Reston Publishing Co., 1985); Franklin J. Sherman, Modern Story of Mutual Savings Banks: A Narrative 
of their Growth and Development (New York: J. J. Little Ives and Company, 1934); Daniel Wadhwani, ‘Protecting 
Small Savers: The Political Economy of Economic Security’, Journal of Policy History, vol. 18 (2006): 126-45; and 
Wadhwani, ‘Citizen Savers: Family Economy, Financial Institutions, and Public Policy in the Northeastern 
United States’, Enterprise and Society, vol. 5 (December, 2004): 617-24. 
 
19 See Comptroller of the Currency, 1913 Annual Report, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1914), 65-7. 
 
20 Sherman, Modern Story of Mutual Savings Banks, 109-10. 
 
21 Louis Brandeis, Other People's Money: And How the Bankers Use It (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 
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highlight that they may have generally inspired greater confidence than their commercial 
counterparts, it remains that popular confidence issues extended to them.  
Taken together, banking historians have not comprehensively explored popular confi-
dence issues during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. This is largely because these historians 
have approached ‘confidence’ through quantitative or behavioural analyses, both of which 
limit how we can see such a phenomenon. Historians of mutual savings banks do tend to in-
corporate qualitative analysis, though they also tend to isolate their subject matter from the 
broader history of banking during this period. Either way, our understanding of popular con-
fidence issues in American banking remains fractured, incomplete, and underdeveloped. 
 
* * * 
 
 Beyond these works, it is true that historians have explored public attitudes towards 
banks, and have looked at the various meanings and functions of cultural artefacts associated 
with banking. Moreover, despite the neglect of and even contempt for popular views shown 
by economic historians, many others have sought to at least acknowledge the views of common 
people and society at large. However, these typically focus upon either a particular group of 
bankers (especially elite Wall Street financiers),22 particular individual bankers (such as J. P. 
Morgan),23 a particular segment of the population (like agrarians),24 or are addressed within 
broader narratives encompassing American society as a whole (typically historical surveys).25 
                                                
1914), 216-23. 
 
22 See, for instance, Steve Fraser, Everyman a Speculator: A History of Wall Street in American Life (New York: 
Harper Collins, 2005) and Charles R. Geisst, Wall Street: A History (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997). 
 
23 See Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance 
(New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990); Robert Glass Clenland and Frank B. Putnam, Isias W. Hellman 
and the Farmers and Merchants Bank (San Marino: The Huntington Library, 1965); June Breton Fisher, When 
Money Was in Fashion: Henry Goldman, Goldman Sachs, and the Founding of Wall Street (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010); and Susie J. Pak, Gentlemen Bankers: The World of J. P. Morgan (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2013). 
 
24 See Norman Pollack, ‘Introduction’ in Norman Pollack [ed.], The Populist Mind (Indianapolis and New York: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1967), xix-xlviii; Walter T. K. Nugent, The Tolerant Populists: Kansas 
Populism and Nativism (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1963); Charles Postel, The Populist 
Vision (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and James Edward Wright, The Politics of Populism: Dissent in 
Colorado (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1974). 
 
25 See, for example, Richard Hoftstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R. (New York: Vintage Books, 
1955); Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920 (New York: Harper, 2009), 
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Not only does this thesis seek to conjoin these strands, it also aims to focus on commonly 
overlooked elements, primarily how they relate to the theme of confidence, and also how they 
relate to the ideological and representational conflict occurring within the public sphere. 
 Concerning embezzlement or ‘wrecking’ scandals, despite their prevalence, historians 
have largely overlooked them, and have not analysed their cultural resonance in any great 
detail, if at all. It is true that scholars have examined individual scandals of this era, including 
several that are featured within this thesis. Joel A. Tarr has examined J. R. Walsh of Chicago, 
arguing that his accepting of public funds from state officials was the result of a faulty system, 
not individual vice.26 Tarr has also succinctly examined former Senator William Lorimer's brief 
and disastrous foray into banking which culminated in bank failures and a protracted court 
case.27 Wrecker Paul Stensland is briefly addressed within Penny Duis' Challenging Chicago.28 
More recently, Mitchell Zuckoff has mentioned Sarah E. Howe of the Ladies' Deposit of Boston 
as a pioneering Ponzi schemer preceding Charles Ponzi.29 Furthermore, Donald R. Cressey's 
1953 sociological study has explored the phenomenon of embezzlement and offers useful 
insights into the motivations of such criminals.30 It remains, however, that the literature is 
scattered and a broader, culturally focused analysis of Gilded Age and Progressive Era bank 
embezzlers has yet to be undertaken. Addressing ‘wreckers’ is vital in order to gage a deeper 
understanding of public fears and attitudes. 
The rural disdain of national bankers and Wall Street financiers has possibly been one 
of the most extensively covered aspects of the Gilded Age's anti-banking sentiment. Much the 
same can be said for the critique of high finance and the ‘money trust’ during the Progressive 
                                                
51-91; Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919, second edition (New York: W. 
W. Norton and Company, 2008), 272-76; Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society 
in the Gilded Age, second edition (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 78-86; and Robert H. Wiebe, The Search 
for Order, 1877-1920 (London; Melbourne: Macmillan, 1967) 97-103. 
 
26 Joel A. Tarr, ‘J. R. Walsh of Chicago: A Case Study in Banking and Politics, 1881-1905’, The Business History 
Review, vol. 40 (1966): 451-66.  
 
27 Tarr, A Study in Boss Politics: William Lorimer of Chicago (Urbana; Chicago; London: University of Illinois 
Press, 1971), 309-14. 
 
28 Perry Duis, Challenging Chicago: Coping With Everyday Life, 1837-1920 (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 
1998), 298-9. 
 
29 Michael Zuckoff, Ponzi's Scheme: The True Story of a Financial Legend (New York: Random House, 2006), 
104-5. 
 
30 Donald R. Cressey, Other People's Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1953). Cressey's bibliography has also been tremendously useful. See 159-66. 
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Era. Both have received wide attention, with Richard Hoftstadter's account of both remaining 
one of the most famous. His Age of Reform appeared sixty years ago, thus offering a glimpse 
of how long historians have been familiar with this material. Nevertheless, these histories have 
not been connected to the broader trust issues of the period and are generally treated in 
isolation.31 This thesis will seek to demonstrate how both relate to the confidence theme by 
showing how in both instances critics ‘othered’ bankers by creating a conceptual distance 
between ‘the people’ and bankers. Using such an approach sheds further light upon how 
suspicion was reflected and reinforced, and displays yet another blow to the public image of 
banks and bankers.  
 Regarding banking reform, much of the scholarship has focussed upon the events 
primarily from 1890 to 1913 that culminated in the creation of the Federal Reserve System.32 
This is perfectly understandable, given the magnitude and importance of the Federal Reserve 
within America's economic history. Indeed, it is true that the ‘Fed’ cannot be excluded from 
any history concerning Progressive Era banking, including this one. Perhaps the most notable 
and significant histories published over the past thirty years concerning the origins of the Fed 
have come from James Livingston, Richard McCulley, J. Lawrence Broz, and Elmus Wicker.33 
Although all offer their own unique interpretations, what they have in common is that they 
focus almost exclusively upon the actions of bankers and capitalists themselves. What this 
approach lacks is an examination into what was happening more broadly within the public 
sphere and within popular politics. In other words, such an approach neglects the social and 
                                                
31 See Hoftstadter, The Age of Reform; Postel, The Populist Vision; Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social 
and Political History of American Finance, 1865-1879 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), and 
Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics of Finance in America 
(Cambridge: The University of Cambridge Press, 1997).  
 
32 Varying time spans have been offered by scholars. This span has been selected as it appears to be the most 
expansive, which should allow for most variations to fall somewhere in between. It comes from James Livingston's 
account. James Livingston, Origins of the Federal Reserve System: Money, Class, and Corporate Capitalism (Ithaca; 
London: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
 
33  Livingston, Origins of the Federal Reserve System; Richard T. McCulley, Banks and Politics During the 
Progressive Era: The Origins of the Federal Reserve System, 1897-1913, second edition (Oxon: Routledge, 2012); 
J. Lawrence Broz, The International Origins of the Federal Reserve System (Ithaca; London: The University of 
Cornell Press, 1997); and Elmus Wicker, The Great Debate on Banking Reform: Nelson Aldrich and the Origins 
of the Fed (Ohio: The Ohio State University, 2005). One could also add Allan Metzler's History of the Federal 
Reserve to this list as it does cover the early years of the Fed. However, it does not really explore its origins. See 
Allan H. Metzler, History of the Federal Reserve, Volume 1: 1913-1951 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2003), 1-135. 
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cultural phenomena that were occurring simultaneously. It is true, of course, that politics and 
culture are not all together neglected within these histories. For instance, McCulley's focus is 
upon political and legislative developments, and the competing political, commercial, and 
financial parties behind them, while Livingston's focus incorporates the way in which culture 
was transformed by elite financiers in order to usher in corporate capitalism.34 Again, however, 
bankers are at the forefront of their histories, and, as such, we do not get a sense of what the 
broader social and cultural meanings, ideologies, and ramifications of banking reform may 
have been. 
 Additionally, myriad other reform proposals and enactments have been explored. The 
history of the Postal-Savings system, for instance, has received attention. Sheldon Garon, 
James Grant, McCulley, and Donald Schewe have all covered the system's history to varying 
extents, ranging from extensive to brief coverage.35 All are useful in that they provide a general 
sketch of the socio-economic conditions influencing its creation in 1911. They also 
demonstrate that there is consensus that a general distrust of banking institutions held by 
working people and immigrants was a large factor in this process.36 These works, however, to 
either treat their subjects largely in isolation, or very briefly. As a result, they are disparate, 
meaning that they are treated as subjects divorced from the broader context, or are appended 
or even buried within larger texts which seek to stress other content and points. By instead 
unifying some of these major reforms and enactments within a single analysis, this should 
allow for a more detailed and comprehensive examination of what they meant overall, 
including socially, culturally, politically, and economically. Doing so will illuminate how 
banking reform relates to the issue of popular confidence. 
 This thesis is not the first to observe the connections between the artefacts created by 
or for banks and popular perceptions of the era. Specifically concerning the representations 
from bankers themselves, several works have been published that explore this relationship. 
                                                
34 McCulley, Banks and Politics; Livingston, Origins of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
35 Sheldon Garon, Beyond Our Means: Why America Spends While the World Saves (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 110-5; James Grant, Money of the Mind: Borrowing and Lending in America from the 
Civil War to Michael Milken (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1992), 87-91; McCulley, Banks and Politics During 
the Progressive Era, 162-6; and Donald Bruce Schewe, ‘A History of the Postal Savings System in America, 1910-
1970’ (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1971), 1-94. 
 
36 See, for instance, Grant, Money of the Mind, 87, and Schewe, ‘A History of the Postal Savings System’, 19-21. 
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Architecture, for instance, has been covered by scholars. Charles Belfoure has succinctly noted 
that following the panics of 1893, bankers became conscious that ‘one way to instill [sic] 
confidence again was through the physical appearance of the bank itself’. 37  Additionally, 
Lynne Pierson Doti and Larry Schweikart have argued that between 1849 and 1893 – the 
frontier period – Western bankers ‘developed their own system for winning the confidence of 
potential depositors’, largely entailing the reliance upon owner reputability and on ‘certain 
architectural features of the bank building’, including their vaults.38 According to Doti and 
Schweikart, this was to convey the capacity of banks to resist external threats, such as burglary 
and fire.39 They overlook the possibility that this may have been to disassociate themselves 
from fraudulent ‘wildcat’ banks and the panics and failures characteristic of the period. 
 Likewise, historical bank advertising has been examined. Although the authoritative 
histories on early advertising tend to be silent on banks, such as Jackson Lears' Fables of 
Abundance (1994) and Pamela Walker Laird's Advertising Progress (1998), which focus 
instead on national advertising campaigns for mass-marketed consumer goods, there have been 
works which either touch upon the subject or seek to explore it in depth. 40 Benjamin J. 
Klebaner very briefly mentions the rise of bank advertising in his survey of commercial 
banking, devoting three short paragraphs to the subject which reveal no more than the fact 
that bankers began advertising in the early 1900s.41 Two other authors have sought to engage 
the topic in greater detail: Gurden Edwards and Richard Germain. 
 In the wake of the Great Depression of the 1930s, Edwards, then ‘director of public 
relations’ for the American Bankers’ Association (ABA), assessed the state of bank advertising 
and public relations in his 1937 article, ‘Banking and Public Opinion’. Edwards claimed that 
advertising and publicity emerged at the turn of the century to ‘create favorable impressions 
                                                
37 Charles Belfoure, Monuments to Money: The Architecture of American Banks (Jefferson; London: McFarland 
and Company, inc. Publishers, 2005), 127. Other works exist which feature bank architecture. See Parnassus 
Foundation and the Museum of Fine Arts, Money Matters: A Critical Look at Bank Architecture (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1990), and Edwin Heathcote, Bank Builders (New York: Wiley-Academy, 2000). 
 
38 Lynne Pierson Doti and Larry Schweikart, Banking in the American West: From the Gold Rush to Deregulation 
(Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 20-48, esp. 20 and 37-9. 
 
39 Doti and Schweikart, Banking in the American West, 39-40 and 44-5. 
 
40  Pamela Walker Laird, Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing 
(Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), and Jackson Lears, Fables of Abundances: A Cultural 
History of Advertising in America (New York: Basic Books, 1994). 
 
41 Benjamin J. Klebaner, American Commercial Banking: A History (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 104. 
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by the use of words’ in response to common anti-banking prejudices and an ‘unfortunate’ 
history of banking within the United States.42 More recently, Germain, a marketing scholar, 
has been the leading authority on historical, pre-1930s bank marketing. Germain's 1996 
monograph, Dollars Through the Doors, remains the seminal history on the topic. In it, he 
argues that by the 1930s banks had transformed from ‘passive business acceptors to aggressive 
business seekers’, or, in other words, from non-marketing to marketing businesses.43 As such, 
his analysis is geared towards proving this proposition, incorporating to this end the emergence 
of advertising, promotions, market-segmentation, and internal staff welfare measures intended 
to improve service. Importantly, he highlights that in their bid to acquire business, bankers 
sought to project ‘confidence’ via ‘architecture, … tangibles in promotions, … confidence 
themes in promotions and slogans, and … in how banks handled runs’. 44  Concerning 
‘confidence themes’, he highlights that ‘growth, director and management integrity, size, and 
longevity’ were frequently emphasised to convey strength.45 Furthermore, he briefly connects 
the usage of such ‘themes’ to the turbulent financial structure, stating that the ‘financial panics 
that swept the nation struck at the heart of bankers' ability to foster institutional confidence’.46 
It is clear, then, that those who have looked at this history can see a clear connection between 
bank imagery and public opinion. Both works are also tremendously valuable and will be 
borrowed from throughout Chapter VI. 
 Nevertheless, Edwards' ‘Banking and Public Opinion’ is a specialist, professional article 
intended for advertising and public relations practitioners, and Germain's account is a business 
history that seeks only to establish basic institutional developments. Edwards' article attempts 
to advise ways for banks and advertisers to overcome the problems they faced at the time of 
publication, which was almost 80 years ago. Historical background is offered only to insist that 
                                                
42 Gurden Edwards, ‘Banking and Public Opinion’, The Public Opinion Journal Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 2 (April, 
1937): 5-26, esp. 5-15 and 18-23. 
 
43 Richard N. Germain, Dollars Through the Doors: A Pre-1930 History of Bank Marketing in America (Westport; 
London: Greenwood Press, 1996), 1. Germain also has an article specifically addressing market segmentation, 
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44 Germain, Dollars Through the Doors, 11-18, esp. 11. 
 
45 Germain, Dollars Through the Doors, 14-6. 
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bankers convey their appreciation for ‘economic forces and social responsibilities’.47 Germain’s 
history prioritises how bank advertising developed over why it developed. In effect, while 
social, political, and cultural elements may be present within both, these aspects are not at the 
forefront of their analyses, and they are thus treated peripherally and briefly. They may 
mention the likes of confidence, anxiety, political movements, and the press, but these authors 
are not primarily concerned with such phenomena. Consequently, the significance of the 
broader context is understated, which in turn downplays the significance of representational, 
attitudinal, and emotional phenomena. It is only by connecting popular distrust and derision 
with the rise of bank advertising, however, that we can actually appreciate and understand 
‘confidence’. Moreover, by failing to adequately provide for what have been considered 
extrinsic elements at best, these works have overlooked intrinsic features of their source 
materials. Approaching such sources from a social and cultural perspective, rather than only 
an economic and business perspective, demonstrates that there is much more to be gleaned 
from them. This subsequently casts more light upon the very meaning and purpose of 
confidence themes, such as conveying reliability and civic mindfulness. So although the 
previous literature remains useful, it leaves significant gaps which that must be filled via a 
social and cultural analysis. 
 Similarly, those addressing the history of business propaganda have overlooked 
banking. General histories of public relations, such as Scott Cutlip’s The Unseen Power (1994), 
Roland Marchand's Creating the Corporate Soul (1998) and Stuart Ewen's PR! (1996), are 
tremendously useful, and provide general accounts of the major events, politics, and figures 
involved in the rise of this profession and practice.48 Bankers, however, are largely if not 
wholly absent from their analyses. Bank related histories, on the other hand, have touched 
upon the topic. Wilbert Schneider's 1956 history of the American Bankers’ Association, for 
instance, features a section on ‘Public Relations and Public Education’. However, after noting 
that the ABA established a Committee on Education in 1897 and subsequently released a 
pamphlet, Schneider states that the organisation lost ‘interest in its public relations job’ after 
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1899 and did ‘little else in promoting better public relations until 1919’.49 This may be true 
superficially, in that the ABA lacked a formal department over this time, but this ignores the 
considerable discussion occurring informally within the organisation and also fails to consider 
its connections with major propaganda campaigns, such as those conducted by the Citizens' 
League for Sound Banking Reform and the Liberty Loan and War Savings committees. And 
although Schneider is focussing on the ABA, this could give the impression that bankers 
generally were oblivious to their public image, which, as this thesis shows, was certainly not 
the case. Finally, other historians, such as Julia Ott and Alan Axelrod, have addressed these 
campaigns, but have tended to do so either by exploring how they connect to other develops, 
or by examining them exclusively in and of themselves. These historians have explored both 
the Citizens' League and the Liberty Loan and War Savings campaigns, though focus on them 
without adequately situating them within the context of a broader confidence issue or without 
considering that they were connected to the rise of a developing impression management 
mentality.50 This thesis will thus connect such seemingly disparate histories. 
 Connecting these histories allows for an investigation into the existence of a general 
fear of and anger towards banks and bankers, and what banks and bankers did in response.  
Furthermore, this will demonstrate how the theme of confidence relates to banking over this 
period. Without exploring both public opinion and banking artefacts together, the notion of 
an ideological and representational conflict collapses and the representations from bankers 
lose a significant part of their meaning. Bankers sought to inspire confidence for a reason, and 
in order to explore this reason, a qualitative approach is necessary. This thus entails applying 
methods associated with social and cultural history to economic topics. 
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* * * 
 
 Around twenty years ago, shortly following the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
‘triumph’ of liberal-capitalism, various cultural theorists began to draw new connections 
between culture and economics.51 More recently, over the past ten years, they have been 
attempting to dismantle the notion that they are entirely distinct fields or ‘spheres’, and have 
instead charged that considerable overlap occurs between them.  Jackson Lears and Jens Van 
Scherpenberg, for instance, have stated that the ‘aesthetic, moral, emotional, and spiritual 
aspects of human experience’ are ‘left out of most economic theory, even though few cultural 
values or artifacts [sic] are insulated from the economics of the market’. Although this may 
suggest that the ‘market’ is a distinct entity which can and does usurp culture, it nevertheless 
demonstrates a dissatisfaction with ‘disciplinary walls’ and is an attempt to create a dialogue 
between the fields. 52  Others have gone further, and argue that economics should be 
subordinated or totally fused to culture; that it is erroneous to split them in the first place. This 
is the view of the editors of the Blackwell Cultural Economy Reader. They declare that they 
seek ‘to put back that which should have never been taken out’ and that ‘this is no easy task 
because prevalent social description has come to take for granted that there are separate 
spheres of activity called culture and economy’. Subsequently, they take it is as their mission 
to challenge ‘this settlement by showing how the pursuit of prosperity is a hybrid process of 
aggregation and ordering that cannot be reduced to either of these terms and, as such, requires 
the use of a unitary term such as cultural economy’.53 Whether one adopts the view that they 
are one and the same is not important here. What is important is the acknowledgement that a 
fundamental revaluation and revision of economics is occurring. Whatever way one views the 
relationship between the two, there is no denying that there is a relationship. Culture can no 
longer be excluded from economic analyses, nor economics from culture. 
                                                
51 Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift estimate in their 2004 edited volume, The Blackwell Cultural Economy Reader, 
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 This thinking has not escaped historians. Though social and cultural historians have 
prioritised important topics like race, gender, sexuality, and class over the past several 
decades,54 various Americanists have more recently started to explore a range of superficially 
dry economic subjects and institutions, from life insurance to corporate securities.55 Ultimately, 
topics once ignored and possibly considered unfavourable are being vigorously engaged. The 
practices of orthodox economic historians themselves are now being challenged, with crude 
quantitative and retrospectively imposed behavioural models being seen as inadequate to 
explain the social and cultural impacts that economic institutions have had upon people, and 
vice versa. This new approach is allowing historians to ask questions and explore phenomena 
which, although once would have been considered within the economic domain, would not 
and could not be addressed by economists. The ‘history of capitalism’ approach has the capacity 
to cast new light upon topics and notions once considered highly specialised, like the ‘free 
market’ or ‘consumer behaviour’. 
Historians working within this field have addressed a number of topics and themes. 
Relating to this thesis, banking has been explored, and so too has confidence. Various scholars 
interested in the history of capitalism have demonstrated that nineteenth and early twentieth 
century business people, from hucksters to high-financiers, depended upon interpersonal 
confidence. This was true within closed business circles where all parties knew one another, 
though in a vastly expanding, urbanising, and industrialising nation, social anonymity 
increased rapidly, which thus also normalised transactions with strangers. In either case, 
having confidence that others could and would deliver on their promises was essential for 
transacting business. As Rowena Olegario has observed, ‘trust was a functional component of 
the entire national economy’.56 Based upon this premise, scholars have explored various ways 
                                                
54  Some notable examples of works dealing with the Gilded Age, Progressive Era, or both include George 
Chauncy’s Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940 (New 
York: Basic Books, 1995), Noralee Frankel’s and Nancy S. Dye’s edited volume, Gender, Class, Race, and Reform 
in the Progressive Era (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1991), Matthew Guterl’s The Color of Race 
in America, 1900-1940 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), Matthew Jacobson’s Barbarian 
Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign People at Home and Abroad, 1879-1917 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2001), and Jean Matthews’ The Rise of the New Woman: The Women’s Movement in America, 1875-1930 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003). 
 
55 For life insurance, see Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in 
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that confidence was manifested, particularly in regards to finance. David Zimmerman, Scott 
Sandage, and Jonathan Levy have explored confidence issues on structural and individual 
levels.57 Olegario and Susie Pak have detailed the importance of confidence to business people 
in their transactions with clients and between themselves.58 Additionally, Julia Ott has charted 
how popular suspicions towards high finance and the stock market were allayed and how an 
‘investors' democracy’ – mass participation within the stock market – subsequently emerged.59 
Further, other historians have keenly explored the Melvillean ‘confidence man’ and the range 
of forms ‘he’ would take.60 Such a figure would create the illusion of trustworthiness to then 
cheat others out of their valuables. Stephen Mihm's history of antebellum banknote 
counterfeiting, for instance, explores how managing impressions was utilised by not only 
criminal counterfeiters but also ‘legitimate’ bankers. It was not unusual for the latter to fleece 
their customers through high-risk investments or outright embezzlement. Passing counterfeit 
notes rested upon confidence as much as acquiring other people’s valuables did.61  Taken 
together, scholars have been busy revealing how confidence was an indispensable requirement 
for commercial and fiscal exchange, whether legitimate or fraudulent. 
 Many American historians, then, have been actively engaging with economic subjects, 
and have acknowledged that they already possess powerful analytic tools to explore the 
prevailing thoughts, feelings, and behaviours which govern economics. Specifically, 
capitalism's various forms and meanings are being explored, and underlying mythologies are 
being unpacked. Furthermore, how the likes of class, gender, and race have intersected and 
coalesced with the economy are being addressed. Overall, instead of capitalism being taken as 
a static and fixed way of life as natural as tidal movements and the sun rising, it is viewed as a 
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largely constructed and thus malleable form of economic organisation. 62  As Zakim and 
Kornblith highlight, by examining ‘capitalism’ as an ‘ism’ is to acknowledge that it is something 
to be observed and that it is a human invention.63 
 
* * * 
  
 Although much has been said on banking, then, there remains considerable room left 
to explore. This is especially so given that social and cultural approaches have previously been 
neglected by economic, business, and cliometric historians. The historiography has been 
dominated by these fields which have typically relied upon very fixed and narrow approaches, 
including crude quantitative and behavioural models. Consequently, social and cultural 
phenomena have been treated either peripherally or dismissed outright and rendered 
insignificant. Furthermore, while there exist many histories on the likes of Wall Street and its 
critics, and on banking reform movements, they have been disjointed and have not been 
explored in connection to the ideological and representational conflict occurring between the 
American public and bankers occurring within the public sphere. This thesis seeks to unify 
these strands in order to explore that conflict, and to do so will adopt the ‘history of capitalism’ 
method of reconciling economics and culture. Ultimately, it aims to capture the popular 
fascination with banks and banking problems, and so too the reactions from bankers. 
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Steel Vaults and ‘Old Stockings, Cracked Teapots, Parlor Clocks [and] 
Family Bibles’: 
 
Capturing the Bipolar Nature of Confidence during the ‘National Banking Era’ 
 
Just put it away in the Bank, John, To keep for a rainy day, They'll loan it on 
Mortgages safe, John, And five per cent int'rest pay. … But what if the safe 
bank should break, love, Then where would our money be? I don't like the 
way times are now, love, They're not as they ought to be. 
 
- Theo D. C. Miller and H. P. Danks, What if the Bank Should Break, 1878.1 
 
Henry Buchtel, Governor of Colorado, was convinced that the American people exhibited an 
abiding faith in the nation's bankers. Addressing the American Bankers’ Association (ABA), 
he claimed that this was evidenced by ‘the fact’ that total deposits aggregated ‘approximately 
fourteen billions of dollars, while the total amount of money of all sorts in the nation [by 
which he meant physical currency]’ was ‘approximately only three billions of dollars’.2 It 
seemed, then, that Americans were very willing to entrust bankers with the near sacred duty 
of safeguarding their money. That trust, however, could be conditional. Writer René Bache 
thought as much. He noted that ‘Whenever there is a financial panic, a great quantity of cash 
is absorbed by old stockings, cracked teapots, parlor clocks, family Bibles, and other hiding 
places regarded by the common people, especially in rural districts, as secure depositories for 
tangible wealth’. In such incidences, cash was ‘swallowed up like a brook in a sandy desert, 
disappearing from sight and withdrawn from usefulness to mankind’.3 
 Buchtel and Bache made these remarks in 1908 in response to the still fresh 1907 
financial panic, one of the worst in America's history. Together, they encapsulate nicely the 
almost paradoxical nature of banking during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. More people 
than ever before were utilising banks, and deposits were growing at an enormous rate. At the 
same time, many people were willing to instantaneously withdraw their funds upon even the 
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slightest hint of trouble, and still many more were not using banks at all. As such, confidence 
and a lack thereof went hand in hand. Buchtel made his observation, after all, to reassure 
bankers that the broader public did actually hold confidence in them. Had there not been a 
problem, it is doubtful that such a comment would have been worth making. Such a tension, 
then, reflected the bipolar nature of banking during this period. 
 As detailed within the previous chapter, economic historians typically have approached 
‘confidence’ in a limited manner, seeing fluctuations thereof essentially as impulsive reactions 
to immediate circumstances. Moreover, they have favoured quantitative approaches. It is 
certainly true that confidence issues were especially pronounced following particular financial 
calamities, such as those that occurred in the 1870s, 1890s, and 1900s. There was a general ebb 
and flow that related to economic ‘good’ and ‘bad times’. For sure, the frequency of bank runs 
and the extent of currency hoarding increased in times of panic, and numbers are important. 
However, treating confidence in such a narrow way neglects its broader social and cultural 
aspects and the possibility that this was an ongoing phenomenon that spanned the entirety of 
the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. 
This chapter is the first of four which seeks to both expand our understanding of the 
concept and to demonstrate the various ways that issues pertaining to it were manifested and 
represented. It examines the bipolar nature of banking in order to begin to explain the 
tenuousness of confidence over part of this period – the ‘national banking era’ (1863-1913) – 
and how the likes of runs and panics in particular had a cumulative effect upon popular 
perceptions of banking. To do so, it looks at the creation of a new system and an enthusiasm 
for banking, on the one hand, and, on the other, the way that that enthusiasm could be ignored 
or undermined by an actual or perceived unreliability, as represented through hoarding, runs, 
failures, and panics. Regarding the latter, it also explores how unreliability was represented 
through cultural mediums, like newspaper reports, magazine articles, songs, and novels. Such 
artefacts not only offer an insight into how this notion was disseminated and how deeply it 
had been ingrained within the popular imagination, but also how they contributed to such an 
impression by depicting these issues as inherent to banking in America. 
 
* * * 
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 Though slavery had been the great unresolved and divisive issue in antebellum America, 
the currency and banking question was another that had been highly controversial and had 
lingered since the founding of the Republic.4 Senator John Sherman even believed that ‘In 
comparison’ to the importance of resolving the latter, ‘the fate of three million negroes held as 
slaves in the southern states’ was ‘utterly insignificant’. Restructuring the national monetary 
and banking system was thus for Sherman more important than abolition.5 Despite the moral 
dubiousness of his priorities, Sherman did at least display how seriously the issue could be 
taken. Overhauling this system, like abolishing slavery, would correct an historic fault-line 
that had emerged from the nation's formative ambiguities. Along with abolition, the ‘rebirth’ 
of the nation required the genesis of a new financial system that everyone could be confident 
in.6     
 Prior to 1863, the year the Federal Government created the National Banking System, 
the history of money and banking in America had been fraught with complications and 
conflict. Section Eight of the Constitution's First Article had reserved the right to ‘coin money, 
regulate the value thereof, ... and fix the standard of weights and measures’ exclusively to the 
Federal Government. 7  It said nothing, however, about banking. Resultantly, the 
constitutionality of what counted as legal money and legitimate banking was ambiguous at 
best, completely silent at worst. The Government had experimented with national central 
banks, albeit largely private ones, on two occasions before 1863 (this does not include the 
short-lived Bank of North America chartered by the Confederation Congress in 1781). In 1791, 
the Bank of the United States, the brainchild of Alexander Hamilton, went into operation. Its 
twenty-year charter expired in 1811 and was not renewed. Following the War of 1812, the 
Second Bank of the United States went into operation in 1816. Like its predecessor, it was 
chartered for twenty years and was not renewed, bringing about its termination in 1836. 
Although not constituting a majority, the paper money issued by both operated as de facto 
                                                
4  Roger L. Ransom agrees. See Ransom, Conflict and Compromise: The Political Economy of Slavery, 
Emancipation, and the American Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 271. 
 
5 John Sherman, ‘National Bank Currency’ (Presentation: Senate of the United States, 19 February, 1863) in 
Sherman, Selected Speeches and Reports on Finance and Taxation, From 1859 to 1878 (New York: D. Appleton 
and Company, 1879), 78.   
 
6 ‘Rebirth’ is borrowed from Jackson Lears' characterisation of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. See Jackson 
Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920 (New York: Harper, 2009). 
 
7 ‘The Constitution of the United States’, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 5. 
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national currencies. The banks also had a disciplinary effect upon independent state banks, as 
the latter were compelled to issue notes in proportion to their assets. If they issued notes 
beyond their capacity to actually redeem them, the powerful central banks could refuse to deal 
with them, thus putting them out of business. Although together they had existed for forty 
years, both institutions had been highly controversial before, during, and after their existence. 
The likes of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson opposed such banks, believing them to be 
unconstitutional, corrupt, and favourable only to a moneyed elite. Federalists Hamilton and 
Henry Clay advocated them on the grounds that they were necessary to finance the nation 
and to facilitate the repayment of its debts. These legislative tensions persisted throughout this 
period and could erupt into wholesale political battles, as was the case with Andrew Jackson's 
infamous ‘war’ against the Second Bank and its president, Nicholas Biddle.8 
 After 1836, America entered the era of ‘free banking’. Over this time, the Federal 
Government was essentially removed from banking, leaving the states the exclusive capacity 
to charter banks. Where they were authorised, these banks were ‘free’ due to their chartering 
being open to anyone that met minimum capital and legal requirements. What eventuated was 
the creation of myriad independent banks that issued their own paper money which could be 
redeemed for their specie. This thus left the nation with a large variety of notes with varying 
exchange values. These notes could be worth less than their actual face value when exchanged, 
and could occasionally be completely worthless altogether. Ultimately, what the nation had 
been left with was a disorganised array of banks, banking systems (like the ‘Suffolk System’), 
and a series of currencies which lacked any kind of uniformity. While fears of a powerful and 
unaccountable bank may have been allayed, America lacked an overarching currency and 
banking system owing to years of ideological conflict.9 
 The Civil War provided the Federal Government the opportunity to rectify some of the 
Republic's foundational issues. By its resolution in 1865, slavery had been abolished through 
the Thirteenth Amendment. A new currency and banking system was also established. It is 
                                                
8 See Richard T. McCulley, Banks and Politics During the Progressive Era: The Origins of the Federal Reserve 
System, 1897-1913, second edition (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 3-8. 
 
9 See Gerald P. Dwyer Jr., ‘Wildcat Banking, Banking Panics, and Free Banking in the United States’, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review, 81 (December, 1996): 1-20; Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in 
America: From the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 572-630; and 
Stephen Mihm, A Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con Men and the Making of the United States (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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true, of course, that the latter had in part been a wartime measure. The Government required 
funding to finance its war effort against the Confederacy. At first it had done so by issuing its 
own paper currency in the form of ‘Greenbacks’, which became legal tender for all transactions. 
Still requiring capital, in 1863, after the successful lobbying of the Secretary of the Treasury 
Salmon P. Chase and Senator Sherman, the first National Banking Act was passed, followed by 
the second Act in 1864. The Acts had authorised the establishment of federally chartered 
institutions, known as national banks, which had to purchase Government bonds with their 
specie to both operate and to issue nationally-backed notes that were uniform in value.10 In 
order to guarantee those notes, the banks then had to deposit their Government bonds with 
the Treasury to serve as collateral. If the bank failed, then their bonds were forfeited and their 
specie used to repay creditors. The sweetener was that banks earned six percent interest upon 
these bonds. Subsequently, the Government secured a market and a means to sell its securities. 
 Nevertheless, this was intended to be a permanent system, one which would persist 
after the war. It was very much designed to supersede State-based ‘free-banking’ and to rectify 
the problem of a disorganised currency and banking ‘system’. Abraham Lincoln made this 
explicit in 1864, stating that it was ‘hoped that very soon’ there would be ‘in the United States 
no banks of issue not authorized by Congress and no bank-note circulation not secured by the 
Government’. Indeed, the National Banking System would ‘create a reliable and permanent 
influence in support of the national credit and protect the people against losses in the use of 
paper money’.11 In 1865, an Act was passed to place a ten percent tax upon the notes issued by 
state banks. Consequently, state banks eventually ceased issuing them, leaving national banks 
as the only private institutions capable of issuing money. Many state banks subsequently 
converted into national banks. Moreover, the position of Comptroller of the Currency was 
created in order to secure continuous federal oversight. As such, though it is true that the 
system was the product of wartime contingency, it was devised to be the nation's new financial 
system. 
 An ideological compromise lay behind this system. It was Federal in scope, but lacked 
                                                
10 At first national banks could issue notes up to ninety percent of the face value of their bonds, though this was 
later changed to one hundred percent in 1900. 
 
11 Abraham Lincoln, ‘Annual Message to Congress’ (Presentation, Congress of the United States, 6 December, 
1864) in Roy P. Basler [ed.], Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings (Cleveland; New York: The World 
Publishing Company, 1946), 780. 
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centralisation. In other words, while it reintegrated the Federal Government into the currency 
and banking system, entailing federal regulation and supervision, it avoided the establishment 
of a formal central bank. The Treasury played a large part within the system for sure, but it 
was not a bank. Further, national banks were legally independent institutions which could be 
chartered by any collective of five or more people that had the required capital. Branches were 
prohibited. Thus, this was ‘free banking’ on a national level.12  Prior to its establishment, 
Sherman, its chief sponsor, declared that this would ‘harmonize’ banks, the Government, and 
the people. It would provide ‘the people’ with ‘a currency combining the national faith with 
the private stock and credit of private individuals’.13 Following decades of experimentation and 
disorganisation, the nation would now have a system that offered a secure national currency, 
a uniform banking system, a means to finance the Government, and a measure of institutional 
independence that eschewed the construction of a potentially gargantuan and monopolistic 
bank. America, it seemed, had learned from its previous errors and had rebuilt a system that 
was, according to Lincoln, ‘proving itself to be acceptable to capitalists and the people’.14 
Evidently, Lincoln exhibited a great deal of confidence within this new system, and apparently 
so too did these ‘capitalists’ and ‘people’, demonstrated, he noted, by the rapid establishment 
of nationally chartered banks.15 During the national banking era, the number of these banks 
proliferated tremendously, from 134 at the end of 1863 to 7,431 by mid-1913.16 Resultantly, a 
national currency, issued by national banks and guaranteed by the government, had been 
successfully implemented.  
National banks continued to issue notes throughout the era as they were legally 
required to, though their focus shifted from note issuance to deposit banking, or fractional 
reserve banking (the type of banking that allows banks to loan out deposits so long as they 
reserve a fraction of those deposits in order to meet demands for cash). The latter allowed them 
to primarily generate profit by loaning out portions of other people’s money, rather than their 
                                                
12 The notion that the National Banking System was a form of free-banking is not new. Comptroller Edward S. 
Lacey described it as such in 1893, for instance. See Lacey, ‘Can Our National Banks be made Safer?’, North 
American Review, vol. 154, no. 423 (February, 1892): 152.  McCulley also describes it as such, and agrees that it 
was an ideological compromise (or at least a hybrid). See McCulley, Banks and Politics, 13-18, esp. 18. 
 
13 Sherman, ‘National Bank Currency’, 70 and 72. 
 
14 Lincoln, ‘Annual Message to Congress’, 780. 
 
15 Lincoln, ‘Annual Message to Congress’, 780. 
 
16 Comptroller, 1913 Annual Report, figures from 104 and 106 respectively. 
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own capital. Accepting the apparent strength of these banks, many businesses and people 
indeed did deposit their funds within them. The capital-to-deposit ratio shifted dramatically, 
with deposits eventually far exceeding the capital paid in by the banks themselves.17 James 
Eckels, Comptroller between 1893 and 1897, noted that ‘deposit banking was now the feature, 
and the issuing of circulating notes but the incident, in national banking, instead of, as in the 
early days of the system, the note-issuing function being the feature and deposit banking but 
the incident’.18 By the turn-of-the-century, deposit banking had come to characterise the chief 
business of the national banks. The Comptroller reported in 1890 that the system's success in 
attracting deposits indicated that it had ‘inspired a degree of confidence not attained by any of 
its predecessors’.19 
 This phenomenon was not exclusive to them, however. Although national banks 
flourished, they were not the only banking institutions to exist. It is true that following the 
tax issued upon their notes, the number of state banks dwindled, but (beginning in the 1880s) 
they experienced a revival to the extent that they eventually outnumbered national banks. 
This was due to a number of reasons, such as generally requiring lower capital and reserve 
requirements. One major reason in particular, though, was the rise of deposit banking.20 Unlike 
national banks, state banks did not have to concern themselves with note issuance and could 
instead focus exclusively upon attracting deposits to then issue out as loans. The same was true 
of multiple kinds of banks, like stock savings banks, trust companies, and various other private, 
non-chartered banks. Mutual savings banks, which had existed in the Northeast since the early 
nineteenth century, also doubled in number after the Civil War and continued to attract 
deposits. Additionally, though national banks had been designed to function as commercial 
banks, in order to compete with their various counterparts, they were also later permitted to 
open savings departments to attract the savings deposits of individuals. 21 By 1910, 57 percent 
                                                
17 Comptroller of the Currency, 1890 Annual Report, vol. 1, 51st Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1890), 10-1. Also see Alexander D. Noyes, ‘The Banks and the Panic of 1893’, Political Science 
Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 1 (March, 1894):12-4. 
 
18 James H. Eckels, ‘Protection of Bank Depositors’, North American Review, vol. 163, no. 480 (1896): 565. 
 
19 Comptroller, 1890 Annual Report, 10. 
 
20 See George E. Barnett, ‘The Growth of State Banks and Trust Companies’, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 36 (1 November 1910): 136-47; C. D. Bremer, American Bank Failures (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1935), 26-31; and Daniel Wadhwani, ‘Why does the US have a weak mutual 
savings banks sector?’, ESBG Perspectives, no. 63 (March, 2011): 64 and 66. 
 
21 This occurred in 1903. See Richard N. Germain, Dollars Through the Doors: A Pre-1930 History of Bank 
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of the nation’s commercial banks were accepting savings deposits.22 
 Growth in both the number of banks and of deposits was intense. The total number of 
‘reporting banks’ – those that had reported to either Federal or state authorities – had risen 
from 1,466 in 1863 to 25,993 in 1913.23 Their aggregate deposits, which included those in 
savings, chequing, and ‘other’ accounts, had risen from $393.7 million in 1863 to $17.4 billion 
in 1913 [See Graph 1]. After 1865, they had grown every year bar six – 1869, 1876, 1878, 1884, 
1893, and 1908.24 Additionally, the deposits held by banks far exceeded the money circulating 
as currency. As Friedman and Schwartz have noted, this ratio ‘had been growing steadily’. For 
instance, there had been ‘$2 in deposit for every $1 of currency’ in 1879. This had grown to 
‘nearly $6 in deposits in June 1907’.25 By 1913, there was $17.4 billion in deposits compared to 
$3.7 billion in currency.26 Much of this owed to the multiplier effect inherent to fractional 
reserve banking – the money supply was expanded through the repeated loaning and 
redepositing of funds deriving from initial deposits. 27  Still, this depended upon people 
depositing their money in banks in the first place. Clearly then, deposit banking had 
undoubtedly developed drastically and banks of various kinds sought to be involved. Overall, 
from commercial accounts to savings accounts, deposits were being received from a range of 
social actors, whether businesses or people, whether rich or poor. This was clearly an attractive 
and popular business model. 
 
                                                
Marketing in America (Westport; London: Greenwood Press, 1996), 6. 
 
22 Sheldon Garon, Beyond Our Means: Why America Spends While the World Saves (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 95. 
 
23 Like national banks, branching was generally prohibited, or at least discouraged for other banks, thus partly 
explaining why the number of individual institutions could be so large. This figure is based upon the 
Comptroller's findings in 1920. Comptroller of the Currency, 1920 Annual Report, vol. 1, 66th Congress, Third 
Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921), 260. 
 
24 Comptroller, 1920 Annual Report, 261. 
 
25  Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963), 164. 
 
26 Comptroller, 1913 Annual Report, 54-5. 
 
27  For an explanation of how this works, see Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Other Half Banks: Exclusion, 
Exploitation, and the Threat to Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015), 13-4. Also see 
‘Multiplier Effect’, Investopedia. <URL: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/multipliereffect.asp> Accessed 26 
July, 2016. 
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Graph 1. Growth of Deposits, 1865-1913. Adapted from the Comptroller's 1920 Report. 
 
* * * 
  
Throughout this period, Americans were heavily encouraged to utilise banks, 
particularly the deposit function. Advocates advised that depositing would offer people a 
means to save funds for a later date or to secure them for immediate access when required. 
Businesses and individuals, men and women, blacks and whites, boys and girls, middle and 
working class people, and white and blue collar workers were all urged to put their money in 
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secure facility, that they could accrue interest upon their savings, or that they would be 
provided with a convenient means to withdraw funds and facilitate payments, especially 
through cheques.28 The latter became pervasive during this period. Such encouragement was 
coming from a large range of sources, from social reformers to lifestyle writers, and of course 
banks themselves (which shall be addressed in Chapter VI). All insisted that making use of 
banks was essential. 
 The importance of money and the making thereof became something of a creed during 
the Gilded Age. As an exchange medium, acquiring and accruing it was the vehicle through 
which Americans could socially and materially prosper; it could bring about bigger and better 
things, physically and mentally. Historian Jackson Lears notes that money had come to be 
‘more than merely a means of keeping people afloat, more even than the key to new realms of 
pleasure; it was also a mechanism for reinventing the self’.29 Horatio Alger's rags-to-riches 
stories, like Ragged Dick (1867), appealed broadly and have come to characterise the age's 
aspirational mentality (though, as scholar Richard Weiss notes, not its socio-economic 
realities).30  Self-help books proliferated stressing the significance of money, or at least of 
financial security. For instance, writer George Cary Eggleston authored How to Make a Living: 
Suggestions Upon the Art of Making, Saving, and Using Money in 1875, and popular 
entertainer Phineas Taylor Barnum's lecture on the Art of Money Getting was released in print 
in 1880. Guides were also published catering for specific audiences, such as Money Making for 
Ladies (1882) and About Money: Talks to Children (1902). Others offered guides for 
aspirational business people on how to strike it rich through various commercial endeavours.31 
                                                
28 See, for instance, Nathaniel Fowler, Jr., How to Save Money (Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 1912), 255-7. 
 
29 Lears, Rebirth of a Nation, 51-91 (quotation from 56). 
 
30 Richard Weiss, The American Myth of Success: From Horatio Alger to Norman Vincent Peale, reprint of 1969 
original (Champaign: Illini Books, 1988), 48-63, esp. 48-9. Sheldon Garon notes that Ragged Dick also encouraged 
saving. See Garon, Beyond Our Means, 90. 
 
31 George Cary Eggleston, How to Make a Living: Suggestions Upon the Art of Making, Saving, and Using Money 
(News York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1875); P. T. Barnum, The Art of Money Getting; Or, Golden Rules for Making 
Money, Project Gutenberg (1880), 2009, 31-2 [on .epub version] <URL: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/8581/8581-h/8581-h.htm>; Ella Rodman Church, Money Making for Ladies 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1882); Perry Wayland Sinks, About Money: Talks to Children (Chicago: 
Fleming H. Revell Company, 1902); Page Fox, One Thousand Ways to Make Money, second edition (New York: 
The Abbey Press, 1900). Everything right down to violet and mushroom farming was asserted to be a potential 
source of profit. George Saltford, How to Make Money Growing Violets (New York: The Violet Culture Co., 1902) 
and Hiram Barton, You Can Make Big Money Raising Mushrooms (New York: Self-Published, 1908).   
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This trend continued well into the Progressive Era.32 
 For individuals, accruing money was taken to necessarily entail saving money. Such a 
practice was stressed as a vital means to achieve both fiscal security and success within a 
capitalist society. This essentially bourgeois ethic emphasised that the individual was 
responsible for ensuring their own financial independence. By saving, individuals would not 
have to rely upon the credit nor the charity of others to purchase any costly goods and services 
required at a later date. Their fate was thus in their own hands. This tapped into the Protestant 
Ethic generally – material and earthly rewards would be granted to those who worked 
diligently and lived morally – and was a part of the thrift ideal specifically. Thrift, of course, 
had been an ideological mainstay throughout much of the nation's history. Benjamin 
Franklin's lessons in his Poor Richard's almanacs serve as an obvious example. During the 
Gilded Age, however, it began to emerge as a social movement. Thrift was not an exclusively 
American ideal, reflected by Englishman Samuel Smile's 1875 guide, Thrift. It was, however, 
certainly embraced and adapted with vigour to American circumstances. Not only was Thrift 
reproduced in serialised form within Harper's New Monthly Magazine in 1875, social 
reformers, such as Mary Willcox Brown and Sara Louisa Oberholtzer, had embraced the ideal 
and had become its chief advocates. Although thrift concerned resourcefulness and minimising 
waste in a general sense, much of it ultimately came down to saving money both for security 
and prosperity.33 
 Of course for people to save, they needed somewhere safe to place their money. Banks, 
particularly savings banks, were conveyed to be the answer to that question. The majority of 
Brown's 1899 treatise, The Development of Thrift, explored the range of banking options 
available to working people. 34  Oberholtzer had been responsible for advocating banker 
operated school savings accounts for children.35 Similarly, the Freedman's Savings and Trust 
                                                
32 For instance, see Bright Ideas for Money Making (Philadelphia: George W. Jacobs and Co., 1911) and Thomas 
E. Hill, The Open Door to Independence: Making Money From the Soil (Chicago: Hill Standard Book Company, 
1915). 
 
33 See Andrew Yarrow, Thrift: The History of a Social Movement (Amherst; Boston: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 2014), 16-29; David M. Tucker, The Decline of Thrift in America: Our Cultural Shift from Saving to 
Spending (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 1-53; and T. J. Jackson Lears. ‘The Modernization of Thrift’ in 
Yates, Joshua Y., and Hunter, James Davison [eds.], Thrift and Thriving in America: Capitalism and Moral Order 
from the Puritans to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 209-42. 
 
34 Mary Wilcox Brown, The Development of Thrift (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1899), 32-145. 
 
35 For instance, see Sara Louisa Oberholtzer, ‘School Savings Banks’, Annals of the American Academy of Political 
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company, created by Congress at the end of the Civil War and operated through branches 
across the country, had been, according to Frederick Douglass, ‘an institution designed to 
furnish a place of security and profit for the hard earnings of the colored people, especially in 
the South’. For Douglass, this had been to develop thrift and the self-help ideal and to elevate 
the social status of African Americans. The bank was thence much more than merely a business 
undertaking.36 Considered together, then, to all such advocates, whatever their background, 
many people saw thrift and banking to be inseparable. 
The encouragement to use banks, however, did not just come from leading thrift 
advocates and social reformers, and various figures advocated for the use of banks beyond the 
savings variety. Closer to the turn of the century, guides and instructional booklets were 
published on banking, such as the Depositor's Handbook with Hints on Banking (1905) and 
The ABC of Banks and Banking (1903).37 J. B. Duryea, a college professor from Iowa, released 
a Practical Treatise on the Business of Banking and Commercial Credits in the early 1890s, 
which proclaimed that ‘Every man, no matter what his calling, should understand the business 
of banking’.38 Later, prominent accountant and scholar Edward P. Moxey published Practical 
Banking (1910), which outlined the roles, functions, and benefits of commercial banks to 
aspiring business people.39  
Articles encouraging the use of banks were also published within popular magazines. 
Eckels, following his tenure as Comptroller and now a banker himself, authored a series of 
three articles on the ‘Tales of the Banker’ which appeared within the Saturday Evening Post 
(1900-1901), the first making the cover. All were intended to demystify and shed further light 
upon banking to the magazine's middle-class audience.40 Similarly, McLure's published an 
                                                
and Social Science, vol. 3 (July, 1892): 14-29. 
 
 
36 Frederick Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, Written by Himself (Hartford: Park Publishing 
Co., 1882), 446-50. 
 
37 J. L. Waring, Depositor's Handbook with Hints on Banking and Opinions of Courts on Important and Every-
day Transactions (Washington: The Henry E. Wilkens Printing Company (‘presented with the compliments of 
the National Bank of the Republic, Chicago’), 1905), and George M. Coffin, The ABC of Banks and Banking (New 
York: S. A. Nelson, 1903). 
 
38 J. B. Duryea, A Practical Treatise on the Business of Banking and Commercial Credits, second edition (Des 
Moines: self-published, 1892), i. 
 
39 Edward Moxey, Practical Banking (New York: Universal Business Institute, 1910). 
 
40 See James H. Eckels, ‘Tales of the Banker’, Saturday Evening Post, vol. 173, no. 20 (17 November, 1900): 1-3 
and 18; no. 25 (22 December, 1900): 6-7; and no. 31 (2 February, 1901): 8-9. A fourth article on ‘Bank Wrecking 
and Bank Wreckers’ was to appear, though never did. ‘Bank Wrecking and Bank Wreckers’, advertisement for 
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article titled ‘Your Money and How to Make it Earn’ in 1913. The simplest and most effective 
way to earn from one's money, it asserted, was to deposit it within a bank and accrue interest. 
It also highlighted the other advantages of an account, noting that ‘Banks relieve depositors of 
the risk of caring for coins and bills’. Placing one's money within a bank was far safer, it argued, 
than hoarding it in ‘stockings, old stoves, bureau drawers, and under the floor’. Money hidden 
in such a way had ‘proved time and again to be the most certain to be destroyed’.41 
 Moreover, given their increasing involvement in financial matters both as earners and 
household managers, women were also directly appealed to within the likes of the Ladies' 
Home Journal and the Woman's Home Companion. In a 1908 article, Choosing Your Bank, 
the latter offered five reasons as to why women should have an account of some sort: money 
was safer within a bank rather than in a ‘trunk or escritoire’; routine depositing encouraged 
saving; the deposits could accrue interest; they made household accountancy easier; and they 
facilitated cheque based transactions for the easy payment of bills.42  Ultimately, all such 
materials advised that life was simply made easier by having a bank account. In doing so they 
were contributing to a broader movement encouraging the usage of banks. Judging by the 
figures above, many heeded to such encouragement, or were at least swept along with a 
developing social and economic custom. 
 
* * * 
 
 For all such encouragement, however, there was just as much to discourage people from 
maintaining a steady, persistent confidence in their banks, or from utilising them at all. 
Throughout this period, a number of complications and events culminated to mar banking's 
record. One immediate complication regarded the ‘system’ itself. Although a federal 
infrastructure had been created by the Acts of 1863 and 1864, American banking came to 
consist of varying and often competing forms: national, state, savings, and non-chartered banks 
                                                
the Saturday Evening Post in Farmer's Voice, 13 April, 1901, 10. 
 
41 Albert W. Atwood, ‘What the Bank Will do for You’ (a part of a series of articles titled ‘Your Money and How 
to Make it Earn: Finance and Insurance’), McClure's Magazine, vol. 42 (November, 1913): 214. 
 
42 Alexander Dana Noyes, ‘Choosing Your Bank’, Woman's Home Companion, vol. 35 (October, 1908): 28. For 
The Ladies' Home Journal, see Isaac C. Kennedy, ‘Bank Rules and Requirements’, The Ladies Home Journal, vol. 
10, no. 4 (March 1893), 10, and Ruth Ashmore, ‘Girls and the Use of Money’, The Ladies' Home Journal, vol. 10, 
no. 10 (September, 1893), 21. 
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of various kinds. Thus, although a uniform currency may have been created, the same 
characteristic could not be applied to banking itself. Regarding events, major systemic panics 
– ones which shut down the economy and launched recessions or depressions – occurred on 
several occasions. Runs against banks, whereby depositors would hurriedly and 
simultaneously seek to withdraw their funds, were recurrent and occurred across the country. 
Bank failures numbered in the thousands. As either a result of panic conditions or other causes, 
like fraud, failed speculative endeavours, or generally bad banking practices, 2,699 banks – 
national, state, savings, trusts, and private – failed between 1864 and 1913. After 1870, not a 
year went by without at least a few failures [See Graph 2].43 Whatever upsides there were to 
banking, then, there were also downsides. 
 
 
Graph 2. Annual Failures, 1864-1913. Adapted from the Comptroller's 1913 Report. 
 
 Banking panics were the most visible and disruptive events. Such panics were by no 
means a new phenomenon within America. The nation had experienced wholesale panics in 
1819, 1837, and 1857. They continued to occur during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. As 
historian Eugene White observes, consensus now holds that there were five major nation-wide 
                                                
43 This figure has been based upon the Comptroller's report for 1913. It adds the 2,193 failed ‘State’ and ‘private’ 
banks with the 506 failed national banks and excludes the 25 that reopened. Comptroller, 1913 Annual Report, 
73, 81, and 104. Jill Hendrickson also draws from these figures to produce a graph much the same as the one 
provided here. See Hendrickson, Regulation and Instability in U.S. Commercial Banking: A History of Crises 
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panics: 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and 1907.44 Those of 1873, 1893, and 1907 were by far the most 
severe and significant. These three panics resulted in banking complications across the nation. 
Bank runs, suspended payments to depositors, recalling and ceasing of loans, currency 
premiums, temporary closures, and permanent failures all occurred. The 1873 and 1893 panics 
marked the beginning of lengthy depressions, lasting six and four years respectively, and the 
1907 panic marked the beginning of a recession that lasted into 1908. Beyond banks, stock 
prices collapsed, thousands of businesses failed, and unemployment soared.45 
 Each panic was, of course, unique in various ways, and was experienced differently. 
Western and Northwestern states, for example, were afflicted by bank failures far more 
severely than elsewhere in 1893, and the panic of 1907 primarily affected New York and was 
characterised far more by suspended payments and the issuance of substitute money than by 
failures.46 It is also true that these panics were the culmination of a number of highly complex 
factors, often incorporating transnational elements. The depression of the 1890s, for instance, 
was not limited to the United States and was preceded by the collapse of Baring Brothers in 
London and the drain of gold from the Treasury.47 The activities of banks remained no less 
significant. Various banks had typically either financed overcapitalised enterprises or had 
placed their reserve funds within banks that had done so. When those endeavours collapsed, 
so too did the banking system. This had been the case in all three panics. The overcapitalisation 
of the railroads had been a major factor behind the 1873 and 1893 panics, and the 
Knickerbocker Trust Company's financing of a failed attempt to corner the copper market in 
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1907 sparked the panic and recession that followed.48 It was such a connection that helped 
destroy the Freedman's bank in 1874 – Henry Cooke, one of the bank’s board members, had 
invested depositor funds into his brother Jay Cooke's ultimately disastrous banking and 
railroad ventures.49 In any case, whether certain banks had been directly responsible or had 
merely been caught up in the maelstrom, the actions of a large number of them (suspending 
payments, recalling and inhibiting loans) compounded problems. 
 ‘Reserve pyramiding’ and interbank depositing united independent banks into chains 
of interdependence which could be nationwide. In other words, banks of all kinds deposited 
in other banks all over the country. Smaller banks could deposit portions of their funds within 
larger banks in order to accrue interest. This was a practise particularly owing to the structural 
division between federally created national banking ‘reserve’ districts. These set minimum 
reserve levels for national banks based upon regional population sizes. Rather than allow the 
reserve funds to lay idle within individual banks, those funds could be redeposited elsewhere. 
Resultantly, significant portions of the reserves within the smaller ‘Country’ banks could be 
redeposited into the larger ‘Reserve City’ banks, which could in turn be redeposited again into 
the even larger ‘Central Reserve District’ banks. Much of the nation's capital, therefore, was 
relocated to New York, and, after 1887, Chicago and St Louis. Resultantly, problems in one 
place could potentially spell problems for most all places, as was the case in the 1873, 1893, 
and 1907 panics.50 
 The hoarding of money outside of banks was a major underlying consequence of all 
such troubles. Short term hoarding directly related to runs and panics. The quest to withdraw 
and rescue funds in reaction to bad news entailed hoarding, even if only temporary. Such 
hoarding occurred on a systemic scale following the era's major financial panics, particularly 
those of 1893 and 1907. Indeed, the only years which failed to observe a growth in deposits – 
1869, 1878, 1884, 1893, and 1908 – all correlate with calamities.51 Following the 1893 panic, 
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columnist Alexander Noyes noted in 1894 that although withdrawals were obviously 
prevented by banks that had suspended payments, ‘withdrawals from other banks were 
doubled’. Further, ‘Deposits of cash in banks almost wholly ceased, and domestic exchange 
was completely blocked’.52 Following the 1907 panic, economist A. Piatt Andrew observed 
that ‘Without taking into account the not improbable loss of cash by trust companies, State 
and private banks, and savings-banks, it would appear, therefore, that at least more than 230 
millions of currency passed out of the [national] banks and disappeared from sight between 
August and December’. Those hoarding included the general public, many of who had made 
use of safety deposit boxes, businesses that feared payroll and other expense complications, 
and, due to interbank depositing and the pyramidal structure, banks themselves.  
The latter two groups were particularly panic stricken. Andrew noted that the ‘general 
testimony seemed to indicate that this transfer of money was not attributable, as is so often 
implied, to women, clergymen, and other timid small depositors, but rather to large business 
interests’. He also observed that a ‘large number of bankers, especially in the West and South, 
appear to have become panic-stricken along with the general public, and to have adopted the 
fatal policy of sauve qui peut [roughly, “every man for himself”]’.53 Likewise, economist Oliver 
Sprague noted in his 1910 book, History of Crises Under the National Banking System, that in 
1907: 
Everywhere the banks suddenly found themselves confronted with 
demands for money by frightened depositors; everywhere, also, banks 
manifested a lack of confidence in each other. Country banks drew 
money from city banks and all the banks throughout the country 
demanded the return of funds deposited or on loan in New York. The 
evidence of lack of confidence in and between the banks is clear and it 
points to a serious difficulty in carrying on banking in this country.54 
 
Banks that had suspended payments did so on the basis of thwarting withdrawals, 
demonstrating that they recognised these sudden impulses to hoard. In such scenarios, 
confidence had been so shot that many, including bankers themselves, believed that trusting 
anyone was far too risky. 
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 Hoarding also took on a long term form, with many avoiding or at least failing to use 
any kind of bank whatsoever. Self-help and guide book author, Thomas E. Hill, declared in 
1894 that ‘It should be understood that there are now, and all the time, hundreds of millions 
of dollars hidden in safety depositories, in safes, stockings and the people's pockets that do not 
have any circulation, because they are thus hidden’.55 It is indeed likely that many did actually 
make use of such places. Looking at individual savings accounts, Historian Sheldon Garon has 
highlighted that by 1910 the vast majority of Americans did not in fact have one, claiming that 
only 10 percent of the population had an account – one of the lowest figures in the industrial 
world for the time. This figure does not include banks other than ‘mutual and stock savings 
banks’.56 Even when including all banks with savings accounts and allowing an extra three 
years, however, the figure is not much better. The Comptroller's 1913 report claimed that 
there were 17,600,000 individual savings accounts. Just under half of these (8,101,238) 
belonged to those with deposits in mutual savings banks, banks designed for this purpose and 
typically held in higher regard by middle and working class people. Although a historically 
high figure, with a population of around 92 million, this means that at best only 18 percent of 
Americans had an account (generously assuming that there was one person to each account). 
Inversely, this means around 82 percent of the population lacked one.57  
 It is true that there were staggering differences between regions. Drawing from the 
National Monetary Commission's 1909 findings, Garon has demonstrated that the New 
England states had the highest percentage of accounts per person (53.5 percent), whereas the 
South and West had the lowest (3.4 and 4.6 percent respectively). The other regions sat 
somewhere in between, with the Mid-Atlantic at 26.6, the Midwest at 14.6, and the Pacific 
Coast at 16.7. Moreover, differences between states could be extreme. Massachusetts had the 
highest rate at 60.9 percent, whereas Oklahoma had the lowest at 0.6. These differences are 
important and thus hint that attitudes towards banks may have varied greatly between regions. 
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39.1 percent lacking an account is better than 99.4, for instance, suggesting that those in 
Massachusetts generally were far more familiar and comfortable with banking institutions 
than those in Oklahoma (and probably also had more money to deposit). 58 The same can be 
said between regions.  
Beyond a lack of confidence, there were also further other factors responsible for these 
variations and low figures. Immediately, a lack of accessible or appropriate banks, particularly 
in the South and West, was a major reason for regional differences. Looking at mutual savings 
banks, for instance, the Comptroller noted in his 1913 report that such banks were ‘confined 
chiefly to the manufacturing centers of the New England and Eastern States, there being only 
23 [of 623] institutions of this character reporting from other sections of the country’. 59 
Insurance also became a major and alternative way to ‘save’.60 Additionally, many people 
undoubtedly lacked an account due to poverty or low incomes – they simply had nothing to 
deposit.61 Further, the temptations of consumption and indebtedness to the likes of loan sharks 
may well have also played a part.62  
Nevertheless, it does not at all seem improbable that many were intentionally avoiding 
banks or making no attempt to utilise them. As we shall see further throughout this thesis, 
many believed this to be the case, including bankers themselves. And although there were 
regional variations, there remain strong indications that this was a national phenomenon. 
Excluding Massachusetts, only Vermont had half its population with an account, and only just 
at 50.2 percent.63 All things considered, the vast majority of people in America did not have 
an account, and all states bar two had less than half their population in possession of one. It is 
entirely possible, then, that many people were hoarding their money outside of banking 
institutions. 
 For all these issues, however, scholars have been quick to point out that not all was 
problematic. They have highlighted that the number of failures was low compared to the 1920s 
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and 1930s, that average annual failure rates were statistically minute, and that the national 
banks fared far better than their state and non-chartered counterparts, both in terms of failures 
(excluding the 25 banks that were reopened, 506 national banks failed compared to 2,193 non-
national banks) and in recovering losses (76.9 percent of losses were recouped from national 
banks compared to around 45 percent from all others).64 Furthermore, ‘clearing houses’ had 
proliferated over the period not only to create a centralised means for banks to settle cheques 
and payments between themselves but also to act as lenders of last resort when members 
experienced liquidity complications. Their existence and successful operation had prevented 
panics, or at least softened their effects.65 And, as detailed in the previous chapter, Elmus 
Wicker has observed that most Americans did not directly experience runs or failures. 
Nonetheless, people could not possibly have compared their situation with that of the 1920s 
and 1930s, clearing houses were imperfect and could put their own interests ahead of the 
general interest,66 and problems associated with banks were visible enough for people to 
observe and be concerned about in one way or another. Even if most did not experience them 
directly, there were many other ways to do so. 
 
* * * 
 
 Experience of banking complications went beyond runs, panics, and hoarding in 
themselves. Banking issues, incorporating such phenomena, had captured the public's 
attention, and had thence become a point of popular intrigue and inquiry within the public 
sphere. Assorted communicative mediums, like newspaper reports, magazine articles, 
photographs, songs, and novels, were utilised to document or explore problems. Such materials 
could capture common sentiments, and could also reinforce and instil them. Ultimately, 
cultural artefacts like these demonstrate not only how these issues could be understood and 
represented, but also how information, ideas, and ‘bad news’ could be transmitted and 
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experienced, including by those who had never actually encountered any problems firsthand. 
Their abundance and diverse forms attest to their popularity. Moreover, they also strongly 
suggest that these problems were often considered to be characteristic of banking in America 
and that awareness of them persisted over this period, inside and outside times of systemic 
panic. 
 Immediately, commentators could construe confidence to be extremely fickle. Some 
considered the recurrence of issues pertaining to confidence, particularly sudden lapses thereof, 
to be common enough to warrant explanation. When manifested in runs and panics, these 
lapses could be seen to be the result of a kind of collective madness. Although this chapter uses 
the term ‘bipolar’ rhetorically, some contemporary observers did actually attribute such 
phenomena to an extreme variability of mental and emotional states. Terms like ‘maddened’, 
‘frenzy’, ‘anxious’, and ‘mental epidemic’ were used within reports.67 In the wake of the 1907 
panic, Moody's Magazine ran an article by Henry C. Nicholas on ‘Runs on Banks’. It described 
the panic itself as ‘unreasoning’ and as an ‘outburst of hysteria’. This ‘hysteria’ had derived 
from a ‘dread and distrust long smouldering in the public mind’ that had in turn resulted from 
a ‘long and sickening series of disclosures of dishonest and indefensible methods in high 
financial quarters’. This was clearly referring to the expository journalism of the muckrakers. 
Regarding runs generally, he asserted that ‘Experience has shown that there is nothing easier 
than to start a run on a bank, and that once suspicion has become thoroly [sic] aroused among 
depositors there is nothing to do but allow the run to take its course’. Even the ‘recognized 
conservatism of the management, the character and financial standing of the officers and 
directors, and the most earnest assurances of the solvency of the institution usually [counted] 
for naught’. Still, so long as the bank could demonstrate its liquidity, the ‘excitement’ driving 
a run usually subsided within a couple of days, subsequently restoring order. Nicholas thus 
observed the existence of a kind of emotional duality, one that fluctuated between polar 
opposites. He considered wholesale and indiscriminate runs or panics to be a consequence of 
emotional downturns. Once confidence (or ‘hope’ or ‘optimism’) had lapsed, then rationality 
was inhibited and emotional states took over. This, he believed, was just a matter of fact, one 
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that characterised the relationship between people and their banks.68 
 In terms of how a run was understood to be initiated, and how ‘suspicion’ was spread, 
rumour was often attributed as a primary factor. Accounts of runs often included details about 
how they were triggered by rumours. A newspaper article on a 1906 run against the Bank of 
Ybor City in Florida, for instance, reported that the run resulted from an ‘absurdly foolish and 
groundless rumor’ which generated doubts about the bank's solvency. It was unknown who 
initiated the rumours (this was apparently ‘the usual case when vicious rumors [got] afloat’), 
though the article claimed that it was ‘understood’ that the ‘guilty party’ was being sought.69 
An even more sensational case occurred in Cincinnati in 1905. The officers of the Union 
Savings Bank and Trust Company claimed that a run against them, which involved a woman 
being ‘trampled’, had been the result of a conspiracy. They asserted that their depositors had 
received ‘postal cards’ and telephone calls advising them to withdraw their funds. However 
accurate this allegation may have been, it nevertheless raises the possibility that rumours could 
be distributed by the post and the phone.70 In yet another case, the New York Times reported 
in 1893 of a run against the Williamsburgh Savings Bank in Brooklyn. This time a rumour 
circulated that a run was already occurring after a crowd had been observed outside of the 
bank. The crowd was then ‘increased by many timid depositors who were anxious to draw out 
their money before the vaults were drained of cash’. It turned out, however, that most within 
the initial crowd were there to actually deposit money. Upon learning this, the frightened 
depositors ‘went home happy and contented’.71 This, then, sheds light on just how rapidly 
information could be transmitted by patrons themselves. All such instances demonstrate just 
how willingly many acted upon even the slightest suggestion of trouble. To them, any bad 
news was enough to arouse suspicions, regardless of its accuracy. It was just too risky not to 
act. 
 Beyond how information could be spread on the ground level, newspapers served as 
the principal medium for distributing news about disturbances. Indeed, newspapers had 
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become the major source of information on all matters that extended beyond people's 
immediate personal and social networks, reaching many millions of people across the country. 
As such, given the impact and importance of financial calamities, news of widespread panics 
spread across the entire nation, from the big cities to remote townships. 72 This was the case 
with the 1873, 1893, and 1907 panics. Even Honolulu reported via the Associated Press on 
‘NEW YORK IN THE THROES OF PANIC’ in 1907.73 News of localised runs and failures could 
also be transmitted across the nation. An ‘EXTRAORDINARY RUN’ against a New York bank 
in 1905, for instance, was reported in Arizona by the Bisbee Daily Review.74 It is true that 
many newspapers, especially the larger ones, were generally favourable to banks. They were 
often just as quick to report of resolutions as they were of problems. One example is the Los 
Angeles Herald's report on improved conditions following the 1893 panic. It claimed that 
‘EVERYTHING IS LOVELY NOW’ and that ‘The Banks and the People are All Serene’.75 
Nevertheless, however keen newspapers may have been to dispel doubts and thwart runs and 
panics, they remained to be the primary distributors of bad news.76 
Much of the imagery depended upon text, though illustrations and eventually 
photographs could accompany such reports, in turn offering readers visual depictions. In the 
midst of the 1873 panic, the Supplement to Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper (actually 
closer to a magazine) included several illustrations in its report on the matter, including a now 
famous image of aggrieved depositors rushing New York City's Fourth National Bank. The 
image depicts an exclusively male crowd, mostly well-dressed and top-hatted (thus suggesting 
upper class patrons), clamouring outside of the bank up to the front door. One patron has his 
fist raised and another appears to be either knocking or barging on the door. The adjacent 
image depicts an even more disorderly run on the Union Trust Company, this time featuring 
what appears to be a working and lower-middle class crowd, along with a police officer in the 
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crowd raising his baton.77 San Francisco's Morning Call did much the same in 1893. Though it 
was quick to downplay troubles, it nevertheless featured three illustrations of runs against the 
Home Savings Bank, the Pacific Bank, and the Union Savings Bank. The latter represented 
bank officials displaying trays of gold to their depositors.78 Photographs emerged closer to the 
turn of the century, and offered ‘realistic’ glimpses of such scenery. Joseph Pulitzer's the 
Evening World, for instance, featured photos of runs on several occasions, including on its 
front page. One such image appeared in 1901 after the Seventh National Bank of New York 
City ‘closed its doors’. The photo, taken on the day the edition was released, captured the all-
male crowd, this time in boater hats (suggesting middle and upper class patrons), crowding 
outside of the bank's doors [See Figure 1].79 A 1905 photo of the closed Cooper Exchange Bank 
displayed women within the crowd, demonstrating that they too could directly experience 
banking turbulence.80 The Evening World was, of course, a major yellow press publication, 
and may thus have been more ready to publish such images due to their sensational nature. 
Regardless, photographers and editors knew that runs were scenes worth capturing due to 
their newsworthiness. As a result, readers could be confronted with sights that they may not 
have been able to otherwise observe first-hand. 
 Magazines could also convey and transmit the idea that banking was something of a 
double-edged sword, or at least a business with clearly demarcated pros and cons. Though 
generally friendly towards banks, mass distributed, middle-class oriented publications could 
touch upon some of the downsides of banking. In an otherwise positive 1890 article exploring 
banking within New York, Harper's New Monthly deemed it necessary to include a passage 
on financial panics. It noted that: 
More injurious to the permanent prosperity of the banks than all the 
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professional criminals in the United States are the financial panics, 
which like malignant epidemics, kill more by terror than by actual 
morbific energy. They have repeatedly occurred in the midst of prolific 
national resources and abundant prosperity. In these crises every one 
strives to save himself. There is a run upon the banks. Crowds of men 
and women besiege the doors. All are distractedly anxious to withdraw 
their deposits, and each to save some peculiar plank to which he my 
cling in the coming deluge.81 
 
The article was clearly tapping into the idea that runs and panics were driven by a kind of 
insanity. It also included illustrations of a panic and a bank run to accompany this vivid literary 
imagery [See Figure 2]. While it concluded that banks were still ultimately beneficial, by 




Figure 1. Photograph of a Run on the Seventh National Bank in the New York Evening World, 27 
June, 1901. From the Library of Congress’ Chronicling America digital collection. 
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Figure 2. One of the images accompanying the Harper’s New Monthly article on Banking in New 
York, 1890. From Cornell University’s Making of America digital collection. 
 
Furthermore, even those articles encouraging the use of banks could acknowledge 
problems. The 1913 article in McClure's (once a muckraking publication) sought to dispel 
doubts and to convince suspicious readers either to open or reopen savings accounts. Nowhere 
was this more obvious than in a section which asked ‘Are Banks Safe?’. It answered 
affirmatively, and stated that ‘Usually … sufficient information finds its way into the public 
press to afford the basis of a reasonable opinion’ and put it down to being ‘All a Question of 
Character’. In reference to a recent bank failure, it pitted part of the blame upon the depositors 
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themselves, arguing they had acted against their better interests by ignoring available 
information. So long as people were diligent, then, they would be fine.83 Similarly, the 1908 
Women's Home Companion offered its five reasons to have an account in response to the 1907 
panic. Like the previous articles, it insisted that despite any and all problems, it was still better 
to utilise banks.84 In doing so, these articles simultaneously reflected and transmitted the 
notion, inadvertently or otherwise, that banking in America was a complicated and at least 
occasionally troubled affair.  
Further attesting to the prevalence of runs and panics within the popular imagination, 
such phenomena also had a presence within artistic productions. One such production was the 
1895 theatrical comedic melodrama, ‘The War of Wealth’, written by Charles T. Dazey and 
produced by Jacob Litt. The play had been performed across America, travelling from 
‘Chicago … to the Pacific Coast and returning later to New York for an extended run’, and was 
met with critical and popular praise, both for its theatrics and its perceived relevance.85 
Commenting on its appearance on Broadway, the New York Times stated that Dazey had 
‘faithfully tried to reproduce a phase of American life of absorbing interest’.86 The main plot 
itself was rather simple. A young bank clerk falls in love with his boss' daughter. The boss' 
younger partner engages in speculation with the bank's funds and then attempts to 
purposefully destroy the bank. This brings the bank into disrepute and triggers a bank run. 
The young clerk then attempts to rescue the bank by mobilising his own funds, though the 
villainous speculator then imprisons him within the bank's vault. He is then rescued by his 
elder boss, who blows him out of the safe. A delivery of gold then arrives at the bank, 
subsequently staving off the run. Finally, the villain is thwarted and the young man marries 
his boss' daughter.87 The bank run scene was spectacular, and served as one of its draw cards. 
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An advertisement within the San Francisco Call mentioned ‘The great ”Run-On-The-Bank” 
scene’ as a selling point, and an illustrated poster advertisement described it as ‘THE MOST 
ANIMATED & REALISTIC SCENE EVER SHOWN ON THE STAGE’.88 Though the play had 
a happy ending, its featuring of a run both demonstrates that this was something on people's 
minds and was something they could understand and relate with. 
 Songs too could feature them as their subject matter. An 1878 song, titled What if the 
Bank Should Break with words by Theo Miller and music by H. P. Danks, conveys the 
conflicted thought process likely undergone by those contemplating whether to deposit their 
money. The song's lyrics depict a dialogue between a couple, presumably a husband and wife, 
debating the matter. One insists that they place their savings within a bank, whereas the other, 
‘John’, doubts the safety of doing so. However, the former eventually comes to realise that it 
is probably best not to use banks after all, concluding that as ‘The banks are all fail-ing’ their 
money was ‘safest at home’.89 Another song, The Bank Has Failed To-Day from 1890 by Charles 
Graham, concerns those that had deposited their money and had subsequently lost it via the 
bank's failure. It describes the scene of a run: ‘Out-side a large stone building grim and strong; 
the doors were closed, the blinds were down, Po-lice men stood a-round, And vain-ly tried to 
keep the crowd a-way!’ It also depicts the ‘sad despair’ of ‘those who trusted blindly’ in others 
who turn out to have been driven by ‘greed’ and conveys the tragedy within its refrain: ‘The 
sav-ings of a life-time, of a mother for her child, The fortunes of the rich, the great and the 
gay; The re-ward of great ca-reers, And of la-bor's thrifty years, Are gone at last, “The bank 
has failed to-day!”’90 Whether set in or out of the bank, both songs attempted to depict an 
unstable relationship. 
 Additionally, bestselling novels also made reference either to the fickleness of 
confidence or the inherent instability of banks. Muckraking novelist and journalist Upton 
Sinclair's highly influential 1906 novel on the experience of migrant workers in Chicago's 
meatpacking industry, The Jungle, includes a scene involving a bank run. The run was a ‘scene 
                                                
88 Advertisement for ‘The War of Wealth’ in San Francisco Call, 22 December, 1897, 7 and Strobridge Lith. Co., 
The War of Wealth: The Run on the Bank, poster advertisement, Cincinnati; New York, c. 1895. Image. Retrieved 
from the Library of Congress. <URL: https://www.loc.gov/item/2014636144/>. Accessed 5 September, 2016. 
 
89 Miller and H. P. Danks, What if the Bank Should Break, 3-5. 
 
90  Charles Graham, The Bank Has Failed To-Day (New York: T. B. Harms and Co., 1890), Notated Music. 
Retrieved from the Library of Congress. <URL: https://www.loc.gov/item/ihas.100005814/>. Accessed 5 
September, 2016. 3-5. 
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of wild confusion’, with ‘women shrieking and wringing their hands and fainting, and men 
fighting and trampling down everything in their way’. It turns out that the run had developed 
due to patrons misinterpreting a crowd outside the bank to be frightened depositors. However, 
the crowd had formed to witness the arrest of a drunken man in the adjacent saloon.91 George 
McCutcheon (under the pseudonym Richard Greaves) also utilised a run as a plot device in his 
1902 novel, Brewster's Millions. In protagonist Montgomery Brewster’s challenge to rid 
himself of one million dollars in the space of a year (Brewster is promised seven million if he 
can successfully do so), he deposits money in five separate banks. This ‘transaction’ was 
‘inspired by the wild hope that one of them might someday suspend operations and thereby 
prove a legitimate benefit to him’. Though this may have been a ‘wild hope’ rather than a safe 
bet, one of these banks does fail, and, to Brewster's good fortune, wipes out $100,000. As a 
consequence, however, the ‘failure had caused a tremendous flurry in banking circles’ and had 
generated a series of runs. This imperilled another bank bearing one of his deposits, this time 
$200,000. While the bank's failure would further benefit Brewster, he realises the harm that 
this would cause, and instead decides to save the bank by conspicuously placing his other 
deposits in its custody. This resuscitates confidence and saves the bank.92 In both The Jungle 
and Brewster's Millions, these runs are not central to the overarching plot. They were 
relatively minor scenes rather than major incidences. This casualness reflects just how 
ingrained banking problems were. Rather than being integral plot devices, they were depicted 
instead as quite normal occurrences. In other words, they were presented as just a part of 
everyday life. 
 Unlike these works, The Banker of Bankersville, an aptly-titled 1886 roman á clef by 
author Maurice Thompson, includes a wholesale banking panic as a major component of its 
narrative. In doing so, Thompson touches upon several common characteristics of such a panic, 
such as a pre-existing uncertainty, the circulation of rumours, and the desperation of 
depositors, and creates a vivid image of what it was like to be caught up in one. The story 
follows two aspiring lawyers, one eventually retiring to become a writer – Thompson's 
surrogate – and the other a powerful, philanthropic, and well regarded banker. The latter later 
                                                
91 Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1906), 132-4. 
 
92 George Barr McCutcheon, Brewster's Millions (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1903), 114-22. 
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turns out to be a confidence artist who, in his honorary position as Bankersville’s treasurer, 
had used the funds and deposits belonging to the townspeople to speculate in risky and 
fraudulent ventures. There already existed ‘for some time a half-formed fear that under the 
surface of Bankerville's apparent prosperity lay the germ of destruction’. Upon the suicide of 
a prominent banker who had been connected to the lawyer-turned-banker, and the 
dissemination of rumours concerning the condition of banks, a ‘run was began on all of them 
by depositors, and the doors of all but one promptly closed’. Among the scenes were ‘Throngs 
of men and women, old, young, middle-aged, richly clad, poorly clad, some in tatters’. They 
were ‘all wild, crying, cursing, shouting, gesticulating’, had ‘besieged the closed doors of the 
banks’, and were ‘struggling, frothing, demanding, beseeching, as a herd of wild cattle when 
surrounded by wolves’. After the calamity, and after the disappearance of the fraudulent 
banker, the people of the town sought vengeance. He is eventually captured, though again 
escapes. Time passes and Bankersville then moves on, and the lawyer-turned-writer pursues 
his literary career. The town, however, had come to experience all the hallmarks of a banking 
panic – something which Thompson described to his readers in striking detail. A story about 
or even featuring banking, it appears, would be incomplete without such an event.93 
 
* * * 
 
 It can be seen that during the ‘National Banking Era’, Americans were receiving – and 
sending – mixed messages regarding banking. On the one hand, this was a new age of banking. 
People across the nation from all walks of life were being exposed to materials encouraging 
the utilisation of banks, all ensuring their significance and reliability. Making money was only 
one side of the coin to capitalist ascension. Depositing it in a bank for safekeeping, advocates 
insisted, was the other. Along with structural transformations within banking, such 
encouragement seems to have facilitated the tremendous rise of deposit banking. Millions did 
indeed make use of banks, many for the first time, both business people and working people, 
blacks and whites, men and women. By placing their money within banks, such people were 
also expressing confidence in them. On the other hand, the banking infrastructure had 
                                                
93 Maurice Thompson, The Banker of Bankersville: A Novel, reprint of original 1886 edition (New York: Smith 
Street Publishers, 1900), esp. 275-87 (quotations from 275 and 276). 
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developed into a complex array of banks and could be volatile. Wholesale panics occurred in 
1873, 1893, and 1907. Bank runs were a recurrent phenomenon and failures numbered in the 
thousands. Resultantly, confidence could be fickle. Those that had entrusted banks with their 
money could and often did seek to withdraw their funds upon even the slightest suggestion of 
trouble. Moreover, the vast majority of Americans did not deposit their money within banks 
at all, evidenced by the low number of individual savings accounts. This was due to a range of 
factors, though a general lack of confidence in the nation's various banks was an important 
one. Hoarding money in the likes of ‘old stockings, cracked teapots, [and] parlor clocks’ was 
likely perceived by such people to be safer. 
 Ultimately, this perceptual and emotional divide represents the bipolar nature of 
banking which persisted throughout the entire era. This is further reflected through the above 
cultural artefacts that depicted this duality as natural and ‘just how things were’, thus 
demonstrating how ingrained this notion had become. In one way or another, directly or 
indirectly, in reality or representation, people could observe failure and complications. Banks 
of all kinds were subject to them. This, however, only scratches the surface. Compounding 
these macro problems was the issue with individual banking malfeasances, particularly in the 






The Popular Fascination with Banker Banditry 
 
The number of cases that could be cited are innumerable, and there is not a 
section of the country that has escaped. The number of bank wrecks piled 
upon the financial beach is a silent monument to this truth. 
 
  - Edward Preston Moxley, an ‘Expert Bank Examiner for the United  
  States Department of Justice’, 1905.1 
 
Amidst the Gilded Age's ethos of attaining material wealth and power, showman turned self-
help guru P. T. Barnum lectured ambitious Americans on the ‘Art of Money Getting’, 
instructing his audience on the values and behaviours necessary to achieve success. After 
outlining a series of lessons, his final point was that preserving one's integrity was more 
‘precious than diamonds or rubies’. Barnum scorned the notion of getting rich quickly by 
dishonest means for the sake of accumulation. Only old misers would tell their sons to ‘Get 
money; get it honestly if you can, but get money’. Dishonesty, he charged, would inevitably 
backfire and result in failure.2 Shortly after Barnum's lecture was released in print (1880), M. 
H. Rosenfeld composed an upbeat satirical song, I've Just Been Down to the Bank (1885), about 
a ‘jolly cashier’ that embezzles from his bank and absconds to Canada, having taken the advice 
of his father to ‘Get money, honestly if you can – but get it’.3 Here was an apt model for 
Barnum's antithesis. Rejecting Barnum’s wisdom, many bankers and bank employees instead 
chose to adhere to an alternative art of money getting, opting to get money quickly and 
dishonestly. 
 Throughout the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, American society was plagued with 
reports of banking embezzlement and misappropriation scandals. Those accused, from 
directors and presidents to cashiers, tellers, and other employees, were often dubbed ‘bank 
                                                
1 Edward P. Moxley, ‘Bank Defalcations: Their Causes and Cures’, Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, vol. 25 (January, 1905): 35. 
 
2 P. T. Barnum, The Art of Money Getting; Or, Golden Rules for Making Money, Project Gutenberg (1880), 2009, 
31-2 [on .epub version] <URL: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/8581/8581-h/8581-h.htm>. 
 
3  M. H. Rosenfeld, I've Just Been Down to the Bank (New York: W. A. Evans and Bro, 1885). Notated Music. 
Retrieved from the Library of Congress. <URL: https://www.loc.gov/item/sm1885.19801>. Accessed 5 September, 
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wreckers’. Whether chartered by the Federal or state governments or not at all, individual and 
unaffiliated deposit banks all over the country were afflicted, especially within major cities 
like New York and Chicago. Wreckers appeared often, both in reality and in representation, 
and were depicted as popular villains within the press and other cultural mediums, like novels 
and songs, and even in a motion picture. Using a slightly different term, Minnesota’s the 
Appeal remarked in early 1907 that the ‘bank breaker is no novelty. He is in the newspapers 
all the time’. These cases were so common that its reporting of a banker restoring a bank's 
fiscal health was considered exceptional.4 The prevalence of wreckers suggests that people 
understood their meaning, and the abundance of materials featuring them shows that they had 
a place within the popular imagination. Fascination was aroused by their abuse of 
interpersonal confidence and, importantly, their capacity to wreck people's bank accounts and 
also their lives. 
This chapter argues that this fascination further reflected, reinforced, and instilled a 
popular distrust directed toward America’s deposit banks. Unlike wholesale banking panics, 
which were periodic and would affect confidence abruptly, wrecking was not restricted to 
time, location, or type of bank. It could occur at any moment, in any place, and in any bank. 
Such criminality was thus a persistent and pervasive threat, one that endured over this entire 
period, inside and outside times of panic. Wrecking, then, affected confidence insidiously. This 
was in part because the media transmitted cases far and wide, which likely amplified their 
significance. Still, wrecking was an actual problem. Overall, as we shall see, it possibly resulted 
in the failure of at least 943 banks between 1863 and 1913. In any case, whether experienced 
first or second hand, countless Americans were confronted with incidences or stories of 
individual banking malfeasances. Consequently, wrecking helped produced a generalized 
suspicion, which was supported by notions of class, character, and gender. Given that 
perpetrators typically were once ‘respectable’ men, their actions displayed that reputability 
and prestige could be entirely cosmetic and thus unreliable indicators of institutional integrity 
and strength. Similarly, they also conveyed the idea that gentlemanly bankers or their young 
male employees could be tempted to fleece their patrons in order to ‘get rich quick’. Overall, 
wrecking was therefore a significant factor that contributed to the broader confidence problem.  
                                                
4 The term ‘bank breaker’ could also be used to describe bank robbers that would ‘break in’ to banks, though in 
this instance it appears that the Appeal was referring to wreckers. Appeal (Minnesota), 19 January, 1907, 1. 
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* * * 
  
The usage of the term ‘bank wrecker’ proliferated roughly around the late 1880s. 
Though this is not to suggest that it necessarily originated at this time, it is certainly the case 
that its usage became pervasive, being applied almost universally to any instance of a bank 
losing funds or going bust due to a villainous appropriation of the funds that people had 
entrusted to it.5 Wrecking, occasionally also referred to as ‘defaulting’, typically applied to 
instances where a bank had been damaged or destroyed by the act of embezzlement, defined 
by the Treatise on Criminal Law in 1896 as ‘an intentional and fraudulent appropriation of the 
goods of another person intrusted with the property of the same’.6 It could, however, also be 
used to describe legally questionable though nevertheless unethical acts that involved the 
misuse of depositor funds by using them to speculate in high-risk business ventures, typically 
through stock-speculation, for personal gain. Wrecking, then, generally referred to instances 
where banks failed to honor their ‘contractual’ obligation, explicit or implicit, legal or moral, 
to return the deposits entrusted to them due to a criminal or at least unethical misappropriation 
of those funds.7 
According to A. R. Barnett, an ‘Ex-Government Examiner of Failed Banks’, the late 
nineteenth century was an ‘Era of Fraud and Embezzlement’. In an article within the 
progressive magazine The Arena, he claimed that ‘bank-wreckers, embezzlers and defaulters’ 
had fleeced depositors of over one hundred million dollars between 1885 and 1895, and that 
conditions were worsening – in 1892 nine million dollars had been stolen whereas by 1894 
the figure had grown to twenty-five million dollars. Such statistics, according to Barnett, 
represented only what was known. The actual cost was expected to be much higher.8 
                                                
5 Prior to the era under investigation, ‘wrecker’ seems to have appeared infrequently. The earliest use of the term 
within the New York Times appears to have been in 1883. New York Times, February 27, 1883, page unspecified. 
Nevertheless, historian Scott Sandage has noted that ‘Shipwreck was a common metaphor of financial distress in 
popular fiction’ during the antebellum era. Scott A. Sandage, Born Losers: A History of Failure in America 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 55. 
 
6 Francis Wharton and W. M. Draper Lewis, A Treatise on Criminal Law (Vol. I), 10th ed. (Philadelphia: Kay and 
Brother, 1896), 863. 
 
7 For more, see Moxley, ‘Bank Defalcations’, 32-42. 
 
8 A. R. Barnett, ‘The Era of Fraud and Embezzlement: Its Causes and Remedies’, Arena, 14, 1895, 196-204. 
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 It is unclear what these figures were based upon, but, if accurate, they do at least offer 
some indication as to the size of this problem, and what its fiscal toll may have been. 
Quantitative data is scant, so it is difficult – and likely impossible – to provide precise figures 
for the number of embezzlements and ‘wreckages’, and for their fiscal costs to society. As such, 
we need to make use of all that is available towards this end. Perhaps the best approach is to 
base a figure upon the findings of the Comptroller of the Currency's 1911 report. Unlike 
reports from subsequent years, the 1911 report offers figures for the different causes 
responsible for the failures of national banks. Between 1865 and 1911, a total of 517 national 
banks failed. Of those 517, 36.36 percent, or 188 failed due to ‘criminal violations of law’, 
including ‘defalcations’, ‘fraudulent management’, or being ‘wrecked by [a] cashier or other 
employee’.9 These figures were only for national banks. Between 1865 and 1911, 2,098 non-
national banks, including state and private banks of various kinds, failed. No details are 
provided for the causes responsible for these failures.10 Nevertheless, with their being subject 
to myriad degrees of regulation and oversight, from being subject to inspections roughly 
equivalent to national bank examinations to none at all,11 it does not seem rash to assume that 
a large number of these failures were the result of wrecking.  
For the purpose of developing a working estimate, if one applies the conservative rate 
of 36 percent to this figure then that equates to the wrecking-induced failure of approximately 
755 non-national banks. Adding the 188 national banks to this, then it can be estimated that 
943 banks were possibly wrecked over this period. It should be noted that by 1911, there were 
28,551 banks in existence.12 As such, a total of 943 wrecking-induced bank failures appears to 
be meagre in comparison. It is also true that losses were usually recuperated in time, and that 
other banks would often come to the aid of a faltering bank's depositors.13 Nevertheless, the 
                                                
9 Another 20.7 percent, or 107 failed due to the ‘Other violation of law’ of making ‘excessive loans’. The 
Comptroller also included ‘Investments in real estate and mortgages’ within this category. Such practices were 
the cause of 2.71 per cent, or 14 national bank failures. Comptroller of the Currency, 1911 Annual Report, 62nd 
Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912), 27.   
 
10 Comptroller, 1911 Annual Report, 67-8. 
 
11 Comptroller, 1911 Annual Report, 71. 
 
12 Comptroller, 1911 Annual Report, 63-4. 
 
13 For instance, this can be observed in the runs against Frank G. Bigelow's bank. Chicago bankers came to ‘save 
the day’ by injecting funds into the bank in order to thwart further runs and a panic. See Perrysburg Journal, 12 
May, 1905, 3. In terms of losses being recuperated, Elliot Flower conceded this fact in his opinion article on the 
‘safety of banks’, though noted that this process could be inconvenient and could take several years. Elliot Flower, 
‘The Safety of Banks’, Sunday Magazine, 19 May, 1907, 4. 
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data reveals only the total number of banks that failed, and not the total number of banks 
which experienced embezzlement. Moreover, the trauma and sensation of wrecking was felt 
deeply, and far and wide. In any case, as we shall see, the number of incidences was sufficient 
enough to warrant suspicion and commentary. 
In every such instance, news would spread fast not only among depositors but society 
at large, both regional and national. With the development of a national press network, itself 
facilitated by the rapid cabling of information via the telecommunications system, any 
malfeasance that involved the swindling of common people could be communicated almost 
instantaneously across the country. This was especially so by the turn of the century, with the 
explosion of expository journalism in the form of the sensationalistic yellow press and, later, 
muckraking.14 Newspapers, then, were apt to report of wreckers, both because they were fairly 
common and because they were popular villains.15 
 Stories involving bank scandals often contained plentiful drama. Indeed, accounts were 
occasionally so sensational that they bordered on the fantastic. In 1898, The San Francisco Call 
covered the foiling of a ‘Gigantic Conspiracy’ of wreckers to rob their bank and to deceive 
examiners.16 The Call also reported in 1900 on a case in New Jersey involving a woman, Anna 
Hart, adorning ‘male attire’ in order to flee police wanting her for questioning over ‘jewels’ 
she had acquired from William Schrieber, a ‘defaulting bank clerk’.17Another spectacular case 
was the capturing of Paul Stensland, the former president of the failed Milwaukee Avenue 
State Bank, in Morocco, who had fled from Chicago on a German ocean liner in a bid to avoid 
prosecution. The case was described as ‘one of the most dramatic in the history of those all too 
                                                
 
14 Leonard Ray Teel, The Public Press, 1900-1945:  The History of American Journalism (Westport: Praeger, 2006), 
1-37. 
 
15 The search results for newspaper items containing the phrase ‘bank wrecker’ (the searches were conducted 
with the inverted commas) within digital newspaper archives are somewhat illustrative of this. For instance, the 
following databases returned these results: Newspapers.com: 1866-89: 739; 1890-99: 4736; 1900-09: 4248; 1910-
19: 1858; 1920-30: 715. The Library of Congress' ‘Chronicling America’ collection: 1866-89: 290; 1890-9: 1830; 
1900-9: 1688; 1910-9: 946; 1920-2: 110 [1922 is the last year available]. New York Times: 1866-89: 149; 1890-9: 
54; 1900-9: 29; 1910-9: 45; 1920-30: 8. The California Digital Paper Collection: 1866-1889: 3; 1890-9: 93; 1900-9: 
91; 1910-9: 40; 1920-1930: 3. While these figures must be taken cautiously – they sometimes include articles 
which feature both terms independently and results depend upon the quantity of materials available for particular 
periods – they nevertheless offer some indication of the frequency of such reports during particular periods. All 
searches were conducted on November 10, 2015. 
 
16 San Francisco Call, 1 November, 1898, 1. 
 
17 San Francisco Call, 16 October, 1890, 2. 
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frequent events’ within an article featuring lively narration and images charting his travails, 
reproduced within various newspapers across the country.18 In yet another case, a New York 
banker named Joseph G. Robin caused a sensation when he pled insanity against charges of 
looting the Washington Savings Bank in 1910. ‘Alienists’, or psychiatrists had to assess his 
mental state following a suicide attempt. He was subsequently committed ‘as a paranoic’ to an 
asylum before being ‘ejected’. Upon his expulsion, he then pled guilty and was prosecuted [See 
Figure 3].19  
 
 
Figure 3. Article on Robin in the New York Daily Tribune, 8 January, 1911. From the Library of 
Congress’ Chronicling America digital collection. 
 
While such wreckers were situated within specific locations and their fiscal effects 
                                                
18 The same article appeared in at least seven Southern and Mid-Western newspapers. ‘How Stensland Was 
Captured’, Donaldsonville Chief (Louisiana); Guthrie Daily Leader (Oklahoma); Jackson Herald (Missouri); 
Perrysburg Journal (Ohio); Rising Son (Missouri); Virginia Enterprise (Virginia); Willmar Tribune (Minnesota), 
September-October, 1906. 
 
19  New York Times, 30 December, 1910, 1-2; New York Times, 28 December, 1910; Daily Missoulian, 29 
December, 1910, 1; Salt Lake Tribune, 6 January, 1911, 1. 
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were largely confined to their immediate vicinities, commentary on their antics could spread 
widely. This was because the figure was relatable almost everywhere. Florida's The Sun 
demonstrated this in a 1906 editorial. The article, titled ‘Jail for Bank Wreckers’, took the 
‘failure of a Chicago bank as a cue for the discussion of bank failures’. Though it did not 
mention the bank specifically, it is highly likely that it was referring to Stensland's Milwaukee 
Avenue State Bank, given the time, place, and description of events. Despite the considerable 
distance between the two states, it charged that the case was nevertheless relevant since 
banking was a ‘leading’ component of Florida's commercial system and that the same principle 
applied to Florida as much as it did to Chicago: that it was ‘IMPOSSIBLE FOR A BANK TO 
FAIL UNLESS ITS OFFICIALS WERE DISHONEST’. Consequently, all bank failures were 
alleged to have been the result of banker malfeasance; of their ‘BETRAYAL OF THE TRUST 
IMPOSED’ in them. Panics were never sufficient explanations, as ‘straight’ and ‘honest’ 
bankers would ‘weather the storm’. This was not necessarily true. Still, the article 
demonstrates how specific cases of wreckers could be discussed far and wide. It also shows that 
the phenomenon was not regionally restricted. These figures could be anywhere, in 
representation and in reality.20 
Further still, accounts of wreckers made for titillating crime stories, both real and 
imagined. ‘Uncle Sam: Detective’, a series of short stories claiming to be ‘true stories of the … 
Federal Detection Agency’, featured an edition in 1916 titled ‘The Bank Wrecker’, involving a 
detective, Billy Gard, uncovering and arresting a crooked cashier.21 Collier's magazine featured 
an article in 1912 titled ‘Trapping the Bank Looter’, which was essentially a collection of 
exciting tales of scrupulous bank examiners catching out clever crooks.22 If not a villain in a 
true-crime story, then the wrecker's other literary role was as a character in a fictional morality 
tale. Popular author Oliver Optic's 1876 novel, Living Too Fast; Or, the Confessions of a Bank 
Officer, tells the story of ‘defaulter’ Paley Glasswood and his ‘downward career of crime’.23 
                                                
20 Sun (Florida), 25 August, 1906, 9. 
 
21 William Atherton DuPuy, ‘Uncle Sam: Detective. The Bank Wrecker’, in DuPuy, Uncle Sam: Detective. True 
Stories of Celebrated Crimes (New York: McKinlay, Stone and Mackenzie, 1916), 24-47. There were various other 
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the Outside’, 136-153, and ‘The Bank Bookkeeper’, 214-230. 
 
22 Frank J. Arkins, ‘Trapping the Bank Looter’, Collier's, no. 49 (18 May, 1912): 34-38. 
 
23 William T. Adams [Oliver Optic], Living Too Fast; Or, The Confessions of a Bank Officer (Boston: Lee and 
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Likewise, Phil A. Rush's 1905 novel, The Teller's Tale: A Bank Story for Bankers, A Law Story 
for Lawyers, A Love Story for Lovers, tells the story of two bank employees, with one that 
prospers due to their integrity and one that flounders due to their criminality.24  Further 
attesting to the issue’s popularity, the motion picture, then in its infancy as a popular mode of 
entertainment, was also used to tell such a story, as represented by the 1906 silent film, The 
Bank Defaulter.25 There was more to wrecking, however, than entertainment value. 
 
* * * 
 
The issue resonated largely due to the nature of the crime and those that committed it, 
particularly in regards to their character and their class. Critics would often attempt to 
demonstrate the criminality of wrecking, and would seek to challenge any notion that it was 
somehow less criminal than other common and openly condemned infringements committed 
by more ‘lowly’ figures. In one instance, an opinion piece on ‘Bank Wrecking’ in New Orleans’ 
the Herald compared wreckers with frontier horse thieves, once considered the ‘lowest 
criminals of the day’. Wreckers were, it asserted, far worse, as while a horse thief would injure 
only the owner of the horse, a wrecker would injure vast numbers of people, often leaving ‘old 
widows’ destitute and orphans ‘dependent on the charity of others’.26 In another, A. R. Barnett, 
the ‘Ex-Government Examiner’, argued that these cases were little more than ‘robberies’. This, 
Barnett insisted, was their ‘true name’, and a bank wrecker, whether a ’trusted officer’ or an 
‘employee’, was a thief ‘just as much so as the man who at night blows open the safe and takes 
what he can find’. Indeed, the wrecker was considered by Barnett to be, in all likelihood, a 
greater threat than a bank burglar. Whereas the burglar, formerly the ‘greatest danger’, could 
‘make away’ with thousands by blasting open vaults, cracking safes, and fleeing the scene all 
in a single hit, a ‘skilled financier or bank clerk’ could steal millions by abstracting or 
misapplying funds and falsifying accounts ‘coolly and quietly’ within their institution over the 
course of many years. Regardless of whether they rationalized their crimes by promising to 
                                                
24 Phil A. Rush, The Teller's Tale: A Banking Story for Bankers, A Law Story for Lawyers, A Love Story for Lovers 
(New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1905). 
 
25 The film is considered ‘lost’ by the Internet Movie Database. ‘The Bank Defaulter’, imdb <URL: 
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repay what they were ‘borrowing’, it remained that they were thieves and that they had 
violated their moral and professional duty. Despite a burglar's capacity for loud and tangible 
acts of destruction, it is clear that Barnett considered a wrecker's capacity for quiet and 
intangible acts to have greater consequences. Both were crimes. Wrecking was worse.27      
 There was, however, an apparent difference in form. Stereotypical criminals, like 
burglars, were expected to be brutish and nasty; to be hardened criminals. Barnett described 
the burglar as a ‘rough character’ that had been ‘brought up in a life of crime’ and made ‘no 
pretense of anything else’. Wreckers, on the other hand, conveyed themselves to be refined 
and noble; to be esteemed citizens. A wrecker would have the privileges of ‘education, 
refinement, and moral surroundings’, would pose as an ‘honorable gentleman’, would be a 
philanthropist, and would be a respected church member. All of this was to cultivate a 
favourable image to win the trust of their peers and their depositors. Manipulating or abusing 
esteemed symbols and behaviours for the purpose of exploiting the trust they could develop 
in others was their modus operandi. This made them much harder to detect than the standard 
criminal figure, and thus more effective.28 
 The dichotomy between rough and honourable was flawed. Stereotypical criminals 
were exactly that. They could be rough figures as much as they could be honourable. However, 
the point should not be dismissed entirely as there remained an essential difference. Wreckers 
were not anonymous people that operated in a hit-and-run, cash-and-grab manner. They were 
usually renowned and respected gentlemen that gradually violated the trust that had been 
placed in them. This is what made their crimes particularly shocking and notorious. If one 
could not trust society's esteemed citizens to ensure the safety of their money, then who could 
they trust? In theory, then, any banker could have been a wrecker. 
 Whatever the particular circumstances, there was agreement that wreckers were 
generally well regarded citizens. James R. Walsh, for instance, had been a ‘former king of 
finance’ according to the Chicago Daily Tribune. He had been a respected member of Chicago's 
financial community. His indictment as a wrecker thus came as a shock.29 Even those very 
                                                
27 Barnett, ‘The Era of Fraud and Embezzlement’, 196-7. 
 
28 Barnett, ‘The Era of Fraud and Embezzlement’, 197. 
29 The quote comes from Chicago Daily Tribune, 1 October, 1909, 1. This article appeared several years after the 
Walsh incident.   
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highly esteemed by other bankers could be wreckers, such as Frank G. Bigelow, who had at 
one time been the president of the American Bankers’ Association (ABA). He was later erased 
from their record.30 Other cases had been conveyed as ‘rags-to-riches-to-rags’ stories.31 In 1881, 
Oscar L. Baldwin, an embezzling cashier at the failed Mechanics' National Bank of Newark in 
New Jersey, represented such an instance. An article in the New York Times succinctly charted 
his background from his time as a ‘boy’ entering the bank, through to his rise as an ‘honored 
and trusted’ cashier who was a ‘Vestryman of Trinity Church’, was ‘looked upon as a model of 
uprightness and business integrity’, and ‘moved in the highest circles of Newark society’. 
Baldwin had then ‘fallen’ by appropriating ‘other people's money’ and sought to hide the losses 
by laundering funds into speculative and depreciating stocks.32 Robin was another example. 
Originally named Joseph Robinovitch, Robin had emigrated as a boy with his family from 
Russia. He later pursued a number of business interests before settling with banking, only to 
result in his demise. For the New York Daily Tribune, the story was not ‘about the rich 
banker's downfall’ though. This was certainly ‘no new story’. Instead, it was about the ‘lonely 
boy Robinovitch and how he ate his way like an acid through the thickly folded fabric of New 
York affairs’.33 Regardless of their origins, bankers were generally wealthy and respected men. 
This is partly what made their cases, and the reports, so intriguing and scandalous. 
Despite any sensationalism, it was not as if wreckers were depicted endearingly. Their 
crimes had a real impact, and to emphasize the scandal and tragedy of such cases, reports would 
focus upon victims, often along class lines – wreckers were characterized as corrupt capitalists 
fleecing the vulnerable. Such was the case with the Chicago Daily Tribune's 1906 report on 
the collapse of Stensland's bank. On the day that the bank had been forced closed for 
examination, the bank was reported to have been ‘Besieged by Thousands’ in scenes of ‘clamor 
                                                
30 See Perrysburg Journal (Ohio), May 12, 1905, 3. In addition to the Perrysburg Journal, this article appeared in 
at least three other newspapers: The Iron County Register (Missouri), The Donaldsville Chief (Louisiana), and 
the Willmar Tribune (Minnesota). Bigelow was listed as the President for 1903 within the proceedings for the 
American Bankers' Association's 1904 convention, though was removed from the following year's proceedings. 
See James R. Branch [ed.], Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Convention (New York: American Banker, 1904), 
v, and Branch [ed.], Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Convention (New York: Daily Bank and Stockholder, 
1905), v. 
 
31 This phrase is borrowed from Mihm. Stephen Mihm, A Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con Men and the 
Making of the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 185. 
 
32 New York Times, 1 November, 1881, page unspecified. 
 
33 New York Daily Tribune, 8 January, 1911, 3. 
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and mute anxiety’. It claimed that in the event that the bank failed to repay its depositors, it 
was ‘feared that distress and perhaps ruin [would] be the portion of the thousands of poor folk 
whose savings were all intrusted to the institution’. One depositor, Henry Koepke, a grocer, 
husband, and father of two children – a working family man – was reported to have fatally 
shot himself upon learning of the bank's condition. Another, John E. Viser, had died of a heart 
attack following the news. Two unnamed women were reported to have been left homeless.34 
The victims of Robins' wrecking were also detailed within the press. Though in a less 
emotionally evocative manner, the New York Times reported that his bank's 7,000 depositors 
came from the ‘poorer districts in the neighborhood of Columbus Circle’. Interestingly, it 
claimed that many were ‘negroes’ and remarked on how poorly ‘versed’ many of the depositors 
were. It is unclear whether there was supposed to be a connection between these two facts, 
though it was clearly implying that society's most vulnerable people had been preyed upon.35  
The villainous nature of the figure is also evident within the plot of The Bank Defaulter, 
the 1906 film. A wealthy and seemingly respectable banker turns out to be a criminal who 
steals from his working-poor depositors, who are subsequently left impoverished. He is 
eventually captured and trialled, only to be acquitted, whereas one of his victims, after being 
left destitute, is convicted for stealing bread.36 Wreckers, then, were not glamorized. They 
were conveyed as crooks that would steal from the poor to give to themselves. 
 Nevertheless, it was not just lower classes affected by wrecking. It was sometimes the 
case that a wrecker's activities bore consequences upon a network of interconnected banks. 
Branching was generally prohibited at the time, though this did not prevent directorship, 
investment, or influence within multiple banks. The banking scandal involving Walsh 
represents such an instance. Walsh had been a ‘leading banker’ of Chicago, and at the helm of 
various types of banks, including national, savings, and trusts, all catering toward people of 
varying demographics. Following the collapse of his banking interests in 1905, runs ensued 
across his banks. Though the majority occurred at his savings banks – banks typically for 
working people – crowds, apparently not seen since the ‘black days of [the panic of] '93’ were 
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35 New York Times, 30 December, 1910, 1-2. 
 
36 This description is based upon those provided by M. Keith Booker and Steve Fraser. See M. Keith Booker, Film 
and the American Left: A Research Guide (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999), 2, and Steve Fraser, 
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composed of individuals from a host of backgrounds. The Chicago Daily Tribune reported that 
the ‘solicitous’ early depositors seeking to rescue their funds were ‘mostly small business men, 
clerks, and women employed in downtown offices’. Overall, the crowd was composed of those 
‘classed between the poor and the well to do’ - in other words, people from the middle-class.37 
Wrecking, then, was a crime against society more broadly, committed by those that were 
supposed to be respectable. Ultimately, their actions challenged the idea that class and 
character alone were enough to evaluate a bank’s strength and stability. 
 
* * * 
 
In addition to class, wrecking was also understood in terms of gender. This was largely 
because it was almost always committed by men. This is understandable given that banking 
was a male dominated business. Regardless, gender conceptions guided how people interpreted 
the problem. We have seen already how much of the sensation around wrecking stemmed 
from high profile cases that were committed by once respectable gentlemen. The figure also 
extended to junior bank employees, however, who were typically conveyed to be young men 
that had succumbed to the desire to get rich quickly. Either way, notions of masculinity 
informed the issue and these two models were different in form rather than substance. 
Regardless of position, if one was a male and within a bank, then they were potentially capable 
of running off with depositor funds. A 1907 newspaper article titled ‘Record is Bad’ made this 
clear. It covered both forms within its analysis and asserted that they were similarly motivated 
by ‘High Living, Fast Women and Speculation’. Perhaps more spectacularly, it charged that 
‘SPECULATION[,] DRINK AND WOMEN CONSPIRE TO RUIN SCORES OF BANKERS 
AND BANK EMPLOYEES EACH YEAR’.38 
The novels by Optic and Rush nicely capture the gendered image of wreckers. Optic 
narrates from the perspective of a former embezzler, charting his journey from being an 
ambitious young man that gains employment in a bank to being an embezzler that flees to 
Europe. Glasswood's descent to criminality was caused by living beyond his means – he started 
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to ‘borrow’ from his bank to finance his expensive tastes and to court and wed a prominent 
young woman. By the end, however, upon seeing the error of his ways and confessing his sins, 
he returns home and establishes an honest and successful business.39 Rush's narrative follows 
two young men from the South who eventually succumb to the temptation to get rich quickly 
and decide to ‘borrow’ funds in order to invest them in securities. Though escaping exposure, 
one of the men is overcome by guilt and vows to repay the money and never repeat his actions. 
The other continues to embezzle. Prior to dying of tuberculosis, the latter confesses to his 
banking companion. The defalcations are then discovered following his death, and the other 
reformed banker subsequently falsely confesses to the crime to preserve his friend's honour. 
He is then charged and convicted. However, he is later exonerated and subsequently revered 
for his extreme devotion to his friend. He then becomes a leading banker.40 Both stories thus 
sought to demonstrate what it was to be a good man, informed by the Protestant ethic that 
asserted that earthly rewards came to those that lived and worked virtuously. This was the 
moral of the stories, which clearly were intended to reach young men of the era. That Optic 
and Rush chose defaulting bank employees to deliver this message suggests that this stereotype 
was a popular and thus poignant figure to do so. 
Additionally, rather than being fodder for plot lines, satirical works could be especially 
thoughtful and aggressive, exploring themes like gender in a facetious though scathing manner. 
An excellent example of this is found in Rosenfeld's song, performed by the ‘popular comedian’ 
J. H. Jordan. Much occurs within this song, demonstrating that a satire could be used to explore 
and explain this phenomenon. It addresses the fallacious nature of trusting others based upon 
their association to esteemed and prestigious institutions and explores the typical reaction to 
such crimes and their sequence of events. Importantly, it also addresses the motivation and 
actual character of these figures. It carried the message that young men of the era were being 
encouraged to get rich quick by any means in order to conspicuously consume as macho bread-
winners. This was what inspired wreckers, and once successful they would be laughing all the 
way from the bank. They were crooks all along, they were confidence men, and they were 
products of the Gilded Age. I've Just Been Down to the Bank was a lesson as much as it was a 
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comedy [See Figure 4].41 
 
 
Figure 4. Illustrated Cover Page for I've Just Been Down to the Bank, 1885. From the Library of 
Congress’ digital collections. 
 
There was an exception to the rule, though. The 1879-80 case of Sarah E. Howe and 
the Ladies' Deposit of Boston marked an incidence of a female wrecker. Howe established her 
bank to attract deposits from ‘single ladies, old and young’ – essentially widows and unmarried 
younger women – promising an exceptionally high rate of interest (eight percent each month). 
By September 1880, it was estimated that the bank had 1,200 depositors with accounts totalling 
                                                
41 Rosenfeld, I've Just Been Down to the Bank. 
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$500,000. It turned out that Howe had been running what would later be dubbed a Ponzi 
scheme, using new deposits to pay the principle and interest promised upon demand. An 
article in the Atlantic Monthly by Henry A. Clapp explored the case in great detail, particularly 
fascinated by the nature of the scheme, the power of the press to expose scandal, Howe's 
character, and the sex of the perpetrator and her victims. Given that Howe's victims were of 
little means, it described her scheme as a ‘peculiar kind of highwayman's justice’, taking ‘from 
the poor to give to the poor’.42 
This was not a glorification of Howe. Howe, allegedly a former convict and psychiatric 
patient, was described as an amoral swindler that held ‘contempt for her sex's powers of 
understanding’, stealing from them to fund a lavish lifestyle, which included the construction 
of a luxurious house. Although a pathological liar, she had a ‘great natural gift of utterance, 
and a singularly plausible manner, and … often persuaded the incredulous in the very teeth of 
their better judgment’. Upon moving the bank in to a new building in early 1880, money had 
been spent on ‘repairs, on a new conservatory, and on plants, pictures, plate, and furniture’. 
Howe also conveyed herself as a philanthropist, offering a service to improve the lives of 
socially and economically vulnerable people. Women trusted her because she was a woman – 
she was ‘sympathetic’ to her female clients, apparently unlike male bankers who treated them 
with contempt.43 All of this was to generate the illusion of respectability and prosperity in 
order to inspire confidence. Howe was, in short, a confidence woman. She was eventually 
exposed through the press, convicted, and sent to prison. 
Much of the sensation was highly misogynistic, depicting women as inherently inept 
with financial matters. Debate emerged over whether Howe actually was a fraud or if she was 
merely incompetent due to her femininity. M. A. Dodge highlighted the absurdity of 
gendering the case, demonstrating that men, as well as women, had been victims of financial 
fraud.44 Nevertheless, wrecking was taken by many to be a crime committed by men. The fact 
that there was a debate over Howe’s culpability is significant. It suggests that male bankers 
were particularly threatening as they were popularly construed to have the intellectual 
capacity to deliberately swindle others. In reality, however, although as a woman Howe may 
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have been exceptional, she does demonstrate that trusting anyone, regardless of gender, was 
to take a risk. 
 
* * * 
 
The fascination with wrecking tapped into and contributed to the era’s drive for social 
and economic reform. Indeed, commentators knew that in addressing the issue, highlighting 
and denouncing a problem was one thing, whereas offering a solution was another. Resultantly, 
they sought to offer remedial measures, especially during the 1890s and 1900s when reform 
sentiment was rapidly proliferating.  
Immediately, this was upon a legislative and judicial level. The Sun, for example, called 
both for ‘more stringent laws, requiring a more careful and more frequent accounting to the 
people’ and for prosecutions to be ‘pushed’ and convictions ‘SECURED’. Laws for ‘small thieves’ 
were apparently adequate. It was now time for the ‘big thieves to be looked after’. Tougher 
sentencing was thought to be a preventative measure. If it were known that the penalties were 
tough, then the risks involved would increase, thus minimizing opportunism.45 The Herald 
was much harsher. The frontier horse thieves were hung, and that apparently ceased the 
problem. A bank wrecker deserved ‘no better treatment’. Although it is unclear whether it 
was seriously suggesting wreckers be executed, it nevertheless advocated they be subject to 
the full-force of the law to receive their just deserts. This was retributive justice as much as it 
was preventative. 46 
Indeed, the failure of the nation’s legal systems to adequately punish offenders was 
subject to considerable commentary. It was common to focus upon justice issues, especially an 
alleged discrepancy in treatment. Here, the difference between a stereotypical criminal and a 
wrecker was especially pronounced. ‘The Man Higher Up’, a regular satirical column within 
The Evening World featuring fictional dialogues between common folk and a well-to-do 
informant, perfectly captured this sentiment in 1903, remarking that: 
If a crook breaks into a bank, blows a safe and gets off with a few 
thousand they hound him to the ends of the earth, soak him for life 
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when they get him, and a suggestion to pardon him would be looked 
upon by the President of the United States as an insult. That is the 
difference between a crook who breaks in from the outside and a bank 
president who breaks out from the inside.47 
 
Despite their shared criminality, it was believed that they were still treated better than their 
stereotypical counterparts. If convicted and not pardoned, they were treated luxuriously. The 
Man Higher Up quipped that a wrecker was given the ‘privilege of putting up rugs and a 
pianola’ within their cell. The Herald article complained that despite their damage, wreckers 
received the ‘insignificant sentence of one year’, which was often commuted for ‘good 
behavior’. While in prison, unlike the other convicts, they were ‘treated with courtesy’, 
eschewed ‘hard labor’, and were permitted to leave prison during the evenings to ‘visit their 
friends’. 48  In response to convicted wrecker Harry J. Welty being granted clemency to 
celebrate Thanksgiving with his family in 1913, The Seattle Star editorialized on its front page 
that his release from Walla Walla prison represented an act of class injustice. Although it was 
in favour of releasing former convicts back into society on rehabilitative grounds – Welty had 
apparently been ‘born again’ - it nevertheless charged that this was an instance of class 
discrimination. The indigent convicts, many in prison allegedly due to stealing out of necessity, 
would never receive this kind of treatment. It then asked: 
HOW LONG IS IT GOING TO BE BEFORE OFFICIALS CEASE TO 
WORSHIP THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAR AND GIVE THE POOR CUSS 
WITHOUT MONEY AND SOCIAL PRESTIGE THE SAME DEAL THE 
RICH AND INFLUENTIAL CROOK RECEIVES IN THE 
ADMINISTERING OF JUSTICE?49 
 
It was easy to wreck a bank. It was apparently quite the opposite for wrecking one's status and 
class entitlements.50 Overturning this alleged discrepancy of treatment was thus essential in 
order for the crime to be taken seriously and to actually create a disincentive. 
                                                
47 Evening World, 21 January, 1903, 10. 
 
48 Herald, 18 April, 1912, 4. 
 
49 Seattle Star, 27 November, 1913, 1. 
 
50 There is merit to these assertions. For instance, Edward L. Harper, president of the Fidelity Bank in Cincinnati, 
was pardoned less than six years into a ten year sentence. Semi-Weekly Interior Journal (Kentucky), 5 May, 1893, 
4. David A. Sullivan, ‘wrecker of the Union Bank of Brooklyn’, had been permitted by his warden to leave Sing 
Sing prison to spend four hours within New York City ‘without being under guard’. His ‘hard labour’ was also 
alleged to have consisted of cushy tasks such as bookkeeping and chauffeuring his warden around in the latter's 
vehicle. Special to the New York Times, 30 October, 1914, page unspecified. 
 
  III. 79 
 
Still, most recognised that this was not enough. Former examiner A. R. Barnett 
proposed a range of practical measures to prevent fraud and embezzlement, most involving 
better supervision and for the ‘young and growing generation’ to be inculcated with honest 
and good business practices. This would end the era of fraud and embezzlement. By 
implication, the contemporary generation had been lacking in moral aptitude.51 Moreover, the 
Herald article went further than calling for harsher punishments. It implied that this was a 
systemic issue and charged that it was up to the United States Government to insure depositors 
against losses. Banks were too unreliable. People would actually be confident to bank if they 
knew that were not risking everything by trusting a banker. This was not a unique idea. As we 
shall see in Chapter V, Federal deposit insurance had been an election issue in 1908 and various 
states had implemented their own versions following the panic of 1907.52 Here was an instance 
where criticism of wrecking was directly linked to a specific reform platform. 
 Additionally, literature was utilized to advance practical and legislative reform. 
Something particularly interesting about The Teller's Tale, for instance, is that it is really more 
a treatise surrounded by a story. The novel format is used to disseminate otherwise fairly 
complex arguments to readers in such a way to make them understandable and relatable, and 
possibly even entertaining. Rush makes his intentions clear immediately. In the first several 
pages, a dedication is made to the ‘Faithful bank employees of America’; fictionalised 
newspaper reports of bank scandals resembling those ‘seen almost daily in the public press’ are 
included; and he asks if a system ‘permitting’ such scandals actually deserved the public's 
confidence at all.53 Later within the narrative, a practical solution to bank embezzlement is 
proposed.54 Through his characters, he warns that this problem would ‘destroy’ banks if left to 
continue. If not due to embezzlement itself, banks would be ruined by popular distrust. The 
‘fact’ that banks were considered easy targets by embezzlers had ‘traveled to the reading public, 
and the intelligent depositor [knew] that his deposit may not be held safely, notwithstanding 
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the integrity of the management’. It was ‘impossible that such knowledge should fail to have 
its influence against the continued and increasing use of the banks by the public’.55 His remedy 
was to increase transparency. Every transaction was to be recorded on passbooks and certified 
by the cashier and president; accounts were to be publicized periodically within newspapers 
for depositors to inspect and verify; and the bank itself was to be thoroughly accountable to its 
stockholders. Within the narrative, the proposal is accepted and enacted into law, bringing 
stability with it.56  
Regardless of whether such a measure would have actually been sufficient, The Teller's 
Tale both demonstrates an awareness of the issue and an attempt to solve it. Curiously, this 
was both at a cultural and a legislative level. Values had to be cultivated in an age of getting 
rich quick, while structural measures had to be enforced to prevent wrecking. Good bankers 
had to be raised while systemic faults had to be eliminated. Overall, whatever solution 
reformers may have preferred, it was recognized that something had to be done and this 
typically involved some kind of state intervention. Until then, there lacked an adequate 
disincentive for bankers or their employees to rob depositors and wreck their banks. Even if 
this could not be achieved, the likes of deposit insurance would at least protect depositors from 
the misdeeds of bankers. All such proposals reflected the era’s popular desire for change. 
  
* * * 
 
Underlying the fascination with wreckers was a specific kind of confidence issue. 
Unlike wholesale banking panics, which were periodic, wrecking could occur at any time, at 
any place, and in any kind of bank. Such criminality was thus a constant threat, one which 
persisted over this entire period, inside and outside times of financial strain and panic. This 
was, at the very least, how many perceived the situation. Cases were reported often and in 
great detail. The problem also inspired critical commentary which was expressed via assorted 
cultural artefacts from editorials to novels, and even emerging mediums like the motion 
picture. The media thence transmitted the issue far and wide, likely amplifying it in effect. 
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Indeed, such representations contributed in no small part to the construction of a figure that 
came to feature within the popular imagination. Even so, wrecking was still an actual problem 
and may well have resulted in the failure of over 940 banks. Either way, millions of people 
were confronted with cases or stories of individual banking malfeasances. Consequently, 
wrecking generated suspicion and distrust and was therefore a significant factor that 
contributed to the broader confidence problem within banking.  
Beyond individual malfeasances, many were also concerned with structure and 
interconnection. As the next chapter shall illustrate, various American people, including 
agrarians and urban reformers, believed that bankers were collectively trying to swindle them, 
or at least profit from them at their expense. Such thinking went beyond the belief that some 
bankers would inevitably fleece some people, and posited instead that bankers, or at least some 





Agrarians and Aristocrats, Progressives and Plutocrats: 
 
 ‘The People’, Money Monopolies, and Bankers as Peculiar ‘Others’ 
 
Take the wheels out of your head, my dear old business man, machinist, 
carpenter, laboring man, or farmer. Cut the string your banker is pulling on 
your thinking machine, and make a few figures for your own benefit. Get a 
barber to cut the wool out of your eyes, so that you can see and think a little 
bit about your own condition. Wake up! The banker has a mortgage on you 
and your prosperity, and it beehooves [sic] you to get to work. He has already 
made slaves and serfs out of millions of your fellowmen, and he is working the 
same game on you. 
 
 - James B. Goode, 1896.1 
 
Is it not extremely important that we should know by what method these 
bankers become the arbiters of our destinies? They were not selected by us to 
do this. Just so long as we allow them to dominate by the system they employ 
the road to success is closed to the vast majority of farmers, wage earners, and 
others employed in different pursuits of life. 
 
 - Charles A. Lindbergh, 1913.2 
 
 As had been the case throughout the Republic's earlier history, what it meant to be an 
‘American’ and to be counted among ‘the People’ was highly contested throughout the Gilded 
Age and Progressive Era. Race, ethnicity, class, and gender were all factors that could 
determine one's social status and inclusiveness. Particular groups could view those that did not 
meet some specific conception as outsiders, or ‘others’. This is most evident with the rise of 
Jim Crow, immigration restrictions, Indigenous dispossession, and male-only suffrage. All 
elevated certain people and devalued and even demonised others.3 Occurring in adjunct to this 
there was one peculiar figure, however, that aroused considerable distrust and disdain, and 
                                                
1 James B. Goode, The Modern Banker: A Story of His Rapid Rise and Dangerous Designs (New York: Charles H. 
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was often divorced from popular conceptions of ‘the People’. This figure was ‘the banker’. 
 This was a phenomenon that predated the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Banking 
had been marred by controversy since the very founding of the nation, and critics conveyed 
bankers to be distinct from ‘the People’. Bankers were at times construed to be a threat to 
democracy and, by extension, a threat to the Republic. Beginning around the 1870s, such 
thinking quickly re-emerged and took on a renewed energy. In addition to concerns with 
failure and the malfeasance of individual bankers, many were also concerned with banker 
interconnectivity and the increasing concentration of money and credit, especially towards 
the turn of the century. Following the Civil War, such sentiment was primarily advanced by 
agrarians, many of who believed that a cabal of bankers – or the ‘money power’ – was 
monopolising and manipulating the money supply in order to extort borrowers and to preserve 
the value of their financial assets. Agrarian disdain was often expressed in extremely hostile 
terms, often alleging conspiracy and occasionally entailing anti-Semitism. By the twentieth 
century, urban reformers became the primary critics of money monopolisation. Progressives 
and muckrakers took the lead from the agrarians, and in the process sanitised and 
intellectualised such sentiment. Their focus had shifted to the ‘money trust’ and how bankers 
used and abused their control over ‘other people's money’, which they sought to demonstrate 
in a more temperate and impartial manner.4 Nevertheless, they retained the conceptual and 
rhetorical division between ‘bankers’ and ‘the People’. Agrarians and Progressives alike 
believed that bankers – primarily national bankers and Wall Street financiers – were operating 
in ways that conflicted with the interests of common Americans. These bankers were a class 
unto themselves, and their conduct threatened to undermine America's democracy. They were 
taken to be anything other than ‘the People’ and were erecting, intentionally or otherwise, an 
aristocracy or a plutocracy. 
 While it is true that much of the criticism concerned specific kinds of bankers, these 
criticisms were reflective of how easily and intensely people could theoretically distrust and 
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dislike bankers. These figures represented the quintessential banker, the kind that set the 
stereotype, and represented what bankers were like if left largely unchecked and unrestrained 
by society. Furthermore, agrarians almost routinely equated ‘national banker’ with ‘banker’ 
and progressives sought to demonstrate that the ‘money trust’ had reached all sections of the 
country and had drawn in banks of varying kinds, even including savings banks, mutual and 
stock. The real or imagined financial interconnectivity between banks thus made it difficult 
to assess which institutions were involved in these networks. In any case, even if people did 
differentiate, these criticisms were still applied to thousands of the nation’s bankers. Such ideas 
were transmitted to millions of people via political tracts, the press, and Presidential campaigns. 
Ultimately, this ‘othering’ represents an extreme kind of distrust: many people lacked 
confidence in bankers to the extent that they saw them as a threat to their very existence. It is 
thus not at all implausible that such animosity helped to keep many people away from banks. 
To demonstrate this, rather than offer a detailed narrative of these movements, this chapter 
will instead provide a succinct overview, followed by an exploration of their major tropes and 
concepts. 
 
* * * 
 
 Gilded Age and Progressive Era notions of banker-controlled money monopolies 
persisted for at least forty years. Prior to the twentieth century, such a belief was exhibited 
primarily within the currency conflicts that emerged following the 1873 panic and lasted until 
the official establishment of the gold standard in 1900. During the Civil War, the Federal 
Government established a national currency in the form of fiat paper notes, or ‘Greenbacks’.5 
Although these notes were not redeemable for specie, gold and silver remained to be legal 
tender. After 1863, so too did the notes issued by national banks. State bank notes remained 
but were gradually taxed out of existence. Still, there were various forms of currency 
circulating. Later, to curb inflation, silver was demonetised in 1873 and Greenbacks could be 
                                                
5 Greenbacks refer both to the original demand notes issued during 1861 and the ‘United States Notes’ which 
were printed following the Government's decision to establish the notes as full legal tender in 1862. For more, 
see Robert P. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction, paperback 
edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 15-55, esp. 28 and 46. 
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redeemed for gold in 1879 and onwards as a result of the Specie Payment Resumption Act of 
1875. Both were intended to contract the money supply. Money was to be reduced to gold-
based national bank notes, thus removing a federally issued currency in favour of a quasi-
public one largely controlled by private interests – namely, national bankers. In response, 
many agrarians from the South and West reacted promptly, believing deflationary policies to 
be against their interests, and favourable only to creditors. This, they believed, was to the 
detriment of producers who relied upon credit, as it would be harder to repay debts and more 
interest would need to be paid due to an artificially scarce money supply. It did not help that 
there were relatively few national banks in the South and West.6 Resultantly, such bankers 
came to be seen as monopolists attempting to exert control over the nation's money supply – 
a particularly pertinent issue given that farmers were already facing ever-increasing levels of 
debt and declining incomes.7 
 Though organisations such as the National Labor Union and the Labor Reform parties 
had formed in the late 1860s and early 1870s to address financial issues, the Greenback party 
was the first significant party to emerge in response to deflationary policies. Inspired by the 
pre-Civil War ideas of Edward Kellogg concerning governmental currency, ‘Greenbackers’ 
sought to retain Government-issued fiat money precisely to ensure that those that relied upon 
credit would not be extorted through a contracted currency. The inflation of greenbacks, they 
believed, would also prevent declining prices. Forming in 1874 and contesting in the 1876 
presidential elections, the party persisted into the 1880s. 8  Following their demise, the 
inflationist cause was taken up by the likes of the ‘silverites’, the Agrarian Movement, and 
subsequently by the People's Party, or the ‘Populists’, in 1891. By the 1890s, even Democrats 
sought to inflate the currency by proposing to repeal the tax imposed upon state bank notes.9 
Various pro-silver advocates believed that silver had been demonetised in the ‘crime of '73’, 
                                                
6 See Benjamin J. Klebaner, American Commercial Banking: A History (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 67-9. 
 
7 See Douglas O. Steeples and David Whitten, Democracy in Desperation: The Depression of 1893 (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1998), 29, and Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 
1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 7-8, 44-50, and 113-9. 
 
8 See Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American Finance, 1865-1879 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1964), and Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition 
and the Politics of Finance in America (Cambridge: The University of Cambridge Press, 1997), 48-52. 
 
9 Fritz Redlich, The Molding of American Banking: Men and Ideas, combined reprint of 1947 and 1951 volumes 
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and subsequently sought to ensure that American currency was based upon a bi-metallic silver 
and gold standard of sixteen-to-one. In both cases, in their bid to retain or inflate the national 
currency, Greenbackers and silverites accused bankers – primarily national bankers and those 
of Wall Street – of deliberately manipulating the money supply in order to extract high interest 
rates and to maintain the value of their financial assets, primarily their bonds. This, they 
argued, was exploiting the ‘producing’ classes.10  
These bankers, then, became national villains intent upon establishing a kind of 
aristocratic society, as represented within a plethora of artefacts, from political tracts to novels, 
which expressed dismay and often extreme hostility, especially during the 1890s. After various 
legislative conflicts, which included pro-silver enactments such as the Bland-Allison Act of 
1878 and the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, the currency battle came to a head during 
the 1896 presidential elections. Democratic and Populist candidate William Jennings Bryan 
took on the silver cause, declaring that gold advocates would not ‘crucify mankind upon a cross 
of gold’.  He subsequently lost to Republican William McKinley, who went on to instate the 
Gold Standard Act in 1900. In conjunction with an economic upswing and high farm prices, 
the inflationist cause and the currency battle had by and large dissipated.11 
 With the currency question ‘settled’, urban progressives took over the mantle as the 
foremost critics of financial monopolisation during the 1900s and 1910s, especially after the 
1907 panic. Their chief concern was for ‘other people's money’, mainly in the form of bank 
deposits though also insurance funds, and how it was being misused by a ‘money trust’ to 
bolster its financial and commercial hegemony. This was in large part a reaction to the 
consolidation of ‘financial capitalism’ and the tremendous degree of corporate mergers and 
acquisitions occurring at the time. During the ‘Great Merger Movement’ between 1895 and 
1904, some 1,800 independent businesses were consolidated into 157 ‘trusts’ or gigantic 
corporate enterprises which generally controlled significant market shares.12 Capital was being 
concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, and industry was consequently owned largely by a 
                                                
10 See Charles Postel, The Populist Vision (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 150-3, and Ritter, Goldbugs 
and Greenbacks, 52-8, 66-73, 90-104, and 194-200, and Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary 
History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 113-9. 
 
11 Postel, The Populist Vision, 269-89. 
 
12 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 2. 
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small financial elite. Within this elite, a tiny network of big bankers was believed to be at the 
helm of the ‘money trust’, who, through their influence over vast financial and commercial 
enterprises, had access to an enormous portion of the nation's capital reserves, which was 
thence used to monopolise industry, inflate stock prices, extract exorbitant commissions, or 
sure-up the position of allies (or, conversely, destroy rivals).13 
 Though progressives and muckraking journalists had been criticising big bankers and 
Wall Street fairly extensively since the turn of the century, the Pujo Committee or Money 
Trust Investigation of 1912-13 was the culmination and climax of the Progressive Era's critique 
of financial monopolisation.14 It, along with its popularisers, also reflected the more temperate 
and objective approach which characterised the progressive critique – legal and ‘social 
scientific’ investigation had displaced the hostile and epithet-laden diatribe. 15  Following 
Charles Lindbergh's congressional motion to investigate capital concentration within Wall 
Street, Congressman Arséne Pujo, with approval from Congress, established a subcommittee 
of the House Committee on Banking and Currency to determine the existence and extent of a 
money trust. The subsequent investigation, headed by lawyer Samuel Untermyer, famously 
brought forth some of the country's largest and most powerful bankers for questioning, 
including J. P. Morgan and George F. Baker. In the process, lawyer and progressive activist 
Louis Brandeis documented and utilised the investigation's findings within his Harper's 
Weekly expository articles (1912-13), which were later revised and collated in his book, Other 
People's Money: And How the Bankers Use It (1914).  
Both the investigation and Brandeis concluded that while the findings were limited 
and did not reveal the full extent of the money trust, in part due to a lack of power, time, and 
resources, it nevertheless demonstrated that a tiny network of elite financiers had control over 
vast portions of other people's money via interlocking directorships in major banks, insurance 
                                                
13 See Committee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions 429 and 504 to Investigate the Concentration of 
Control of Money and Credit, H. R. Rep., No. 1593 (1913), 26-9, 42-50, 55-113, 155-8, and 163-5, and Brandeis, 
Other People's Money, 3-27, 46-50, and 135-61. 
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companies, and corporations.16 Brandeis reported that the Committee had discovered that 
Baker and the First National Bank of New York (which he controlled) were ‘represented in 
nineteen corporations, with aggregate resources or capitalization of $11,542,000,000’,17 while 
Morgan and his associates ‘directly controlled’ thirty-four ‘banks and trust companies’ which 
‘held $1,983,000,000 in deposits’. The latter also held ‘72 [board] directorships in 47 of the 
largest corporations of the country’.18 For Brandeis and the Committee, this was ultimately 
enough to prove that such a trust existed. 
 While both of these movements took on different forms and had differing 
preoccupations, they both believed that a financial monopoly existed. For inflationists, the 
concern was over who controlled the currency and the money supply. For progressives, the 
concern was over the domination and exploitation of other people's money. In both instances, 
an elite group of financiers and bankers were understood to be securing for themselves the 
nation's capital resources. Resultantly, these critics believed that elite bankers figures were 
working against the interests of the broader American public, or ‘the People’. 
 
* * * 
 
 Historically, who ‘the People’ has actually entailed has been complex and ideologically 
relative. As noted earlier, many people have been excluded by virtue of their race, ethnicity, 
class, gender, or other attributes. Additionally, the meaning of ‘the People’ has changed over 
time.  Nevertheless, ‘the People’ in traditional American lore has generally meant the ‘demos’ 
– the body of citizens – or, more generally, the common folk. The demos idea was foundational, 
and pertained to notions of democracy and equal political rights. Such ideas were in direct 
opposition to monarchism and aristocracy, both believed to be based upon arbitrary and 
unearned distinctions and privileges. Instead, as all were equal, they were all entitled to 
participate within the nation's political affairs. The People themselves were to rule through a 
representative and elected Government. While the franchise was at first restricted to property-
owning males, over time it was extended to others (all white male citizens and, after the Civil 
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War, all male citizens) and ‘the People’ came to incorporate the ‘common’ folk, or the ‘average’ 
American, particularly during the Presidencies of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and 
Abraham Lincoln. These commoners typically incorporated labourers, farmers, and even 
middle-class professionals. By the mid-1860s, America was ideologically ‘Of the People, By the 
People, and For the People’. While who counted among ‘the People’ continued to be contested 
politically and socially (the franchise was not extended to women until 1920, and Jim Crow 
bolstered racial distinctions in the South, for instance) there was by this stage at least a core 
meaning and mythology, even if it was vague enough to allow for varied interpretations. 
America was a nation of, by, and for the commoner.19 
 On various occasions during the nation's past, bankers had been identified as being 
different and threatening to these commoners. Often bankers were set in direct opposition to 
them. Thomas Jefferson opposed the establishment of the Bank of the United States on the 
grounds that it was both unconstitutional and wrongly privileged a select and minute group 
of people. Later, he remarked in 1816 that ‘banking establishments’ were ‘more dangerous than 
standing armies’ and claimed in 1819 that banks had the ‘regulation of the safety-valves of our 
fortunes, and ... condense and explode them at their will [emphases added]’. Bankers, then, 
were perceived by Jefferson to be a potential threat to democracy and to the prosperity of all. 
It was thus imperative to limit their size and their abilities.20  
Later, Andrew Jackson's bitter conflict or ‘war’ with Nicholas Biddle and the Second 
Bank of the United States rhetorically cast the People against a monstrous and tyrannical 
institution. Within his ‘Veto Message’ to the Senate in 1832, which explained why he was 
vetoing the re-chartering of the bank, Jackson announced that while a central, national bank 
could in various ways be beneficial for ‘the Government’ and ‘the people’, the ‘powers and 
privileges possessed by the existing bank’ were ‘unauthorized by the Constitution, subversive 
to the rights of the States, and dangerous to the liberties of the people’. It was monopolistic, 
extremely powerful, largely owned by a ‘favored class of men’ along with foreign ‘aliens’, and 
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arbitrarily privileged. Moreover, it was so powerful that it had established a ‘bond of union 
among the banking establishments of the nation, erecting them into an interest separate from 
that of the people [emphasis added]’. An enormous, unchecked, essentially private banking 
power had, according to Jackson, become a menace to American society, and thus had to be 
broken up. Like Jefferson, Jackson believed that banks had to be constrained.21 Even with its 
dissolution in 1836, and the emergence of the ‘free banking’ era of independent state banks, 
problems persisted. Frontier society was plagued with fraudulent ‘Wild-Cat’ banks, there were 
major panics (1837, 1857), and the value of bank-notes could vary wildly as there lacked a 
federal currency. All no doubt continued to create a distance between bankers and the People, 
observable both within the political and broader cultural spheres.22 
 By the time of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, this mentality had been firmly 
engrained. Further, over this period, such splitting had become pervasive, and large segments 
of the public shared and expressed such a view. Whether inspired by the ‘producer ethic’, 
which posited that wealth was entirely the product of labour and that therefore producers 
were the most vital and valuable economic actors, 23  or by the progressive concern with 
financial consolidation, critics frequently divorced ‘bankers’ from ‘the people’. Within his 1896 
pro-silver and anti-banking novel, The Modern Banker, James B. Goode called upon ‘the 
business man, machinist, carpenter, laboring man’, and the ‘farmer’ to wake up to the evil 
machinations of bankers.24 Capt. S. Nicoletti of Los Angeles sought to make it clear within his 
1896 tract, Gold Conspiracy, that everyone, ‘NORTH AND SOUTH’, ‘Blacks and Whites’, were 
affected by ‘King Gold’ and what he later described as ‘banking brigands’ [See Figure 5].25 Later, 
muckraker Upton Sinclair depicted the actions of big bankers to be adverse to the ‘vast public’, 
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including ‘business men’, ‘working-men’, and even ‘helpless widows and orphans’, within his 
1908 novel, The Moneychangers.26 During the Progressive Era's focus upon the antics of the 
Money Trust, Charles Lindbergh claimed in 1913 that a system dominated by bankers was 
inhibiting opportunities for ‘the vast majority of farmers, wage earners, and others employed 
in different pursuits of life’. Indeed, bankers were, according to Lindbergh, a distinct class. 
Regarding how they used deposits, Lindbergh charged that bankers, ‘as a class’, were ‘rich’ and 
were ‘made rich by the use of the credit’ that was ‘supported by us’.27 Wealth, by this view, 
was being extracted from society and was bolstering a particular class of people. 
 
 
Figure 5. Image from Nicoletti’s A Gold Conspiracy, 1896. From the Internet Archive’s collection of 
digitised books. 
 
 Lindbergh was not alone in depicting bankers as a separate and privileged class. Other 
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critics shared this belief, and often expressed it in much harsher terms. Bankers were 
sometimes considered not only to belong to a distinct class but to a ruling elite. They were 
described as aristocrats, oligarchs, kings, despots, and plutocrats – all terms representing figures 
considered anathema to an egalitarian and democratic society. Nicoletti, for instance, reflected 
this sentiment by arguing that the American financial system was dominated by an 
‘aristocracy’. Ultimately, America was allowing for the inadvertent establishment of a 
powerful elite that was equivalent to and even connected to those of the Old World. 28 For a 
nation that valued independence and democracy and abhorred domination and arbitrary 
elevation, this was particularly troubling. Nothing could be further removed from the People 
than a moneyed elite taking the form of an aristocracy or a plutocracy. 
 Beliefs in the existence of such an elite tied into fears that such a class jeopardised the 
Republic itself. According to national mythology, America was a nation founded upon the 
premise that all citizens were equal, independent, and entitled to participate politically. They 
were also entitled to reap the material rewards of their individual labours. The establishment 
of an aristocracy or a plutocracy threatened to compromise these values. Bankers (or at least 
some bankers) were often believed to be a socially and politically favoured class that arbitrarily 
received special privileges. Due to these privileges, they had acquired the capacity to dominate 
the nation's economic affairs on a macro level, and to determine the prospects of independent 
businesses and labourers on a micro level. The latter jeopardised the ideal of the entrepreneur 
or the self-made man. Further still, bankers were often charged with controlling the 
government itself, either by actually entering it or by forming nepotistic relations with 
senators and congressmen. A 1903 tract charged that the money power mandated ‘the 
legislatures’ and that ‘the judiciary and executive authorities of the government obey’.29 All of 
this meant that the People had lost control over their own republican and democratic 
institutions. Goode asserted in his novel that national banks were a ‘menace to our very 
existence’. His entire narrative was framed around a conflict between a virtuous, traditional 
America that valued its Revolutionary ideals and a sinful, perverted America rife with 
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domination, greed, connivance, and corruption. 30  Brandeis charged that the money trust 
threatened to undermine republican independence or ‘manhood’ by creating conditions of 
mass dependence. It had a ‘blighting and numbing effect’ that extended to the ‘small and 
seemingly independent business man, to the vast army of professional men and others directly 
dependent upon ‘Big Business’, and to many another’.31 In one way or another, America itself, 
and everything it stood for, was thus under attack. 
 It is true that some were careful to make concessions to bankers and to mark a 
distinction between their profession and their persons. Lindbergh considered them to be ‘well-
informed and enterprizing business men’ and also as ‘generally good people’ who took a ‘great 
interest in the communities in which they [lived]’. Additionally, they were ‘acquaintances’ 
and were just like all other people.32 Lindbergh of course had an interest in saying so. As 
historian Richard McCulley highlights, Lindbergh himself was a bank director and 
stockholder.33 Similarly, former state-senator Robert Addison Dague of Los Angeles made it 
clear within his pamphlet advocating a nationalised banking system that he was making ‘no 
war upon bankers as individuals’, who he considered ‘as honest as the average citizen’.34 Even 
the outspoken critic and novelist Alfred Crozier, best known as the author of The Magnet 
(1908), conceded that there were many ‘patriotic’ bankers intent upon serving their 
communities and their nation.35 Instead, this was, at least to Lindbergh and Dague, a structural 
issue. According to Dague, it was the ‘radically defective system’ that was ‘to blame’ rather 
than ‘the banker personally’.36  
Both believed that while bankers were just people, they were granted certain privileges 
by law which allowed them the capacity to prosper at the expense of others. For Dague, this 
was their ability to take deposits from people and to issue out that same money as interest-
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bearing loans. For Lindbergh, this was their practice of pouring surplus reserve deposits into 
other larger banks within major financial centres, particularly Wall Street, which were then 
used for speculative purposes. Either way, this access to money allowed bankers the ability to 
accrue both wealth and power. As such, their apparent concessions were actually a premise to 
their broader critiques: it was true that bankers were people like everyone else, yet, due to the 
structure of the financial system, they had been granted the ability to determine the prospects 
of others via their control of money.37 Thus, while bankers may have been morally and legally 
equal, they were nevertheless participating or caught up within a system that was removing 
and elevating them from the rest of society. 
 
* * * 
 
 In addition to rather crudely separating bankers from the People within rhetoric, critics 
also relied upon various other tropes to conceptually remove and ‘other’ them. These included 
the construction of stereotype, the reliance upon Wall Street as a physical and mental entity, 
the erection of elaborate conspiracy theories, the scapegoating of foreign and ethnic figures, 
and the use of anthropomorphic imagery. It is of course true the utilisation of these methods 
varied over time and space. As historian Steve Fraser has demonstrated, there is a marked 
difference, for instance, between how progressive activists approached the issue of financial 
monopoly compared to how their predecessors did. Unlike the latter, which relied upon 
morally charged language and imagery, the former sought to adhere to an empirical and ‘social 
scientific’ approach.38 Such differences will be noted. However, there remained similarities 
between the agrarian and the progressive critiques. Generally, progressives sanitised the 
language, though still relied upon at least some of these tropes. Either way, both relied upon 
rhetoric and imagery that reinforced conceptual divisions between bankers and people.   
 The standard image of a banker was of a powerful, serious, opulent, high-society figure. 
This was actually a rather neutral image shared by both the friend and foe of the banker. Added 
to this, many people, particularly from the middle and upper classes, saw bankers as 
                                                
37 Lindbergh, Banking and Currency, 34-5 and 54-60; Dague, A Postal Savings System, 4-7. 
 
38 Fraser, Everyman a Speculator, 296-7. 
  IV. 95 
 
respectable and well-regarded people. They were prominent citizens, and were also church 
going and philanthropic. James B. Forgan, Chicago's most pre-eminent banker, was described 
later in 1917 as one of the city's ‘foremost citizens, a great moral force and director of charitable 
movements’.39 J. P. Morgan was an active devotee of St. George's Protestant Episcopal Church 
and donated money to a range of projects, including museums, universities, and hospitals.40 
Upon his visit to San Francisco in 1901, the San Francisco Call reported that a bishop declared 
that Morgan possessed the necessary characteristics needed to lay the ‘foundations of a great 
estate and a great civilization’.41  Moreover, many hailed Morgan as a hero following the 
depression of the 1890s and the panic of 1907. In both instances, Morgan had essentially bailed 
out the country by raising capital and thus bolstering liquidity within the national economy.42 
The banker, then, could be and certainly was perceived by many to be an honourable figure. 
Indeed, as we have seen, this was what made wrecking scandals particularly shocking. A 
sizeable amount of people had to see bankers as respectable enough in order to do business 
with them in the very first place. 
 Critics, however, rejected this more positive interpretation and instead forged their 
own. This was the first-step in erecting a division between bankers and the rest of society. 
While they recognised that bankers could be leading social figures, this was not taken to be an 
admirable characteristic. This was almost like a Jekyll and Hyde feature, though critics saw 
this more as a front than a split personality. The Manufacturer and Builder perfectly illustrated 
this within an 1874 article titled ‘Agriculturalists Vs. Bankers’. It noted that the banker or 
‘money-lender’ was ‘opulent, wealthy, and fastidious’ and a ‘leader of society’. He was also, 
however, a ‘manager of legislation, and general absorber of the substance of industry’.43 So 
although the banker may have been at the top of the social hierarchy, he was also a kind of 
parasite that expropriated the wealth generated by producers. This way, his high-status was 
built upon legalised theft. In order to emphasise their elitist and aristocratic tendencies, critics 
                                                
39 B. C. Forbes, Men Who Are Making America (New York: B. C. Forbes Publishing Co., 1917), 129. 
 
40 Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance (New 
York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990), 50-2. 
 
41 San Francisco Call, 12 October, 1901, 1. 
 
42 Chernow, The House of Morgan, 77 and 122-9. Also see Fraser, Wall Street: America's Dream Palace (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 115-24, and David A. Zimmerman, Panic!: Markets, Crises, and Crowds in 
American Fiction (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 154-5. 
 
43 M. Boucher, ‘Agriculturalists Vs. Bankers’, The Manufacturer and Builder, vol. 6, no. 2 (1874), 39-40. 
 
  IV. 96 
 
depicted the banker as plump, ornate, well-dressed, and smugly confident.44 Even Mr. Dooley, 
the wisecracking Irish caricature of Finley Peter Dunne's popular satirical columns, described 
a banker he knew as ‘solid’ in physique and ornamented with a ‘gould watch’ which would 
clank against ‘th' pear buttons iv his vest’. This banker would never give Mr. Dooley ‘much 
more thin a nod out iv th' north-east corner iv his left eyebrow’.45 Such imagery of wealth, 
power, and indifference thus removed bankers from ordinary folk. They were elite figures 
within a nation that celebrated anti-elitism, and their wealth represented the product of other 
people's labour. Some even depicted them to be completely incapable of identifying with the 
broader public. Their self-interestedness was all-encompassing and blinding. William ‘Coin’ 
Harvey charged in Coin's Financial School (1894) – a best-selling pro-silver tract – that 
‘specialists’ such as bankers had ‘little regard for the interests of producers’ and that their 
‘selfishness and greed’ blinded them. Harvey considered this to be the result of a faulty thought 
process rather than deliberate connivance – their ‘minds’ were ‘running in a groove’ and they 
could not ‘see the rights of others’.46 This was generous compared to others like Nicoletti who 
considered them to be ‘shrewd and cunning’ 47  and Sinclair who depicted his villainous 
antagonist, Dan Waterman, an obvious surrogate for Morgan, as a vicious sociopath that would 
stop at nothing to get what he wanted.48 Whatever the case, critics had drawn upon an image 
which set ‘the banker’ apart from ‘the People’. 
 Typically, this imagery was of the city dwelling big banker rather than the small banker 
of the town or county. Lindbergh marked this distinction, noting that ‘[m]any of them [small 
bankers], and more especially those from the country districts’ were ‘not opposed’ to breaking 
up the money trust and knew ‘that they [had] special privileges that they ought not to have 
[had]’.49 Additionally, Brandeis' critique primarily centred upon large investment bankers, and 
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the Pujo Committee's most sensational moment was when Untermyer challenged Morgan on 
the stand.50 Nevertheless, the ‘big banker’ was the ultimate abstraction of a banker; he was the 
quintessential figure that set the stereotype. This is plainly observable through the images of 
the stereotypical banker – abundantly wealthy and socially and politically powerful. 
Illustrations of national bankers within Nicoletti's tract certainly adhered to this image,51 and 
so too did the descriptions provided by the Manufacturer and Builder and Mr. Dooley.52 And 
while Lindbergh made concessions, it remained that he considered contemporary bankers to 
generally belong to a rich ‘class’ unto themselves. 
 Furthermore, it is of course true that Wall Street had been a primary target for critics. 
Wall Street had been America's financial centre since the late 1830s.53 From that time, it had 
consistently aroused popular fascination and suspicion, a trend that continued throughout the 
Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Innumerable references to Wall Street and its cast of 
characters – Vanderbilt, Gould, Fisk, Morgan – were made within the press and general media, 
both positive and negative. Their alleged acts of heroism and villainy were followed closely.54 
Moreover, most critics, including agrarians, labour agitators, and progressives, narrowed their 
sights upon the Street. Terence Powderly of the Knights of Labor, for instance, claimed that 
the ‘currency question’ was ‘the history of favortism to Wall Street, New York’. It was ‘high 
time’, he pronounced, that the ‘vast territory embraced within the boundaries of the United 
States, and situated beyond the limits of Wall Street, New York, should enter its protest against 
a policy which, has for years ignored the best interests of the people’.55 Wall Street, then, was 
ground-zero for financial monopolisation and at the epicentre of American banking. 
 Where Wall Street actually was and where it was imagined to be, however, could be at 
odds. In reality, it was a relatively short street located in Lower Manhattan. In the popular 
imagination, it was a figurative entity that constituted and spanned the nation's financial 
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system. Regarding the banking system specifically, Wall Street was at once its hub and a 
rhetorical stand-in. Lindbergh made this explicit, stating that when he used the phrase ‘Wall 
Streeters’ he did not ‘confine it to those having offices in Wall Street’. Instead, the ‘Wall Street 
system’ was ‘maintained in all the large cities’ and he included ‘within the term Wall Streeters 
all those supporting the Wall Street system, wherever they may be’.56 Likewise, banks and 
Wall Street, to anti-monopolists, were close to synonymous. Agrarians depicted the national 
banking system as largely an offspring of ‘eastern’ – New York – financiers.57 Progressives 
depicted banks as either being dominated or subservient to the Street.58 A 1911 cartoon in Puck 
encapsulated such thinking. It depicted a worker, dubbed ‘American citizen’, shovelling his 
savings into a ‘Syndicate Bank’ boiler powering Wall Street's ‘Public Service' Machine’. This 
machine, oiled by Morgan and driven by a belt inscribed ‘Control of “Other People's Money”’, 
operates precisely to boot the worker into handing over his savings [See Figure 6].59 This was 
clearly a metaphor for Wall Street's domination of the banking system. Wall Street was, then, 
where the trail started and ended. It was a kind of omnipresent entity. Overall, it was a 
metaphor as much as a place.60 
 Even with Wall Street as the financial headquarters, however, several critics sought to 
emphasise the expansiveness of their critiques. Coin Harvey challenged fictionalised versions 
of prominent Chicagoan bankers: Lyman Gage of the First National Bank of Chicago and John 
R. Walsh of the Chicago National Bank (before he was a disgraced bank wrecker).61 Goode's 
diatribe appears to be directed towards all bankers, not just those of Wall Street or the national 
banks.62 And although Brandeis' chief subjects were those of Wall Street, he also made it clear 
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that the trust extended to other money centres, particularly Boston and Chicago. He went on 
to predict that ‘similar relations would doubtless be found to exist with the leading bankers of 
the other important financial centres of America’.63 So while Wall Street may have been the 
big bankers' primary location, and while it may have figuratively spanned the nation, it was 
not as if it was construed to be the only actual, physical site of financial monopolisation. 
 
 
Figure 6. Alfred Levering’s image of The Stoker, featured in Puck magazine, 1911. From the Library 
of Congress’ digital collections. 
 
 Wherever the big banker may have been situated physically or mentally, many 
believed that his machinations had cornered the entire financial system, and that other banks 
either were acting in concert with him or were under his control. In other words, various 
critics, as we shall see, charged that banks across the nation were actively colluding with 
financial elites or were caught in their web. Cooperation was secured by consent, coercion, or, 
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more benignly, structure. Theories and accounts of conspiracy or of domination, formal or 
informal, were utilised to draw connections between institutions and to explain how a banking 
system of thousands of supposedly independent banks had been monopolised. 
 Agrarian inflationists accused national bankers of being among the architects of both a 
discriminatory system and deflationary policies. The system's very inception was believed to 
have stemmed from favouritism and the bidding of an organised class of bankers who sought 
to control the money supply. The Manufacturer and Builder considered the system to be one 
established upon ‘favor and fraud’ and the ‘most brazen and outrageous class-legislation’ the 
nation had ever seen.64 This was rather tame. Others went much further. Bankers were accused 
of intentionally initiating the 1893 panic in order to instate a gold standard.65 Sarah Emery also 
accused Wall Street of opportunistically exploiting the Civil War to usher in the system.66 Even 
highly fantastical claims were not off limits. Nicoletti strongly suggested that bankers had been 
responsible for Lincoln's assassination.67 Conspiracy theories were openly embraced and these 
critics were not afraid to use the term itself, as reflected by titles like Emery's Seven Financial 
Conspiracies Which Have Enslaved the American People (1894) and Nicoletti's Gold 
Conspiracy. Some also sought to utilise hard, documentary evidence. Emery, for instance 
quoted in full a ‘private circular’ allegedly distributed by bankers prior to the creation of the 
national banking system, stating that ‘[t]o repeal the law creating national banks, or to restore 
to circulation the government issue of money, will be to provide the people with money, and 
will therefore seriously affect your individual profits as banker and lender’.68 This supposed 
circular was hence utilised as both clear evidence that bankers had devised a system intent 
upon ‘robbing the people’ and, thus as a means to demonstrate that bankers themselves had 
aligned against them. However, it was reported as early as 1878 that the circular was fake. 
James Buell, its alleged author, described it as a ‘forgery’ and ‘warp and woof’.69 Despite this 
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discrepancy, Emery ignored the document's potentially dubious nature and used it anyway. 
Taken together, conspiratorial thinking was clearly a facet of the inflationist critique of 
national banks and the ‘money power’. 
 Subsequent critics throughout the 1900s also had their share of conspiracy theories. 
The panic of 1907 in particular was singled out to be the result of an instance of deliberate 
financial manipulation. Sinclair's The Moneychangers was a fictionalised account of the panic. 
In it, the Morgan-like character orchestrates a series of bank runs in order to discipline 
uncooperative financiers and to initiate the acquisition of corporate enterprises. While the 
wholesale panic that followed was an inadvertent by-product, it was nevertheless the result of 
this underlying conspiracy.70 Sharing this view, Peter Kinnear sought to provide a factual 
account of the events behind the panic within his 1908 pamphlet, Wrecking the Nation: The 
Crime of 1907-8. Like Sinclair, Kinnear saw the panic as the direct result of financiers seeking 
to undermine their competitors and usurp their businesses.71 Republican Senator Robert La 
Follette from Wisconsin charged in 1908 that the panic itself was deliberate.72 Crozier also 
made this accusation in 1912. He accused Wall Street and big bankers of orchestrating it in 
order to advocate a banker-controlled central bank.73 Furthermore, Chicago's the Day Book, 
an ‘adless’ daily for working people, covered the bank wrecking scandal involving former 
Senator William Lorimer and his bank. The newspaper paid close attention to the claims that 
this was the result of a financial conspiracy involving a syndicate of elite bankers attempting 
to put a new rival out of business. James Forgan, connected to Morgan, was suggested to be an 
arm of a plutocracy attempting to monopolise the capital of the nation. The assault upon the 
LaSalle Street Trust and Savings Bank was thus tied to the money trust. For the Day Book, here 
was an instance of that trust destroying a threat to its hegemony, in turn stifling competition 
and bolstering control over the supply of capital.74 
 It was sometimes the case that critics believed that English Jews were at the helm of a 
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conspiracy. The Rothschild banking family had been the world's prevailing financier 
throughout much of the nineteenth century. Their close relationship with American finance, 
particularly with Wall Street and J. P. Morgan, warranted cause for alarm for some, and thus 
aroused deep suspicions and animosity. Such sentiment tapped into Anglophobic and anti-
Semitic sentiments. Often the two were combined, especially given that the Rothschilds were 
both English and Jewish.75 Whether merely anti-British or anti-Semitic, in both cases financial 
woes could be reduced to the intrusions of a foreign parasite, which was killing the host 
organism by leeching off its vitality. In this instance, the quintessential banker was so unlike 
the American people that he was not American at all. Outsiders, then, were responsible for 
undermining the Republic. 
 Anti-British sentiment reflected a long-standing Anglophobia shared by many 
Americans. America had, after all, established itself by not only gaining independence from 
England, but also as its antithesis. England was monarchistic and aristocratic. America was not. 
England was of the ‘Old World’. America was of the ‘New’.76 By allowing powerful English 
financiers to permeate America's financial system, this threatened America's very 
independence. America was, after all, a debtor nation largely to Britain until the First World 
War. During the silver conflict, these bankers were accused of being chief advocates of the 
gold standard, which would only bolster their power as creditors. 77  Nicoletti lambasted 
President Grover Cleveland, accusing him of surrendering to the English by seeking a gold 
standard. He charged that Cleveland differed from Thomas Jefferson, ‘the founder of 
democracy and the author of that sacred document, the Declaration of Independence, which 
freed us from England’. Now, unlike Jefferson, Cleveland was seeking to ‘annul’ the 
Declaration ‘by enslaving the people to the gold lords of England with an intent to perpetuate 
the debt’.78 Here, through the establishment of a Gold Standard, the American people not only 
faced conflict with creditors – their very nation faced an existential threat. 
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 Likewise, anti-Semitic ideas and imagery could be drawn upon. While the prevalence 
of anti-Semitism within the agrarian movements has been long debated, historians now tend 
to agree that while it may not have necessarily been pervasive and was certainly not the 
primary motivator, pitting the blame upon Jewish people nevertheless occurred.79 Goode, for 
example, made it entirely clear who he believed controlled the world's finances. He asserted 
that: 
By a concerted cunning, peculiar to themselves, the Jews have 
contrived to get all the people of the world to adopt a banking system 
that allows the Jews to receive the money of the world as deposits, and 
then loan it out to the world at a good interest, on their own accounts, 
which interest goes into the Jews' vaults as clear profits. Every man who 
deposits money in a bank regularly, is sure to want to borrow some from 
the bank at times, and here is where the Jew catches his victim.80 
 
The stereotype of the avaricious, amoral, predatory, and parasitic Jew was on full display here. 
Jews, Goode argued, had tricked everyone else into accepting a system of usury. Others often 
relied upon references to Shylock, the infamous Jewish moneylender from Shakespeare's The 
Merchant of Venice (1600). Emery, for instance, framed her anti-banking tract around the 
various ways she believed that ‘Shylock’ had defrauded the American people.81 So too did 
Gordon Clark in his anti-banking treatise, Shylock: As Banker, Bondholder, Corruptionist, 
Conspirator (1894).82 Shylock was certainly not a new figure within the popular imagination. 
The character has had a long presence within European and American cultures.83 And as David 
Anthony has demonstrated, the figure was common within antebellum America. 84  Its 
application to bankers, then, was unoriginal, but it persisted nonetheless. Additionally, while 
its usage may not have always been intended as an ethnic slur but rather a reference to 
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Shylock's character rather than his Jewishness, 85  it remained a word with strong ethnic 
connotations. When applied to the Rothschilds, the connection was obvious.86 
 Anti-Semitic imagery usually came from inflationist critics, though it did linger. 
Crozier, for instance, later offered a ‘Warning to American Jews’ in 1912. Though he declared 
that he had ‘no prejudice against the Jewish race’, he advised America's ‘Hebrews’ to vote 
against legislation favourable to Wall Street to disassociate with major Jewish financiers and 
prevent ‘that dreaded cry, “Down with the Jews!”’ However well-intentioned Crozier may 
have believed this to be, he was clearly lumping Jewish-Americas into a homogenous group 
and was instructing them to vote as Americans, not as a united class of Jews.87 Whatever form 
Anti-Semitism took, it, like anglophobic criticisms, was ultimately a means to distance the 
banking power from the American people. Their foreignness represented just how far removed 
they were. 
 Anthropomorphic metaphors were also common. Bankers were depicted as a range of 
dreaded animals, usually serpents, sharks, and octopuses. Seeing bankers as monstrous beasts 
did not originate over this period. Jackson, for instance, had waged war against a ‘monster’ and 
a ‘hydra’ which had been intent upon devouring the Republic.88 Such imagery went on to 
pervade the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The octopus was a favourite, seen as an apt 
metaphor for financial and corporate monopolisation. Its application drew upon common, 
transnational imagery of the time, and likely upon traditional folklore such as the Kraken, the 
squid-like mythological beast that would imperil sailors by entangling and destroying their 
ships. Instead of attacking ships, the industrial octopus strangled independent proprietors and 
society at large.89 Though broadly applicable, bankers were the ultimate octopus due to their 
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centrality within a capitalist socio-economic system – they had a firm grasp over the nation's 
capital and could thus wrap their tentacles where they pleased. 
 Though this imagery was figurative, relying on such metaphors nevertheless associated 
bankers with inhuman monsters. As such, this represented an extreme kind of othering. They 
were not like everyone else, and were viewed as extremely dangerous and threatening. 
Agrarians and progressives alike depicted them as these menacing and tentacled creatures. 
Silverites certainly utilised and disseminated the image. The very title of F. M. Fogg's 1896 
tract was The Banking Octopus and the Silver Question, in which he described the national 
banking system ‘as the greatest living octopus of all’. This octopus had ‘thrown its tentacles 
around the nation’ and was ‘devouring it by suction’.90 Beyond American bankers, English 
bankers were conveyed as such. A famous image featured within Coin's Financial School 
depicts the Rothschilds as ‘THE ENGLISH OCTOPUS’, which has wrapped its tentacles around 
every continent bar Antarctica [See Figure 7].91 Progressive Era critics retained the imagery. 
One of Brandeis' money-trust articles in Harper's included a cartoon by Walter J. Enright of 
an enormous, portly, and grimacing man with eight arms extending out and grasping onto 
banks.92 This was a tamer depiction, perhaps, but it was clearly drawing upon the metaphor. 
The idea, then, remained, even if it was sanitised by a slightly tamer middle-class decorum 
[See Figure 8]. Crozier, however, rejected this approach and instead utilised the standard 
bestial version within his critique of the ‘Aldrich Plan’, which proposed to instate a national 
reserve association owned and operated by bankers (this will be discussed in Chapter VII). 
Crozier's octopus represented the ‘COMING MONEY TRUST’. It has wrapped its tentacles 
around the Treasury, the Capitol, the White House, a bank, a farm, and a factory, and is busy 
spewing money into the New York Stock Exchange. For good measure, Crozier also gave his 
octopus horns, sharp teeth, frowning brow ridges, dollar-sign pupils, and barbed-tipped 
tentacles. Unlike others, Crozier's image was a premonition intended to raise alarm [See Figure 
9].93 Nevertheless, he had drawn upon what had become a stock and standard metaphor for 
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organised bankers and financial monopoly. 
 
 
Figure 7. The 'English Octopus' featured within Coin's Financial School, 1896. From the Internet 
Archive’s collection of digitised books. 
 
 
Figure 8. Walter J. Enright's illustration of an octopus-like banker accompanying one of Louis 
Brandeis' articles in Harper’s Weekly, 1913. From the Hathi Trust Digital Library. 
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Figure 9. Crozier's ‘National Reserve Association’ Octopus, 1912. From the Internet Archive’s 
collection of digitised books. 
 
Standard conspiratorial thinking aside, prominent progressive accounts like those 
advanced by the Pujo Committee, Lindbergh, and Brandeis, were generally more subdued. 
Though they retained elements of collusion, they discarded with the vitriol and downplayed 
notions of wickedness, and incorporated more nuanced notions like those of structure and 
inadvertent consequences. They sought to expose the money trust via temperate, professional, 
and objective means. The Pujo Committee premised its investigation upon finding breaches of 
and weaknesses within the Federal anti-trust law and the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Doing so gave the investigation a legal basis, which thus allowed it to explore how a ‘group of 
financiers’ had come to wield ‘a power over the business, commerce, credits, and finances of 
the country’ that was ‘despotic and perilous’ and was ‘daily becoming more perilous to the 
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public welfare’.94 Looking at how banks were embroiled in the trust, it claimed that: 
National banks and other moneyed and other institutions are directly 
or indirectly owned, dominated, or controlled through their directors 
through stock ownership, official management, patronage, or otherwise 
by the same persons, interests, groups of individuals, or corporations 
located in the same city and in interstate corporations that are 
customers of said national banks and other moneyed corporations.95 
 
Their involvement was, then, the result of an intricate network based upon the consent or 
coercion of its individual units. Similarly, Brandeis charged that investment and commercial 
bankers had ‘invaded’ each other’s spheres, though this ‘was not a hostile invasion’. Instead, 
they became ‘allies’ and developed a system of ‘cooperation’ which then allowed for ‘more 
railroads, public service corporations, and industrial concerns’ to be ‘brought into complete 
subjection’. 96  This was established upon a ‘pseudo’ ethic – one that facilitated a kind of 
gentlemen's agreement to avoid intruding upon each other's financial and commercial 
interests. The ‘basis’ of this ‘rule’ was that ‘the interests of the combined bankers’ were 
‘superior to the interests of the rest of the community’.97 Thus though collusion was involved, 
it was informal rather than formal. Brandeis even included stock and mutual savings banks 
within this vast financial web and advised people to avoid them.98 And finally, Lindbergh 
stated that the banks utilised by the public served ‘as supply stations for the larger city banks’. 
They were ‘not designed for that purpose’ but this was ‘the result of the system under which 
they operated’.99 Here, Lindbergh was suggesting that the prevailing banking infrastructure 
had facilitated the inadvertent construction of a vast financial web that had entangled the 
nation's banks, intentionally or otherwise. This was therefore not a simple case of deliberate 
and controlled conspiracy orchestrated by all bankers but rather a consequence of consent, 
coercion, or, more generally, structure. 
 At the same time, however, Linbergh, Brandeis, and the Committee were still 
responsible for helping to disseminate the idea that people's money was going into the coffers 
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of a gigantic financial monopoly. Linbergh had brought the idea to the Committee. Brandeis' 
articles appeared within Harper's Weekly, a publication with a large middle-class audience. 
Furthermore, the Committee was a direct influence upon Woodrow Wilson's ‘New Freedom’, 
which sought to increase governmental intervention and thwart financial and commercial 
monopolies in order to bolster individual liberties and opportunities.100 Wilson made allusions 
to the Committee's findings during his 1912 presidential campaign, observable through his 
references to the big banks. He noted their interconnectedness and how they utilised other 
people's money to invest in their own securities to manipulate or control their market values.101 
Resultantly, Wilson further transmitted the idea across the country. 
 
* * * 
 
 The banker as ‘other’ had persisted over the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, and 
continued to serve as a potent means to separate the banker from ‘the People’, intentionally or 
otherwise. Bankers, primarily national and Wall Street bankers, were taken by both agrarians 
and progressives to be at the helm of or caught up in a financial monopoly engulfing the entire 
nation. This did not necessarily entail all bankers, and nor were such views universal. Yet the 
big banker stereotype represented to many the quintessential banker. Additionally, critics 
stressed the expansiveness of the big banker’s grasp, which had drawn in other bankers 
through collusion or coercion. In any case, beliefs and depictions of a money power or a money 
trust reflected yet another way that people could distrust bankers and how passionately they 
could do so. If bankers were not out to swindle people on their own, then they could be out 
to do so collectively, purposefully or otherwise. 
 Richard Hoftstadter has dismissed this kind of conspiratorial thinking, particularly by 
agrarians, as paranoiac and desperate; as little more than a means to provide a scapegoat for 
the issues that reform advocates faced within a changing society.102 It was certainly true that 
many critics offered simplistic and frankly ridiculous accounts. Worse still, others could rely 
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upon racial and ethnic stereotypes to explain their grievances. However, no matter how wrong 
they were, such accounts were means to explain underlying problems.103 For agrarians, this 
was debt, declining prices, and their lack of credit. For progressives, this was the establishment 
of a tremendously powerful financial elite. Both were legitimate concerns. Banking was tied 
up with them in some capacity, through structure or even collusion. Whatever the cause, 
whether seen as valid or not, banks were related to the problems that people faced. Many thus 
identified bankers as different and threatening, who were either colluding or entangled within 
a system operating in a manner that conflicted with the interests of ‘the People’. It is hard to 
demonstrate precisely how this may have affected the behaviour of depositors, actual or 
potential, though it is probable that these intensely negative and hostile notions made a lot of 
people reluctant to trust and deal with banks.  
Through these conflicts we can begin to observe reformist sentiment and the turn to 
the state. This is especially evident through the currency conflicts of the late nineteenth 
century. Agrarians in particular wanted the Federal Government to fundamentally transform 
the currency system so as to accord with popular interests. Ultimately, they wanted to 
democratise money and credit and were fixated upon people’s lack of both. Later into the 
Gilded Age, however, in the wake of recurring runs, panics, and frauds, many people also 
began to turn towards the Federal Government to democratise banking in one way or another. 
As shall be explained in the next chapter, due to the broad, underlying confidence issue, they 
sought to transform banking to make it amenable to the interests of the people.  
                                                




Making Banks Fit for the People: 
 
 Confidence, Democracy, and People-Oriented Banking Alternatives 
 
We have seen that everybody will trust the bank that is 
guaranteed by the Government. It is clearly evident therefore, 
that all is necessary then, is for the Government to guarantee the 
depositors that the money which shall be left at the bank shall be 
given to them when they ask for it. … The easiest method to 
accomplish that, will be for the Government to establish and own 
the bank. 
 
 - Thomas E. Hill, 1894.1 
 
Within his tract on money and banking, Money Found, Thomas E. Hill, an author of 
popular self-help and success manuals, charged that the American banking system was ill and 
was infecting the nation. 2 ‘Through bad management and failure to pay back the money which 
is given the bank’, Hill asserted, ‘the people’ had ‘lost confidence’. They had ‘withdrawn their 
money and hidden it’. Confidence had been so undermined that people would not trust 
bankers to ensure the safety of their money. Money was thus taken out of circulation and was 
stifling commerce. There was only one remedy. In order to reinstate the public's confidence 
and their deposits, and thus circulation, people had to instate popular control over banking 
functions, which for Hill entailed turning them over to the Government.3 
 Hill’s call to place banking under popular control reflected ideas that had been 
developing in the late Gilded Age and early Progressive Era, particularly following the 
financial crises of the 1890s and the panic of 1907. At the turn of the century, expressions of 
dissatisfaction and the need for alternatives appeared regularly within the public sphere. 
Socially oriented reformers from various backgrounds, from Populists to progressives, all 
offered ideas on how to repair or even overhaul any unreliable, inequitable, or plutocratic 
features they saw within banking, in commercial or savings banks, or in chartered or private 
                                                
1 Hill’s tract was originally published in 1893, though this chapter uses the revised 1894 edition. Thomas E. Hill, 
Money Found: Recovered From its Hiding Places, and Put into Circulation Through Confidence in Government 
Banks, revised edition (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Company, 1894), 29. 
 
2 His Hill's Manual of Social and Business Forms allegedly sold a quarter of a million copies. See Hill, Hill’s Manual 
of Social and Business Forms: A Guide to Correct Writing, 10th ed. (Chicago: Hill Standard Book Co., 1887), 5. 
 
3 Hill, Money Found, esp. 18-9, and 29. 
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banks. Such ideas were diverse, ranging from the establishment of government owned and 
operated banks, to the introduction of strong regulatory measures, and even to the creation of 
popularly owned ones. Government banks, postal savings banks, mandatory deposit guarantees, 
and cooperative banks were all proposed, and were enacted in one way or another. Despite 
this variety of approaches, they all perceived that there existed various faults within American 
banking – faults that were generating a widespread lack of confidence in the nation's banks 
and bankers. Whether based upon a fear of losing deposits, being denied credit from one's 
depository, or of those deposits being used by magnates to finance their private business 
empires, each proposal reflected, reinforced, and possibly helped instil a general distrust.  
 Unlike many other businesses, banking came to be considered special due to its direct 
and central role in the circulation of the exchange medium. Thus, it was popularly accepted 
that a capitalist society, composed of businesses and individuals, depended upon banks, either 
for depositing or loaning. They were the linchpin of such a socio-economic structure and were 
thus a kind of ‘public service’ that could not be done away with. Democratising banking by 
ensuring some degree of popular control, through the Federal Government or otherwise, 
would, reformers believed, ensure a cooperative and fairer kind of capitalism – a kind that 
ensured access, participation, and security to all. As such, through these calls for reform we 
can observe how people were realising the malleability of financial institutions, and were 
rejecting notions of inevitability or naturalness. Such institutions could be moulded into more 
democratic and equitable forms. Rather than leaving bankers largely to their own devices, ‘the 
people’ were to play a significantly larger role within banking. The reformers' ideas were at 
least partly realised in the enactment of the postal-savings system, deposit-guarantees, and 
cooperatives. While this is not to suggest that all people agreed with such sentiment or that 
there was ever a likelihood of ‘banking’ as a whole being outright socialised, the circulation of 
such ideas nevertheless challenged the authority of privately owned or operated banks. 
 
* * * 
 
Amidst the era’s general agitation for social, political, and economic reform and 
democratisation, banking was high on the agenda. Indeed, it had been from an early stage, as 
reflected by the currency conflicts that emerged shortly following the Civil War. As we have 
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seen, whether advocates of fiat paper or gold and silver backed currency, such movements 
called for the Government to print and issue the ‘people’s money’. Seeking to reform the 
nation’s currency system implied the reformation of the national banking system. This also 
demonstrated the development of a mass movement – albeit a disjointed one – devoted to 
increasing the Government’s role within finance and banking. 
Beyond this issue, occurring simultaneously and often in tandem, many people began 
to focus upon ‘banking’ in its own right and upon ensuring the safety of the money that people 
did have rather than what they did not have. This applied to both those that had money in 
banks and those that did not, of whom there were many. Getting people to place whatever 
money they had into trustworthy banking facilities became a chief concern. Though having 
roots in the 1870s, in the wake of numerous calamities, including systemic bank panics, failures, 
runs, frauds, payment suspensions, and loan contractions, this focus, as we shall see, gained 
traction during the depression of the 1890s and became unavoidable following the panic of 
1907. It was this concern in particular that drove the idea that banking was a kind of ‘public 
service’. 
It is true that some banks had long been accepted as public-spirited institutions, and 
that these had existed for much of the nineteenth century. Historian Daniel Wadhwani has 
demonstrated how socially elite philanthropists in the Northeast established mutual savings 
banks in order to inculcate thrift and self-sufficiency among wage-earners. They also sought 
to ensure the safety of these banks, typically through legislative measures that limited loaning 
only to gilt-edged securities and real estate. Thus, the belief that certain banks could be people-
oriented already existed, and so too did the notion that the state was in some way required to 
protect their users.4 It is also true, however, that by the end of the century deposit banking 
had become the prevailing business model for privately owned, for-profit institutions, both for 
commercial and stock-savings banks alike – deposits, rather than capital stock, became the 
primary means to finance loans. As a result, reformers and depositors began to focus upon the 
actual or perceived safety or usage of deposits – of other people's money – and how security 
and popular participation could be maximised. Deposit banking thus came to be seen as an 
                                                
4 See Daniel Wadhwani, ‘Protecting Small Savers: The Political Economy of Economic Security’, Journal of Policy 
History, vol. 18 (2006): 126-45; and Wadhwani, ‘Citizen Savers: Family Economy, Financial Institutions, and 
Public Policy in the Northeastern United States’, Enterprise and Society, vol. 5 (December, 2004), 617-24. 
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indispensable public service which the strength and virtue of the nation very much relied 
upon, and thus required significantly more public engagement and intervention in one way or 
another. This even included mutual savings banks. 
 Historian Elizabeth Sanders has considered financial reform proposals as a part of a 
broader movement, though she identifies this movement as an agrarian push towards greater 
‘statist’ intervention. 5  Admittedly, many of the reforms addressed in this chapter were 
supported by agrarians. Regardless, this chapter aims to show that such thinking was neither 
exclusive to the South and West, nor to agrarians. It became clear to many that the existing 
banks were not serving their interests. The necessity for a fair and functioning financial system 
that worked for ‘the people’ became a primary concern for reformers and society at large. Who 
counted as ‘the people’ was, of course, highly contentious. Women, African Americans, Native 
Americans, and immigrants were either included or excluded as civic members depending on 
the discourse.6 Nevertheless, ‘the people’ were, as we shall observe in the rhetoric, often 
construed to mean either the democratic body of the nation's citizens or, more generally, 
common people, incorporating labourers, farmers, and even middle-class people. Agrarians, 
urban reformers, laborers, immigrants, and others turned to the state or cooperative 
organizations, as democratic institutions theoretically owned by their constituent body of 
common subjects (‘the people’), in order to facilitate some degree of popular control. 
Robert Addison Dague thought as much. Dague, a former state senator from Los 
Angeles, asserted in 1899 that banking was a ‘public business’ like other institutions 
‘cooperative, nationalistic and socialistic in their nature’, like public schools, public hospitals, 
police and fire departments, and courts.7 So too did Thomas Hill. Hill explained the importance 
of banking through an analogy to the circulatory system (and also, for good measure, the 
‘planetary system, juices in the plant, sap in the tree, [and] water in the body’). A nation's 
money, Hill argued, ‘is the blood of commerce’ whereas its ‘heart is the bank’. Money, like 
                                                
5 Elizabeth Sanders, The Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 1-9 and 217-66. 
 
6 See Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920 (New York: Harper, 2009), 
esp. 92-132, and Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919, second edition (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2008), esp. 216-30 and 231-52. 
 
7 Robert Addison Dague, A Postal Savings System Proposed to Prevent Bank Panics (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr 
and Company, 1899), 13-4. 
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blood, circulates throughout the economy, like the organism, by being pumped to and from 
banks, like the heart. The bank was thus an ‘indispensable institution’, and should it fail to 
send and receive money, then ‘sickness begins in commercial affairs, and death to the nation 
may be the result’, like it would for an organism whose heart stopped circulating blood.8 
 
* * * 
 
 Hill's prescription to nationalise banking came during the depression of the 1890s and 
amid its waves of bank failures. Countless people had withdrawn and hoarded their money in 
response. Nevertheless, he was not alone in calling for the state to assume banking functions 
in order to inspire confidence and to solve the nation's financial woes. Such calls were also 
more than knee-jerk reactions to immediate circumstances. Many others called for ‘Uncle Sam’ 
to become a banker to solve deep-seated issues which had persisted throughout the era. 
Various reformers, including Populists, progressives, labour agitators, depositors, workers, 
economists and even prominent governmental figures, were attracted to the idea of 
supplementing or doing away with private banking by turning to the Government. In either 
case, these reformers saw state-owned banks to be solutions. 
 This is observable within reform and progressive oriented publications. A Duluth and 
Superior newspaper, the Labor World, charged in 1898 that the ‘majority of the people, after 
a series of bank failures, never bring their money back to the bank’. People had lost confidence 
and would not trust bankers. This, in effect, was causing currency stringency. The only possi-
ble way to regain their trust would be for the Government to own and operate ‘all banks’. 
Bankers ought not to have feared this arrangement, it argued, as they would become employees 
of the state.9 In the Arena, G. Cooke Adams proclaimed in 1906 that ‘[o]ne of the most urgent 
reforms necessary in the direction of state or municipal-ownership of public utilities … is that 
of the people's savings banks’. After outlining the typical features of a bank run, and assessing 
state-owned banks in Australia and New Zealand, which he considered highly successful, Ad-
ams asked whether American workers would ‘force’ their governments ‘to take immediate 
                                                
8 Hill, Money Found, 11-20. 
 
9 Labor World (Minnesota), 10 September, 1898, 1. 
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action by returning to power only those representatives sworn to carry out that most vital of 
all reforms - state protection of the people's savings and trust-funds’. Rather than continuing 
to rely on private individuals, governments, as institutions expected to preserve the interests 
of those they represented, were to become the proper custodians of the people's savings.10 An-
other Arena article sought in 1909 to challenge the idea that Andrew Jackson was vehemently 
against a central bank, arguing that he was against a private central bank. Overturning this 
myth was essential in order to facilitate the creation of a bank owned and operated by the 
Federal Government.11 Though all referred to different kinds of banks, each made it clear that 
the Government ought to own and operate some kind of banking institution.  
 In addition to literature limited to special audiences, like radical reformers and 
labourers, this idea was also present within works published and exposed to mass audiences, 
suggesting just how much this idea had permeated the popular consciousness. Edward 
Bellamy's best-selling 1888 novel, Looking Backward, and its 1897 sequel, Equality, depicted 
a utopian future society which had no need for bankers (nor merchants), and featured a 
‘national bank’ owned by society that supplied equal funding to all.12 Furthermore, Selden R. 
Hopkins' guide to money and banking, aptly titled ‘Money!’, also reflects this. Featured within 
P. T. Barnum's 1890 self-help book Dollars and Sense, the guide is framed around a fictional 
conversation held between participants within the ‘Industry Club’, consisting of various public 
figures from the professor to the common man, who assemble to discuss the virtues and vices 
of the ‘dollar’. Within his three chapters devoted to answering the question ‘Are Banks 
Beneficial?’, Hopkins has one participant, ‘Mr. Opposite’, object to the argument that they are 
beneficial. Citing the extensive ‘list’ of bank ‘defalcations, frauds and wrecking schemes’, the 
character argues that in a society without banks ‘the perpetration of such frauds would be 
impossible’ and that ‘there would be no defalcations of bank employés [sic]’.13 An absence of 
private banks would not be a problem, as the ‘Government would establish a financial system 
                                                
10 Adams, ‘State-Owned Savings-Banks’, 590-2. 
 
11 Ellis O. Jones, ‘The Central Bank Idea’, Arena, vol. 41, no. 229 (January, 1909): 323-7, esp. 324 and 326-7. 
 
12 Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward, reprint of 1888 edition (New York: Dover Thrift Editions, 1996), 155-6 
and Bellamy, Equality (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1897), 24-34. 
 
13 Selden R. Hopkins, ‘Money!: Where it Comes from and Where it Goes, Being a Concise History of Money, 
Banks and Banking’ in P. T. Barnum, Dollars and Sense; Or, How to Get on (Chicago: People’s Publishing Co., 
1890), 452-71, esp. 467-9. 
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perfectly adequate to meet the demands, the needs and convenience of every person in the 
land’. Though this does not explicitly state that the Government would take on banking 
functions, it is implied. Such a claim was then rejected as a mere ‘opinion’.14 Nevertheless, that 
it was included not only within the narrative but also within a Barnum book again suggests 
that such a view was common. 
 Nowhere, however, was the government or ‘Uncle Sam’ bank idea more pronounced 
than within the push for postal savings banks. Unlike the more radical ideas detailed above, 
these banks were generally intended to be complementary to the nation’s banks rather than 
substitutive. Inspired by the postal savings systems established mid-century within the United 
Kingdom and various European states, agitation for an American system gained momentum in 
the early 1870s and persisted until 1910 when such a system was enacted. Although proposals 
varied on specific details, like what channels the deposits were to be redistributed into (that 
is, whether governmental or commercial), the basic idea was that these banks would be owned 
by the Federal Government through the postal system. Individual post-offices would assume 
depository functions in order to accept the savings of low-income earners, incorporating 
labourers, rural folk, migrants, women, and children as young as ten.15 Such people, reformers 
argued, either did not trust private banks or lacked access to them. Either way, the vast 
majority of Americans were not utilising banks. It was the Government's duty, then, to ensure 
that all American people were provided with safe and easily accessible savings facilities. This 
was both to restore currency to circulation – it was repeatedly asserted that hundreds of 
millions of dollars were ‘unaccounted for by the banks, clearing houses and other 
depositories’16 – and to encourage thrift, the ‘mother of Prosperity’, as a capitalist virtue.17 
 The idea of such an institution was tremendously popular and resonated widely. From 
East to West, North to South, it was a national phenomenon, engulfing urban and rural people. 
The idea of assigning the Federal Government (or ‘Uncle Sam’) as a banker featured within 
                                                
14 Hopkins, ‘Money!’, 471. 
 
15 See George V. L. Meyer, ‘Postal Savings Banks’, North American Review, vol. 188, no. 633 (August, 1908): 248-
53. For a comprehensive examination, see Donald Bruce Schewe, ‘A History of the Postal Savings System in 
America, 1910-1970’ (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1971), 1-94. 
 
16 F. E. McMillan quoted in Leonard Fowler, ‘For Safer Deposits’, The Ranch (Washington), 1 September, 1908, 
5. Also see Meyer, ‘Postal Savings Banks’, 248 and 250. 
 
17 Theodore L. Weed, ‘The Poor Man's Bank’, New York Tribune, 2 October, 1910, 29. 
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newspapers articles across the country [See Figure 10]. 18  Moreover, Populists, socialists, 
organised labour, and even governmental figures and politicians advocated these banks. The 
People's Party, better known as the Populists, embraced the idea, and so too did the Knights 
of Labor, various Postmasters General from the 1870s onwards, and, eventually, President 
William Taft.19 These figures played a key role in transmitting the concept. 
 
 
Figure 10. 'Uncle Sam Turns Banker'. This article appeared in the San Francisco Call, 20 August, 
1911, the year after the Postal Savings System began operating. From the Library of Congress’ 
Chronicling America digital collection. 
 
The Populists’ advocacy of such banks is well known. Within their financial platform, 
in addition to calling for the free-coinage of silver, the Populists advocated postal banks ‘to be 
established by the government for the safe deposit of the earnings of the people and to facilitate 
exchange’.20 Much of this proposal related directly to the currency debate. It was believed that 
                                                
18 Thousands of articles or reports on postal banks were published across the country. The Library of Congress's 
‘Cataloguing America’ digital archive returns 41,986 search results for ‘postal savings’. This is, of course, an 
imprecise result, but should suffice to offer some indication as to the amount of coverage the idea and policy 
received. In terms of references to ‘Uncle Sam’, several articles were written by authoritative figures upon the 
inception of the system, or immediately following. See, for example, Frank G. Carpenter, ‘Uncle Sam Turns 
Banker’, San Francisco Call, 20 August, 1911; and Weed, ‘The Poor Man's Bank’, 29. 
 
19 See Sheldon Garon, Beyond Our Means: Why America Spends While the World Saves (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 105-15. 
 
20 Ignatius Donnelly, The Omaha Platform, 1896 in The World Almanac, 1893, 83-5. Reproduced in George B. 
Tindall [ed.]. A Populist Reader: Selections from the Works of American Populist Leaders (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1966), 90-6. 
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postal banks could assist to restore money to circulation, which would thus actually bring 
about a means to ‘facilitate exchange’. Still, this suggested that governmental institutions were 
best suited towards achieving this end. It was implied that people would undoubtedly trust the 
government to assure the safety of their money, and that they desired a facility to do so. Some 
Populists even considered postal banks to be the first step towards nationalising banking 
completely. These were not only to be alternative depository institutions but replacement ones. 
Only popularly owned banks, via the government, could be trusted.21 While it is true that 
agrarians were especially critical of national banks, for these more radical Populists (the kind 
that would later veer towards socialism), this was an issue, then, with all banks. Whatever the 
case, Populists were responsible for helping disseminate the idea that a government bank of 
some kind was not only desirable but necessary. This also demonstrates the overlap between 
the currency and banking issues. 
 Public figures also had a role in disseminating this idea. Upon highlighting that public 
sentiment – as ‘voiced through the press’ – was ‘almost unanimous’ in its support for ‘savings 
banks under the patronage of the Government’, John Wanamaker, merchant and Postmaster 
General between 1889 and 1893, declared to Congress in 1891 that ‘private savings banks do 
not meet the wants of all the people’.22 They were demonstrably unsafe, as evidenced by their 
record of failures, and inaccessible to large numbers of people. Regarding the former, these 
banks were characterised by ‘mismanagement’ and ‘recklessness’.23 To be clear, Wanamaker 
was referring to banks which were not chartered by the Federal or state governments. National 
and state banks were acceptable institutions, and he proposed that postal deposits be redirected 
into national banks nearest to the receiving post offices. 24  Regardless, this was a clear 
denunciation of bankers that eschewed governmental oversight and regulation. This critique 
also implied that bankers could not be trusted to act entirely on their own accord and that 
state intervention was thus crucial to ensuring that minimal standards of security were met. 
In this way, postal banks would then be an extension of the state’s capacity to provide security 
                                                
21 See Louisiana Populist, 30 November, 1894, 1 and Natchitoches Populist (Louisiana), 9 December, 1898, 1. 
 
22 John Wanamaker, Postal Savings Banks: An Argument in their Favor (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1891), 3 and 7. 
 
23 Wanamaker, Postal Savings Banks, 8-10. 
 
24 Wanamaker, Postal Savings Banks., 14. 
 
  V. 120 
 
within banking. 
 Others went further. Within his proposal for postal banks to the Union Reform League 
in 1899, Dague, the former state senator, made it clear that he aimed to overhaul what he 
considered a ‘fatally defective and unsound’ monetary system. Not only were banks unreliable, 
evidenced by ‘bank suspensions’ and the ‘loss of millions’, but also amassed their fortunes via 
‘other people's money’. Banks would loan this money back to the people at a high rate of 
interest, and would thus profit from the latter's money and simultaneously put them in debt.25 
The unreliability and profiteering nature of banks were here connected, as the interest 
amassed would create financial bubbles that would inevitably burst.26 To Dague, a financial 
system like this, that privileged a few at the expense of many, was unacceptable. It was ‘one of 
the most mischievous and fallacious errors of the age’, Dague charged, ‘that money should be 
issued, owned and controlled by private individuals or corporations for their own benefit, 
instead of by and for the government which is composed of all the people [emphasis added]’.27 
Government banks were, again, the solution. Dague’s postal banks were to be more than 
complementary to the existing banking system – they were to become a major component of 
a new system. While he made it clear that it was the system he was attacking and not individual 
bankers, and conceded that privately owned banks could still exist, he nevertheless made it 
absolutely clear that their power would be significantly reduced, and would be secondary to 
the banks owned by the people.28 
 Prominent and visible actors were not alone. Demonstrating their broad appeal and just 
how extensively the idea of them had been transmitted, working class people also expressed 
support for them. One can observe this even at a relatively early stage. Within the Atlantic 
Monthly's 1879 article on ‘Workingmen's Wives’, which sought to capture the experience of 
working class life generally and married women particularly, a mechanic and his wife who 
lived together in ‘a village not far from the city’, expressed excitement for the idea. The wife 
claimed that working people recognised the importance of money and savings, but, referring 
to the perceived fragility of savings banks, ‘the uncertainty about receiving their money’ did 
                                                
25 Dague, A Postal Savings System, 3-6 and 7-8. 
 
26 Dague, A Postal Savings System, 9-10. 
 
27 Dague, A Postal Savings System, 13. 
 
28 Dague, A Postal Savings System, 13-14. 
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‘more than anything else to discourage’ them ‘from trying to save’. Something must have been 
‘very imperfect in our civilization, or the organization of society’, claimed the wife, ‘when all 
the wisdom of this great country and all the power of the government cannot give a laboring 
man who saves fifty dollars any security that he shall have it returned to him when he needs 
it [emphasis added]’.29 Her solution was for the ‘national government to receive money from 
the people at the post-offices everywhere, and give them certificates of deposit, charging a 
small fee to pay for the clerical labor involved’. Not only would this provide a safe medium for 
people to deposit their savings, it would also empower them, rather than the directors and 
stockholders of savings banks (and also life-insurance companies), to ‘organize and direct’ their 
own affairs.30 Although this is a lone example, it demonstrates that the idea had reached and 
been embraced by working folk. It also captures the lack of confidence in private institutions, 
and the desire for governmental intervention. 
Additionally, it was claimed that European immigrants, particularly Southern and 
Eastern Europeans, held ‘little confidence in any depository for savings which [was] not 
vouched for by the Government’.31 This was evidenced by the fact that many were sending 
millions of dollars to their trusted overseas postal banks via money orders (effectively 
removing money from domestic circulation). Money orders were also being used domestically 
as an informal means to save. Postmaster General George Meyer observed that between the 
first of March, 1907, and the first of March, 1908, ‘no less than 128,146 moneyorders’ had been 
issued through the post offices, ‘aggregating to the amount of $8,104,447’. Many of these had 
been arranged to keep money with the post office until the orders were redeemed by their 
holders.32 This demonstrated, according to the Chief Clerk of the Post-office Department, that 
a ‘real demand’ for postal banks had been created from below, or by the people themselves.33 
It is problematic to consider 128,146 money orders to be representative of a kind of mass 
grassroots movement and it is unlikely that every money order was issued for this purpose. 
                                                
29 ‘Workingmen's Wives’, Atlantic Monthly, vol. 43, no. 255 (January, 1879): 65. Lears also uses this source. See 
Lears, Rebirth of a Nation, 78-9. 
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Poor Man's Bank’, 29. The quote comes from Meyer, ‘Postal Savings-Banks’, 251. 
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Still, accepting such figures, this does at least suggest that there were many ordinary people 
pushing for postal banks in a rather ingenious way. 
 In the wake of the 1907 panic, the push intensified for postal banks, and warnings were 
issued to bankers about the impact of rejecting them. Most bankers, particularly through the 
American Bankers’ Association (ABA), had done so over the span of the proposal’s legislative 
history, largely due to their concern about losing business to an apparently paternalistic 
government.34 In his 1909 argument ‘Addressed to Bankers’, Charles Hall Davis, a Virginian 
lawyer, warned bankers that by opposing the creation of these tremendously popular banks, 
they were also ‘opposing the will of the people’, and would thus ‘intensify the feeling’ that the 
‘Banking Fraternity [was] selfishly seeking to promote its own interests without regard for, 
and often in antagonism to, the interests of the people’.35 Similarly, a 1909 editorial within the 
Chicago Tribune, entitled ‘BANKERS! WARNING!’, advised that it was ‘not the part of wisdom 
for the American Bankers' Association to array itself against the demand for postal savings 
banks’. After outlining three major benefits of such banks – their accessibility, their capacity 
to draw out currency hidden within ‘stockings and buried kettles’, and their ability to ‘breed 
thrift’ – the editorial warned the Association that its ‘opposition [would] not increase the 
confidence of thousands of people in the banks’. Instead, it would ‘prejudice public opinion 
against banking opinion when the problem of currency reform [was] laid before the country 
for its consideration’. It was counterproductive to oppose a much desired institution, as doing 
so was alienating bankers from the rest of society. Not only did this maintain suspicions, it also 
risked making the reform proposals pitched by bankers themselves seem to be class oriented 
and adverse to popular interests.36 Edwin Kemmerer, a prominent economist, believed that 
this had happened. He claimed in 1911, the year the postal savings system began operating, 
that the near unanimous opposition by the ‘banking fraternity’ appeared to many that their 
interests conflicted with those of the public.37 Seeking to thwart postal banks, then, may well 
have reinforced popular distrusts and, ironically, increased their appeal. 
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* * * 
 
 Not all reformers preferred the idea of government banks, however. Many favoured 
strong regulatory measures over state ownership in order to make banks safer, to secure 
confidence, and to restore currency to circulation. The clearest example of this was the 
proposal to instate a deposit insurance program, which would oblige banks to contribute to a 
fund to cover losses to all depositors, commercial and savings, usually consisting of about one 
percent of all deposits received. Though not exactly a new idea (New York had established a 
‘Safety Fund’ in 1829 and the idea had been debated within Congress and banking circles),38 it 
gained traction during the early 1900s, and again represented a popular distrust in banks. It 
was a different means to a similar end – to establish an equitable or at least safer banking 
system amenable to the interests of ‘the people’. 
Immediately following the 1907 panic, mandatory deposit guarantees were established 
in Oklahoma, followed by other Midwestern states – states that had been historically hard hit 
by panic-induced bank failures.39 Subsequently, William Jennings Bryan promised to instate 
such a system at a national level (that is, upon the federally governed national banks) during 
the 1908 Presidential campaign. Bryan criticised Taft's postal savings proposal due to its plan 
to place deposits within national banks. This, he argued, would only add to the coffers of Wall 
Street.40 Furthermore, the Democratic platform sought to remove an inconsistency in how the 
Government valued the safety of its own deposits and how it valued the safety of the general 
public's deposits. ‘The Government’, the platform declared, demanded ‘security for every 
dollar it [deposited] in national banks’. It then asked whether the ‘bank deposits of the people’ 
would ‘also be secured against loss by bank failures’. Enacting a deposit insurance program 
                                                
38 Richard T. McCulley, Banks and Politics During the Progressive Era: The Origins of the Federal Reserve System, 
1897-1913, second edition (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 156. 
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would thus undermine this double standard, and henceforth ensure that depositors were 
protected against loss the same way the Government itself was. With this knowledge instilled, 
popular confidence in banking would be secured, and money would remain in circulation via 
the banks.41 
 Bryan and Democratic Midwestern legislators were not alone. Even before the panic, 
Elliot Flower, a novelist and writer for magazines such as the Saturday Evening Post, argued 
in favour of such a measure within a May 1907 issue of the New York Tribune's Sunday 
Magazine, albeit upon a state rather than national basis. He observed that although actual 
losses had been statistically minute, depositors were still inconvenienced and faced hardship 
by being deprived immediate access to their money. Clearing houses were not the solution, as 
they could determine which banks received support, subsequently allowing some banks to fall. 
This thus made them incapable of eliminating runs and panics. Runs were bad for all banks as 
the public did not discriminate between solvent and insolvent institutions, Flower contended. 
Thus, all banks needed to support any measure that would ‘give the public abiding faith in 
banking institutions generally’.42 In a letter to the editor of the New York Times, a George M. 
Coffin insisted that the idea be ‘thoroughly discussed’ instead of being lambasted and dismissed 
outright.43 Within another, a John E. Slawson of New York informed the Times that he and 
his brothers would be voting for Bryan and John Kern (Bryan's Vice Presidential running 
mate), as they ‘believed fully in the bank guarantee plank in the Democratic platform’.44 The 
Times also reported that Bryan had been applauded following an address in Brooklyn. 45 
Furthermore, guarantee bills were subsequently introduced outside of Democratic strongholds, 
including Illinois, New York, and New Jersey.46 Finally, while voting patterns do not tell us 
much about voter support for particular policies, they do demonstrate that even despite the 
regional divisions between Republicans and Democrats, sizeable amounts of voters within 
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Republican states voted for Bryan.47 This does not necessarily reflect support for guarantees, 
though it does at least suggest that many outside of Democratic states may have found the idea 
favourable. 
 There were, however, vocal opponents to guarantees. Bryan's advocacy of the measure 
had sparked a war of letters with James Forgan, Chicago's pre-eminent banker, which played 
out within the press. Editorials and open-letters were exchanged between the two in order to 
publicise each case. Forgan publicly accused Bryan of misquoting and misconstruing him, and 
claimed that the measure would unjustly ‘make all banks equally good’. 48  Bryan accused 
Forgan of presenting ‘selfish’ arguments which put the ‘the interest of the big banker above 
the welfare of the community and the country at large’. 49  Such charges were obviously 
intended for an audience beyond themselves – Forgan made it clear, for instance, that his 
response was an ‘open letter’ and that he would be giving copies of it to the press.50 
 The feud pitted competing conceptions of democracy and capitalism against one 
another, and through this we can observe the intellectual foundations of a regulatory approach 
that prioritised the public-interest. On the one hand, self-determination and the free-market 
were espoused, whereas on the other intervention and public welfare were advanced. Forgan 
charged that making banks equally good unfairly removed the competitive advantage of those 
that were well managed and would thus level their status with the speculative and reckless. In 
effect it would then encourage reckless banking as there would be no incentive to be 
‘conservative’ - establishing distinction would be unnecessary and riskier behaviour would be 
encouraged in knowing that other banks would cover losses.51 This tied into another danger. 
Guarantees would violate the liberal principle of exercising rational judgement. He saw 
depositors as investors that sought out banks based upon their reputations. By eliminating the 
distinction between good and bad banks, this would also diminish the investor's need to make 
sound financial decisions; it would undermine their ability to choose whether they wanted to 
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do their business with reputable or disreputable firms. Ultimately, this kind of intervention 
would undermine their independence.52 Forgan later enunciated upon this idea to the Illinois 
Banker's Association, stating that it was ‘not a good thing for the public that they should be 
treated as children or non-entities and relieved by their government the necessity of exercising 
ordinary judgment and discrimination in their personal affairs’. Indeed, this ‘would certainly 
not tend to improve their business acumen or their social efficiency’. It therefore was not the 
role of government to intervene on the behalf of individuals.53 
 Bryan saw banks instead as public service institutions that needed to be regulated in 
order to protect the interests of the depositing public. ‘The bank’, he argued, existed ‘for the 
benefit of the people’, and it was a ‘mistake to assume that the people existed for the benefit of 
the bank’. Putting the private interests of the few above the interests of the many was wrong. 
Banks had to work for the people. Furthermore, depositors were vulnerable, and had ‘no way 
of knowing’ which banks were ‘good’ and which were ‘bad’. Every bank, after all, presented 
itself as ‘conservatively managed’. Therefore, Bryan argued, it was absurd to believe that 
depositors could make a sufficiently sound judgement. 54  Accordingly, Forgan's informed 
choice approach was conveyed to be fundamentally flawed. Rather, it was the duty of the 
government to intervene in order to protect depositors from dangers beyond their control. 
Private ownership would persist, but the people, via the state, would further govern the 
activities of bankers in order to ensure that the people’s independence was not debased by the 
frailties of the institutions that they entrusted. 
 Despite the latter view's avoidance of advocating state-owned banks, Forgan described 
guarantees to be of a ‘socialistic character’.55 James Laurence Laughlin, an economics professor 
at the University of Chicago, expanded upon this charge. Laughlin first accused the proposals 
of being vague in their details, especially concerning whether they were intended to guarantee 
that people would have immediate access to their funds or would receive them after 
liquidation, and of wrongly conflating savings banks with commercial banks. Unlike those that 
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utilised savings banks, who merely sought a safe place to keep their savings, those that utilised 
commercial banks were businessmen that strove to profit through their depositing and 
borrowing.56 He then claimed that guarantees were ‘not supported by any theory of political 
expediency but the socialistic’, which he considered to be a ‘philosophy of failure’. Not only 
was appropriating the capital of innocent parties to repay the debts of others an assault upon 
property rights, it was also a means to absolve people of their personal responsibilities, 
especially when applied to commercial banking. ‘To be asked to be relieved from the ill success, 
or risk, of one's own business ventures’, Laughlin asserted, ‘is of the very essence of socialism’. 
The weak, or life's ‘failures’, were trying to have the State remove the risk from their 
transactions. This was antithetical to capitalist individualism, which rewarded the diligent, 
talented, and brave.57 
 However, Bryan made it clear that he was seeking to secure all depositors, both 
commercial and savings. By advocating guarantees for national banks, Bryan claimed that this 
would subsequently force other banks, like state banks, to adopt them in order to remain 
competitive and to attract deposits. 58  Further, he charged that the Democrats were the 
champions of ‘the farmer, the laboring man, the business man, the professional man’ and even 
the banker.59 And, outside of pushing for deposit guarantees, Bryan had rejected accusations 
that the Democrats were socialistic. He defined socialism as the wholesale government 
ownership of all the modes of production. ‘Cooperative’ government, conversely, took on only 
what was non-competitive and what people could not do on their own.60 At least according to 
this definition, deposit guarantees were not socialistic. Although considered public service 
institutions, banks were to remain privately owned and operated. They were, however, to be 
further regulated, especially given that they existed to serve the public, rather than vice versa. 
As the public could not, according to Bryan, determine which banks were actually safe – 
something which was outside of their control – the Government had a responsibility to 
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intervene. Thus, the government was to play an even greater role within the banking sector, 
even if only a limited one. 
 
* * * 
 
 Still, other reformers preferred to minimise governmental interference. Thrift advocate 
Mary Wilcox Brown, for instance, considered hefty intervention, like Government ownership, 
to be too socialistic. Referring to postal banks, Brown stated within her 1899 treatise, The 
Development of Thrift, that ‘[t]he promoters of the system will do well to bear in mind that 
the absorption by the government of business enterprises leads to state socialism’. Establishing 
such banks would, according to Brown, be a step towards transforming the American economy 
from a capitalist form to a socialist form. This was, she believed, antithetical to treasured values 
such as individualism and self-sufficiency.61 Unlike other reformers that saw the state as an 
indivisible apparatus owned and operated of, by, and for the people as a collective whole, they 
maintained a conceptual division between the two – the Government and the people. 
 Despite this, they too assumed that banking was necessary to common people and thus 
also strove to increase popular control within banking. Rather than achieving this through the 
state, however, they sought to do so through the people themselves. Inspired by practical and 
theoretical developments overseas (from British and European cooperative banks to the ideas 
of Pierre-Joseph Proudhoun) and the broader cooperative movement,62 the idea was that by 
forming democratic ‘people’s banks’ or ‘co-operative banks’, ones directly owned and operated 
of, by, and for the people that utilised them, the banker would be eschewed altogether. Instead, 
people themselves were to become their own bankers – they, rather than anyone else, were 
best suited to direct their own financial affairs. Though this was slightly different to the 
immediate concern over the perceived security of deposits, it still exhibited a lack of faith in 
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outside actors, particularly bankers. Their underlying idea was that the safekeeping and 
loaning of the people’s money was best left to the people themselves. 
It is true that ‘people’s banks’ like building and loan societies – also known as ‘Co-
operative Savings and Loan Associations, Co-operative Banks, Building Associations, … 
Mutual Loan Associations, [and] Homestead Aid Associations’ – were not exactly a new idea 
by the turn of the century. 63 Indeed, they had existed prior to the Civil War, with the first 
appearing in 1831. Moreover, their emphasis upon democratic ownership and operation was 
reflected within Pennsylvania's 1859 act to regulate them. 64 Further, their relation to 
‘democracy’ was articulated shortly following the war, as reflected by Edmund Wrigley's guide 
to building and loan societies, The Working Man's Way to Wealth, first published in 1869. In 
it, their ‘democratic’ nature was made absolutely explicit. Savings banks, while good for 
teaching the ‘working classes how to save’, did not, he argued, inculcate self-sufficiency. They 
had a ‘tendency to aristocracy’ as they were managed by people from a ‘different class’.65 
Instead, what was needed was a system that allowed the ‘working man’ to ‘become his own 
capitalist’. This was the ‘building association’ - a ‘perfectly democratic’ institution. People 
formed such societies themselves, and could thus deposit to and borrow from themselves, 
particularly to finance home ownership. There were no middlemen here. This was a system 
‘of the people, by the people, and for the people’. Indeed, it was a ‘People's banking system’.66 
As such, the idea of democratising banking had been developing decades earlier.  
 Such thinking had carried through to the turn of the century. Brown, a leading thrift 
advocate, later echoed Wrigley and acknowledged that there was little democracy within 
savings banks – they did not ask their ‘depositors to concern themselves about [their] 
management’. This included mutual savings banks which, although lacking stockholders, were 
administrated by trustees – typically wealthy people, including bankers. While Brown stated 
that it was good that such banks had instilled the thrift habit within many, she also claimed 
that they undermined the independence of the depositing public. Management determined 
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what was done with other people's money, not the owners themselves.67 Her solution was to 
establish and encourage ‘people's banks’ which would empower people to save and manage 
their own capital in a cooperative manner. Brown looked at a range of models besides building 
and loans, such as German and Italian cooperative banks. Whatever the specific system, so 
long as it was cooperative, this would then allow for people themselves to become capitalists. 
Common ownership would thus greatly enhance everyone's opportunity for social mobility, 
individually and collectively.68  
Furthermore, such institutions started to proliferate in the 1880s. The Manufacturer 
and Builder noted in 1894 that while ‘building and loan associations had their birth in the 
decade between 1840 and 1850’ the Commission of Labor's ninth annual report demonstrated 
that the ‘average age of all the associations is but 6.2 years, the local associations having an 
average age of 6.3 years, and the nationals an average of only 2.5 years’. There were ‘5,146 
associations out of the whole number under 15 years of age’, with only 433 ‘over 15 years of 
age’.69 Historian David Mason has observed that ‘[w]hile the American thrift business grew 
slowly during the first forty years of its existence, growth accelerated in the 1880s, and soon 
thrifts were in operation across the country’. 70  Moreover, as historian David Tucker has 
highlighted, prior to the 1880s such institutions had been temporary. During the 1880s, 
however, they were legally entitled to exist on a permanent basis, and assumed standard 
banking functions. Subsequently, they ‘won national popularity’ and attracted ‘seven percent 
of all personal savings by the end of the century’.71 While no doubt there may have been 
myriad reasons for this, a lack of accessible credit for private needs being one, it is clear that 
many were attracted to the idea of ‘becoming their own capitalists’ through popularly owned 
banks. Indeed, they had been so successful that a commentator noted at the end of the 1880s 
that ‘no scheme has yet been devised and put into operation which combines safety of funds, 
cheapness in management, and good rates of interest in so great a degree as the Co-operative 
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Savings and Loan Association’.72  
 The idea behind the ‘Negro bank’ was ideologically similar to the cooperative ethic. 
Like the cooperative banks, the idea was for African Americans to become their own capitalists. 
Despite the Freedmen's bank disaster, and in the face of segregation and white society's 
attempts to depict African Americans as financially incompetent, various African Americans 
established their own banks. These banks were typically organised to accord with the ‘black 
capitalism’ ethic, which encouraged the uplift of the ‘race’ to middle-class respectability.73 
Thus, while privately owned and operated, they were nevertheless driven by a social 
prerogative. Rather than an end in itself, profit was a means to an end, and that end was 
community development. Furthermore, private ownership was to demonstrate that African 
American people could conduct financial affairs on their own without the assistance from 
others (such ‘assistance’, after all, had led to the downfall of the Freedmen's bank).74 Maggie 
Lena Walker, an African American and America's first female president of a chartered bank, 
represented this ethos through her St Luke's Penny Savings Bank.75 Further examples included 
African American bankers within Mississippi, who were reported to be successful.76 Therefore, 
these were often ‘people's banks’ for those that had been and were being excluded from 
popular conceptions of ‘the people’. Owners and patrons of these banks were in effect unified 
into a financial community that was built upon a shared identity and interpersonal trust.  
 The notion of a ‘people's bank’ took on a range of forms. They may have been building 
and loan associations or even ‘Negro banks’. Still, they all featured an essential similarity: they 
all sought to democratise banking by maximising popular participation and control in such a 
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way that avoided state-ownership or hefty intervention. Here they differed to the other plans 
which had embraced the state. Even then, however, they still sought to redistribute power 
from capital – and the banker – to ‘the people’. The means may have been different, but, again, 
the end was the same: popular control.     
 
* * * 
 
 In one way or another, all such ideas and proposals were implemented. Postal banks, 
governmental guarantees, and cooperative banks had been established in some capacity by or 
at the end of the twentieth’s century’s first decade. Much of this was the result of persistent 
advocacy from reformers and the people behind them. This was particularly so regarding the 
postal savings system and the guarantees. William Taft's Republican administration enacted 
postal savings in 1910, bringing about their creation the following year. This ended thirty-nine 
years of continuous congressional lobbying. Still, the bill that passed made concessions to 
bankers. Deposits would be redistributed into national banks, and it was pitched as a panic 
preventative – when currency was withdrawn from banks and placed within postal banks, that 
currency would then be placed back into the banks, thus maintaining their liquidity. 77 
Governmental guarantees had been implemented within various Southern and Western states 
by the end of the decade. It is true that some bankers embraced the system,78 though Bryan 
and the Democrats failed to implement such a system at a national level. Cooperative banks, 
on the other hand, managed to flourish. This may well have been because they eschewed the 
need for hefty intervention and hence could avoid protracted legislative battles. Resultantly, 
of the three forms examined here, cooperatives may have been the most successful. 
Regardless, all three had managed to make the transition from idea to reality, even if 
their final form was imperfect or adulterated. All had accepted that banking was an essential 
‘public service’ within a capitalist society, and all were responses to various issues within 
American banking. Many came to acknowledge that they had the capacity to create more 
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secure and equitable systems. This way, confidence could be bolstered and democracy 
increased. Ultimately, people did manage to implement some degree of either popular 
ownership or control in banking.  
Moreover, by the early 1910s, the idea that banks were a kind of ‘public service’ 
institution had been established as something of a truism. In 1912, Herman Myrick, an editor 
and writer for popular magazines like Good Housekeeping and Farm and Home, described 
banking as ‘a quasi-public business, for it affects every branch of industry, and is vitally 
connected with the interests of employed and employer, producer and consumer’.79 Brandeis 
claimed that ‘[r]eceiving deposits and making loans therefrom should be treated by the law 
not as a business, but as one of the public services’.80 He also quoted Democratic Senator Robert 
Owen's pronouncement that ‘a bank is a public-utility institution’ which could not ‘be treated 
as a private affair, for the simple reason that the public is invited, under safeguards under the 
government, to deposit its money with the bank’. The public therefore had ‘a right to have its 
interests safeguarded through organized authorities’. 81 Bankers were also exposed to this 
sentiment. Edmund Walker, the President of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, lectured New 
York's state bankers in 1912 on the ‘public service’ nature of banking.82 It is clear, then, that 
the notion that banks existed to serve the public, or ‘the people’, had come to circulate widely 
within the public sphere, reaching audiences spanning from the farmer to the urban middle-
class professional, and even to bankers themselves. Banks were now conceptually obliged to 
serve ‘the people’.  
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 Responding to Distrust through Advertising 
 
To promote public confidence in the bank ... is the first step in an advertising 
campaign. The majority of small business men and wage-earners are 
unfamiliar with banks and banking methods, and the institution which tells 
them frankly, in simple terms, what security their deposits will have goes a 
long way toward securing their accounts. All the more is this necessary and 
expedient now, when the ‘muck-rake’ has shattered confidence in some 
business concerns. 
 
  - Daniel Vincent Casey, How to Increase a Bank's Deposits, 1908.1 
 
Speaking before the American Bankers’ Association (ABA) at their 1908 convention, 
Woodrow Wilson, then President of Princeton University, remarked that ‘the bank’ was ‘the 
most jealously regarded and least liked instrument of business in this country’. America's banks 
were, according to Wilson, ‘remote from the people and the people [regarded] them as not 
belonging to them but belonging to some power hostile to them’. Common American people, 
or the ‘average man’, saw the banker as both a distinct and threatening figure who pursued 
their self-interest while remaining oblivious to the welfare of others. Though he made it clear 
that he disagreed with this attitude, stating that bankers were generally decent and productive 
people, he insisted that his audience accept the attitude's existence as ‘fact’. After evaluating 
what was being done by bankers to address this, he went on to announce that ‘the banks have 
turned away from their old time modesty and reserve and have now gone out into advertising’ 
and were ‘drumming the country up and down for business and sending out the most attractive, 
even deceptive circulars’. Upon receiving laughter for this remark, one presumably made in 
jest, he rephrased this by stating that bankers were ‘falling over themselves and each other to 
get into communication with the general body of people in this country’.2 
 Although Wilson believed that this method was ineffective and wondered how else 
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bankers could ‘get in connection with the minds of this country’, he nevertheless accurately 
and elegantly conveyed the situation.3 By the turn of the century, bankers had become highly 
conscious of their generally poor public image. The recurrence of runs, panics, wreckers, and 
plutocrats – in reality and in representation – had taken their toll, and bankers knew this. As 
this chapter argues, in the wake of the depression of the 1890s and especially following the 
panic of 1907, many bankers came to acknowledge that they had to wrest control of their 
image and, towards this end, many of them began to see advertising as a remedy to their 
problems. Bankers turned to the medium in the belief that it could ‘educate’ the public and 
establish and maintain confidence. Put simply, advertising was beginning to be the primary 
medium for individual banks to convey themselves positively within the public-sphere. 
 While utilising publicly visible artefacts and symbols was not a new practice (a bank's 
architecture, vault, name, and directorate had long been utilised to symbolise strength, 
prosperity, and identity),4 what was new was that bankers began to consciously formalise ways 
of presenting themselves in the form of advertising, which came to entail almost anything, 
from bank statements within newspapers to people themselves. This was more than a bid 
merely to promote their individual institutions within markets glutted with competing banks. 
In order to acquire and sustain deposits, individual banks of all kinds – national, state, and 
private, and commercial and savings – sought to represent that they were reliable and that 
they were essential fixtures of their communities. Indeed, regarding the latter, they sought to 
demonstrate that they were ‘of, by, and for the people’. In this way, through advertising they 
believed that they could legitimate and naturalise their existence, a view which was especially 
poignant at a time when many were starting to advocate banking alternatives. This was 
ultimately to convince people that they were and always had been society's appropriate 
financial and depository institutions. In turn, this would stimulate confidence. Therefore, 
through their embrace of advertising we can begin to observe the moment when bankers 
started to believe that taking to the public sphere was the best way to ‘get in connection with 
the minds’ of the American people. 
 
                                                
3 Wilson, ‘Address’, 231. 
 
4  See Charles Belfoure, Monuments to Money: The Architecture of American Banks (Jefferson; London: 
McFarland and Company, inc. Publishers, 2005), 9-124, esp. 17, 64, and 113. 
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* * * 
 
 By the turn of the twentieth century, if any class of people had come to know the social 
and commercial value of confidence, it was bankers. America's bankers – national, state, 
savings, trust, or otherwise – were by now acutely aware that it was just as important as taking 
deposits and making loans. Along these lines, J. M. Elliot, the president of the First National 
Bank of Los Angeles, commented in 1908 that the ‘confidence of its customers in any bank is 
as valuable as its capital stock’.5 Likewise, in a letter to Arsene Pujo, J. P. Morgan and Co. 
claimed that to ‘banking the confidence of the community is the breath from which it draws 
life’. They then noted how fickle confidence could be, stating that the past was ‘full of examples 
where the slightest suspicion as to the conservatism, or the methods of the bank's management, 
has destroyed confidence and drawn away its depositors overnight’.6 Bankers had evidently 
come to appreciate that without confidence there could be no banking. 
 Tellingly, the first ever article in the Chicagoan trade journal The Bank Man (1906) 
asserted that bolstering confidence was the quintessential requirement of a bank and a banker. 
Responding to an alleged tendency of the ‘uninformed’ to see bankers as stern and emotionally 
aloof, the article contended that bankers in fact were very conscious of sentimentality: a bank's 
‘principal asset’, its most essential and most valuable feature, was a ‘sentiment’. As custodians 
of ‘other men's money’, based upon the implicit contract to return that money upon demand, 
inspiring and maintaining confidence was paramount. In the event that a bank did anything 
to ‘undermine’ that confidence, it would cease to exist. Ultimately, according to the article, 
this is what made bankers ‘unique’ compared to other business people.7 Confidence had thus 
become a kind of symbolic commodity which could be exchanged within the market. Bankers 
figured that those that could manufacture it in the greatest quantities could and would garner 
the largest deposits. 
 This notion emerged within in an environment where banking issues were all too 
                                                
5 J. M. Elliot, ‘A National Clearing House as a Safeguard Against Panics’, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 31 no. 2 (1908): 160-2. 
 
6 J. P. Morgan and Co., Letter from Messrs. J. P. Morgan and Co., in Response to the Invitation of the Sub-
Committee (Hon. A. P. Pujo, Chairman) of the Committee on Currency and Banking of the House of 
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familiar to patrons and to a newspaper reading public. Bankers were not detached or isolated 
from the various doubts and suspicions held against them. While it would have been simple 
enough to have noticed reports and criticisms within the media and elsewhere, they could also 
directly encounter public commentary and were thus very aware of how seriously the issue 
was considered. Wilson's address was one such instance, and it elicited a response from I. B. 
Tigrett, the president of the Tennessee Bankers' Association. Within his 1908 address to the 
Jackson Chapter of the American Institute of Banking, subsequently reproduced within the 
Bankers Magazine, Tigrett quoted Wilson as stating that he was ‘sure that many bankers must 
have become acutely and sensitively aware of the fact that the most isolated and the most 
criticized interest of all is banking’. The wording differed slightly to the ABA's transcription, 
and though this version was perhaps harsher, the same point was conveyed – the broader 
American public generally held an unfavourable view of the nation's bankers. Accepting this 
verdict, Tigrett asserted that this ‘epitome of the popular sentiment’ led bankers to ‘seriously 
consider the profession of banking’. He then commented on ‘Mistaken Public Opinion’. Tigrett 
identified general prejudices that he believed were tarnishing the image of bankers, including 
historical, age-old notions that characterised those in the business of dealing with money as 
‘rich, rapacious and greedy’.8 
 He was not alone in his acknowledgement of ‘popular sentiment’. Various other 
observers identified more immediate and specific causes behind hostile public attitudes, 
especially causes they believed were actively undermining the general public's confidence. For 
instance, one such cause concerned how the general public interpreted the misdeeds of some 
banks and bankers to represent those of all banks and bankers. J. M. Elliot complained in 1908 
that due to the volatility of the nation's fragile and disjointed banking infrastructure, bankers 
who conducted ‘their business in [a] careful and honorable fashion’ were ‘compelled to keep 
silent while the speculative, the unfit, the unfair, and sometimes the fraudulent, competitor 
[was] following the road to ruin for himself and incidentally bringing trouble, anxiety and loss 
to all honestly engaged in the business’. They could generate a ‘lack of confidence in the whole 
banking fabric which [had] been built up by years of honest dealing’. Confidence was 
extremely valuable to any bank, and it was thus ‘unfair to allow it to be damaged by any one 
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man or institution’. Elliot made this pronouncement in the wake of the 1907 panic, and may 
have been implicitly referring to the run against the Knickerbocker Trust Company and its 
connection to the disastrous attempt to corner the copper market. Regardless, he was alluding 
to the public's apparent inability to distinguish between good and bad banks, the latter 
including all those that would misuse and abuse their access to other people's money. In short, 
he asserted that the actions of one would tarnish the reputation of all others.9 
 Additionally, Frank Vanderlip, then Vice-President of the National City Bank of New 
York, drew attention to factors that he believed were undermining popular confidence. Also 
commenting in the aftermath of the 1907 panic, Vanderlip made explicit reference to major 
issues like banking panics and cash hoarding. Beyond this, however, he charged that it was 
vital to address what was actually driving these issues. The ‘financial crisis’ had ‘by no means 
been altogether a matter of money’. Instead, it had ‘been a matter of what was in men's minds’. 
In other words, Vanderlip claimed that the panic did not stem merely from financial 
conditions or from business cycles (these were still factors), but also from popular doubts and 
misconceptions. Vanderlip believed that the latter had been a product of the age's politics, 
particularly the progressive mission to expose and overcome injustices, stating that he ‘would 
again go back a few years in search of the roots of our present difficulties and note that we 
have had a period of so called “muck raking”’. This was a period where there had been ‘the 
most general criticism of leaders, both financial and political’. Though he conceded that some 
of their expositions were warranted, he observed that such muckraking had wrongly cast 
doubt upon all leaders and their capacity to protect and serve the interests of the public; thanks 
to ‘muck raking’, they were not popularly perceived to be trustworthy figures. This, combined 
with a concern over the risky investments of trust companies, was, according to Vanderlip, 
why people were so susceptible to panic in 1907; why panic ‘found quick lodgement in the 
minds of the people and the depositors’, and why these ‘suspicions’ were ‘promptly felt by 
large withdrawals of deposits and a considerable hoarding of cash’.10 
 Here, Vanderlip clearly recognised that certain ideas and materials distributed 
throughout the public sphere could be detrimental to bankers. The public sphere’s capacity to 
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transmit unfavourable content and to apparently shape public opinion attested to its power. 
Conversely, it also attested to its potential. The solution was obvious. In order to counter any 
and all negativity, bankers themselves had to take to the public sphere. This was to be achieved 
through ‘education’. Vanderlip was convinced that ‘there was never a time when education of 
the people in the principles of banking and currency was more seriously needed’.11 Therefore, 
the public simply had to know more about banks and banking. Once they had been educated, 
they would be more confident in their utilisation of them. By the time of the panic, and 
especially after it, many bankers shared this view. Many had also started to accept that the best 
way to ‘educate’ the public was through advertising, a medium considered to be ‘nothing but 
teaching – teaching people to think about a particular thing and act, as you want them to think 
and act about it’.12 
 
* * * 
 
 Compared to other businesses, particularly those selling consumer goods, banks were 
slower to begin embracing ‘modern’ advertising practices. One observer even claimed they 
were ‘among the last of established lines to enter the advertising field’.13 Consumer advertising 
and its corresponding industry had been developing gradually over the late nineteenth century. 
The new method sought to arouse desire by conveying that the advertised product would 
facilitate personal transformation and progress. The depression of the 1890s dramatically 
stimulated consumer advertising’s growth, as many merchants came to accept the idea that it 
would generate demand, which was sorely needed in what was understood to be a crisis of 
over-production. Advertising agencies began to convince businesses that they alone were 
capable of achieving this and subsequently went on to initiate mass, nationwide campaigns on 
behalf of their clients.14 Various banks did start to follow new advertising trends in the early 
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1890s. Even prior to the decade, many banks had been advertising in some capacity, typically 
through their statements within local newspapers. However, the former were exceptional and 
the latter typically limited their content to their name, their financial details (like their capital 
input), and the names of their directors and staff, all in the space of a small rectangular column. 
Such content was to instil confidence, though often it was also required by law (as was the 
case with national banks). For the most part though, they were technical and minimalistic 
when compared to other advertisements of the time, and resembled classifieds.15 O. Howard 
Wolfe, author of Practical Banking, later described this style as ‘tombstone’ advertising in 
1917.16 Bankers adhered to this approach apparently because they generally believed that to 
actively solicit business was to be undignified, and believed it unsuitable for a financial 
institution to flaunt itself to the public.17  This is what Wilson meant by their ‘Old time 
modesty’. 
  In the immediate aftermath of the depression, however, many bankers swiftly began 
to forego such modesty. Beginning in the late 1890s and carrying on into the 1900s, they 
realised that they could not afford to ignore the medium, especially in its ‘modern’ form which 
promised the capacity to persuade. Reflecting this almost instantaneous fascination and 
embrace of advertising, various discussions and guides emerged which sought to explore and 
advance the medium. Specialised advertising manuals started to proliferate, including Practical 
Bank Advertising (1900), Banking Publicity (1904), Pushing Your Business (1908), Financial 
Advertising (1908), How to Increase a Bank's Deposits (1908), Bank Advertising (1912), and 
Bank Advertising Plans (1913).18  Banks started to delegate staff members to specialise in 
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publicity and created special departments.19 Experts emerged, like Theodore McGregor, who 
became a leading figure and an author of multiple definitive guides, including Pushing Your 
Business and Bank Advertising Plans. The Bankers' Magazine started to feature a section 
devoted to advertising in 1906, overseen by McGregor. Also in 1906, the Bank Advertiser, a 
‘Monthly Journal Devoted to Bank Advertising’ entered circulation. In its second edition, the 
journal claimed that ‘the initial number … was received enthusiastically by bankers over the 
country’.20 It went on to take its subject so seriously that in 1908 it explicitly outlined what a 
bank's promotional duties entailed, taking the form of ‘The Banker's Ten Commandments’.21 
The biblical reference attests to how devoted some were to the subject. Getting it right teetered 
on being a religious creed. 
 In time, anything to do with a bank's public presentation came to constitute 
‘advertising’. McGregor noted that bankers had already been advertising through the likes of 
the ‘individuality of the banker’, ‘civic and social activities’, and ‘massively and conspicuously 
located buildings’.22 In a way, this was true, though these presentations only came to be widely 
considered as such retrospectively (with the exception of bank architecture).23 McGregor's 
observation thus reflected a new way of categorising these behaviours and objects – they were 
now seen as advertising. He also highlighted that banks had started to rely upon a range of 
materials to reach out to the public. Newspaper advertisements, booklets, and circulars were, 
of course, typical. However, many other mediums were embraced, including window displays, 
cookbooks, ‘tactful employes [sic]’, Sunday school prizes, aeroplanes, personal rewards for 
savings achievements, electric signs, billboards, and postcards.24 Satisfied customers and even 
children could also be advertisements for a bank.25 In a 1907 article within the Bank Advertiser, 
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F. W. Ellsworth, the manager of the First National Bank of Chicago's Advertising and New 
Business department, divided all such mediums into two categories: ‘general’ and ‘specific, or 
direct’. The former entailed ‘newspapers, financial and commercial journals, magazines, 
booklets, street car cards, billboards and novelties’, whereas the latter entailed ‘personal letters, 
circulars and personal contact’.26 Materials were thus tailored both for the group and the 
individual; they could be impersonal or personal. Moreover, Germain has demonstrated how 
‘service’ became integral to a bank's promotional repertoire. He highlights that ‘transaction 
velocity’, ‘accessibility’, ‘clean money’, ‘noise’, ‘check security’, and ‘accuracy’ were all utilised 
towards this end.27 Ultimately, whatever a bank displayed to the public (or even whatever a 
bank did in front of the public) could be a kind of advertising. 
 Nevertheless, newspaper advertising took pride of place. This was primarily because 
newspapers, particularly daily editions, were distributed considerable distances and to vast 
amounts of people. Francis Morison noted in Banking Publicity that the ‘daily newspapers’ 
were ‘undoubtedly the most profitable and at the same time most economical mediums for 
financial advertising’. This was because they were ‘constantly in touch with the affairs of their 
immediate neighborhood’ and because they circulated ‘far and wide reaching alike the homes 
of the rich and the poor’.28 Likewise, McGregor later asserted that there was ‘a great deal to be 
said for the daily newspaper as an advertising medium’. A daily newspaper, he remarked, ‘goes 
everywhere’, ‘[e]verybody reads it’, and ‘[e]very day it comes entirely fresh and new’. While 
the newspaper and the advertisements within it lacked ‘permanency’, it made up for this 
through the ‘frequency of its appearance’. Thus, due to its power, ‘[c]onsiderably more than 
half of an advertising appropriation for any financial institution or investment house’ could 
‘be safely expended in the newspapers’.29 Bankers agreed, at least according to William Borsodi, 
author of Financial Advertising. He claimed that the ‘awakening [to advertising] has come, 
and there is hardly a newspaper in which the bankers are not telling their story in a most up-
to-date way, illustrated and finely displayed, typographically’. Indeed, almost ‘every country 
newspaper carries bank advertisements of persuasive art, asking the great non-banking public 
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to come in and sample their line of goods’.30 Newspapers, then, were accepted to be the best 
means to get into ‘communication with the general body of people’. 
 There was an underlying purpose driving this turn to advertising. On the surface, the 
immediate goal, of course, was to sell the services of a particular bank. By the turn of the 
century, banks of all kinds were attempting to attract time or demand deposits. On a deeper 
level, though, bank advertising was embraced due to the shared belief that the medium had 
the capacity to ‘educate’ the public about banking and to bolster popular confidence. It was 
such a belief that prompted the Bank Advertiser to note in its first edition that bank advertising 
was ‘growing better every day; the people are being educated to use the banks more and more’. 
It then asked ‘[i]s it not possible to hasten the day when the people and the banks will be 
brought into a closer confidence?’ The answer: ‘[w]e think it is’.31 Through advertising, then, 
banks could communicate to the broader public – apparently uneducated and distant from 
banks – precisely what it was that they could do for them. After emphasising that bank 
advertisements had to be ‘educational in character’, C. L. Chamberlain explained in the 
Bankers' Magazine that this education was to both promote banking generally and the 
advertising bank specifically. He asserted that advertisements ‘ought to enlighten the reader 
concerning both the advantages offered by a good bank and the benefits offered by the 
particular bank advertised’.32 This education, then, was as much about selling banking as it was 
about selling a bank. 
 Their ‘educating’ reached out to nearly all classes and categories of people in America. 
Advertisements were tailored to particular audiences and could therefore vary greatly in terms 
of who they appealed to and how they crafted their messages. Germain has highlighted that 
banks oriented their promotions to appeal to target ‘markets’, segmented into categories such 
as age, gender, ethnicity, race, and class. Banks were clearly attempting to get in touch with 
everyone, including adults and children, men and women, white people and black people, old 
residents and new immigrants, capital and labour, and white and blue collar workers.33 A 1907 
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advertisement for the Planters National Bank of Richmond, Virginia, captures this well. Titled 
‘A PAGE TO BANK ON’, the full-page advertisement is composed of a collection of individual 
advertisements promoting a range of services and appealing to different people, including 
business people, workers, women, and children (or their parents) [See Figure 11].34 Overall, 
such advertising was a concerted effort to educate a ‘segmented’ public and in turn create a 
class of depositors and patrons of America's various banking institutions. 
 Differences aside, then, the ultimate goal of this education was to gain the public's 
confidence (meaning also their patronage). Indeed, inspiring and maintaining confidence was 
paramount and was something of a golden rule. This was considered foundational for all 
advertising. Daniel Casey argued in How to Increase a Bank's Deposits that to ‘promote public 
confidence in the bank’ was the ‘first step in an advertising campaign’.35 McGregor charged 
that commercial depositors would ‘not come to a bank or remain with it’ unless they had 
‘absolute confidence in it’. He followed this by claiming that ‘[n]ine times out of ten, when a 
man does not use the facilities a bank offers it is because be distrusts the institution’ or did now 
‘know what it could do for him’. Therefore, the first rule for commercial bank advertising was 
to ‘[i]nspire and maintain popular confidence’.36 Savings banks, according to McGregor, had a 
larger and more diverse clientele, and appealed to people on a personal, rather than a 
commercial, basis. Therefore, they had to ‘preach’ the idea that ‘[e]verybody who earns money 
should save some of it and deposit his earnings in a strong bank’. In other words, savings banks 
had to promote thrift. Still, it appears that McGregor was building an additional layer upon 
the confidence premise, observable through the inclusion of the term ‘strong bank’.37 Practical 
Bank Advertising made no such distinction when offering its two vital ‘requisites’ for effective 
bank advertising. It advised its readers that the first ‘requisite’ was to ‘convince yourself that 
your business is all that, and exactly what, you would have folks believe it to be’. Banks actually 
had to believe what they were saying. The second requisite, or the ‘next great thing’, was to 
‘create public confidence in the stability of your institution; to convince people thoroughly 
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that you are sound to the core’.38 Either way, coming in first or second place, the need to arouse 
confidence was a core, indispensable principle. 
 
Figure 11. Advertisement for the Planters National Bank of Richmond, Virginia, appealing to a broad 
range people, 1906. From the Library of Congress’ Chronicling America digital collection. 
 
 The perceived need to do so was not based upon abstract assumptions but instead actual 
observations. Stimulating confidence was considered necessary due to the age's social, 
economic, and political environment. Advertising specialists were well aware that there was 
an issue with popular confidence. Hoarding, runs, and panics, for instance, were all 
acknowledged to be actual problems. Borsodi noted in Financial Advertising (1909) that 
‘[a]ccording to official statistics … 5,000,000 people are keeping their savings in stockings, in 
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nooks and corners, and in hiding places of diverse sorts’.39 E. St. Elmo Lewis, author of the 
identically named Financial Advertising (1908), asserted that ‘if people knew more about 
banks and banking there would not be the same danger of panics and runs’.40 The Bank 
Advertiser agreed, stating in mid-1907 that a bank that kept it customers ‘informed’ through 
publicity was ‘less liable to suffer from untrue reports of its condition, which sometimes lead 
to a run on the Bank’.41 The Bankers' Magazine advised that ‘[w]hen confidence is lacking’ 
during times of panic, the banker ‘should stimulate confidence’ through advertising, and that 
when ‘people hoard their money’, the banker ‘should educate them to the point of bringing it 
forth to the daylight, where, in performing its functions, it will benefit all alike’.42 Taken 
together, bank advertising was clearly intended to arouse the confidence of those not using 
banks as well as those that were. 
 They were also aware of how banks were being depicted within the public sphere. The 
media was blamed for disseminating unfavourable information and, consequently, 
perpetuating distrust. Lewis attacked the ‘yellow press’ for doing so, and called for it to be 
‘curbed’. Due to its popularity, he asked if it was ‘any wonder that a lot of the savings stay in 
the tea caddies, the unused stove, the old stocking in a corner of the closet?’43 Similarly, Casey 
instructed his readers that the need to arouse confidence through advertising had become vital 
as the ‘muck-rake’ had ‘shattered confidence in some business concerns’.44 Furthermore, the 
Bankers' Magazine asserted that the ‘Postal Savings Bank idea’ appealed ‘so strongly to the 
popular fancy’ because people had been sold the notion that the government was absolutely 
stable. The implication was that the government was being construed to be far stronger and 
more reliable than banking institutions. This had become ‘part of the public consciousness 
through a species of advertising’. It was up to banks, then, to convince the public through their 
own advertising that they were just as secure. This had to continue until the phrase ‘Strong as 
the bank’ was as common as ‘Strong as the government’. Thus, there would be no need for 
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something like a postal savings system.45 Evidently, ideas concerning bank advertising were 
not only inspired by their social, economic, and political context, but they were also responsive 
to it. 
 This was especially so in the wake of the 1907 panic. These experts saw the panic as a 
kind of turning point for bank advertising. It had been so cataclysmic and had depleted 
confidence so abruptly and pervasively that it proved beyond reasonable doubt the need to 
educate an apparently wild and ignorant public. Put another way, it forced bankers to accept 
that there was a deep-seated confidence problem and that it was their duty to dispel any and 
all doubts and suspicions. The Bankers' Magazine stressed that the panic ‘brought home to 
bankers’ the need to create ‘in the public mind a feeling of greater confidence and trust in 
financial institutions, and a better knowledge of what banks exist for’. 46  Within Bank 
Advertising, Maurice Rothschild expressed consternation as to why banks had not engaged in 
‘more persistent advertising to offset the panic tendencies and retrogressive periods’. He 
blamed the panic on the press, which, he argued, overemphasised bank failures and resultantly 
created the impression that ‘the safest place’ to keep one's money was in ‘a broken crockery 
cup on the top of the pantry shelf’. The lesson was that bankers could no longer allow such 
reporting to go unchallenged, and thus had to do all they could to bolster confidence in times 
of distress.47 Lewis had a different take on things. He concluded that various banks had in fact 
been busy advertising and through doing so had successfully restored confidence. They had 
achieved this by calmly emphasising that they were solvent and that conditions were 
improving. His lesson was that newspaper advertising was a tremendously powerful 
instrument, and, therefore, all banks had to take advantage of it. He remarked wryly (and using 
a racial slur) that ‘[a]ny banker who went through the money stringency of 1907-8 and did 
not come out of it with a higher opinion of printers' ink, no matter his individual experience, 
has little brains or is lacking in the comprehension of a Hottentot’.48 While Rothschild's and 
Lewis' interpretations differed, both agreed that the 1907 panic demonstrated the importance 
of taking to the press through advertising. Doing so was vital in order to sustain confidence, 
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both in and outside times of panic.  
 
* * * 
 
 Most of the aforementioned observations and suggestions came from bank advertising 
specialists. Their field and their role within it were new, and both had emerged almost exactly 
at the turn of the century. Thus, it is of course true that they had an interest in conveying the 
effectiveness of advertising – they were simultaneously attempting to legitimate the medium 
and their status as experts. Nevertheless, they were not isolated. Their content reached bankers 
through the Bankers Magazine and through conference presentations. Additionally, some of 
these experts were bankers themselves. For instance, A. E. Rice, author of Practical Bank 
Advertising, was the President of the Croghan Bank of Freemont, Ohio, and Francis R. 
Morison, author of Banking Publicity, was the assistant secretary and treasurer of the Equitable 
Guarantee and Trust Company of Wilmington, Delaware. Beyond these specialists, however, 
it is clear that many bankers not only agreed about the efficacy of advertising but were indeed 
beginning to embrace the medium, precisely for the reasons outlined by the experts. This is 
observable by looking at advertisements themselves. 
 Immediately, the confidence theme was manifested through repeated emphases upon 
the strength, security, and reliability of the advertising bank. As Germain has shown, this was 
typically represented through ‘tangibles’ such as emblems, logos, or images. Banks would 
incorporate imagery featuring ‘bank buildings, eagles, lions, dogs, mountains, vaults, and well 
recognised antiquities such as the Tower of Babel’. All were ‘in regular use’ by 1910. Clearly, 
doing so was to associate these icons of strength to the bank itself. Also towards this end, 
Germain highlights that advertisements typically included details regarding a bank's ‘growth’, 
‘director and management integrity’, ‘size’, and ‘longevity’. Again, all these ‘themes’ were to 
stress the reliability and permanency of the particular bank's strength and integrity.49 This was, 
without doubt, the most popular theme. In order to acquire and maintain accounts, banks had 
to convey that they were trustworthy institutions. 
 W. F. Woods' 1907 book, Bank Advertisements, offers an important and illustrative 
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insight into the turn to advertising and the promotion of strength and stability. The book 
features over 2,700 ‘advertisements’, all submitted by bankers from across the entire country, 
and from ‘every class’, including ‘National Banks, State Banks, Private Banks, Savings Banks 
and Trust Companies’. Though the book appears to have been published prior to the 1907 
panic, it nicely captures the emergence and development of what was becoming a trend, one 
that would be further developed following the panic. In other words, it captures a moment of 
transition. Moreover, something especially fascinating about the book is that these 
advertisements were not necessarily real, as if they were actually presented to the reading 
public. Instead, Woods, a cashier for Woods National Bank in San Antonio, Texas, had asked 
bankers to prepare what they believed to be a good advertisement. He noted in his 
introduction that every advertisement within the book was ‘prepared by a banker and 
submitted as an embodiment of his idea of what constitutes an appropriate and at the same 
time a productive advertisement of his particular institution’.50 In effect, this book provides us 
with a relatively large sample of what bankers at this time believed to be suitable and effective 
advertising.   
 Rather than offer a detailed analysis of these advertisements, Woods insisted upon 
letting them speak for themselves. Nevertheless, he offered the observation that they generally 
possessed a ‘tendency to educate the public respecting the nature and forms of banking’. 
Various advertisements sought to explain the benefits and functions of banking. In this way, 
it was accepted that advertisements were didactic. Additionally, if we accept that information 
detailing capital input, deposit rates, director names, and growth count as ‘confidence themes’, 
then this constitutes virtually every advertisement. This may have been implicit. On the other 
hand, a fair amount of submissions also featured explicit confidence themes, which can be 
observed by some of the terms used within the advertisements. For instance, the entries for 
national and state banks produced the following: 313 national banks and 238 state banks 
featured at least one of the following terms pertaining to institutional integrity and the security 
of deposits: ‘safe’, ‘safety’, ‘strength’, ‘security’, ‘stability’, ‘protection’, and ‘insured’; 147 
national banks and 107 state banks mentioned the term ‘conservative’; 100 national banks and 
82 state banks utilised the terms ‘trust’, ‘entrust’, and ‘confidence’; 118 national banks and 112 
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state banks featured fairly extensive passages outlining the benefits of banks. It must also be 
noted that many of these advertisements used a variety of these terms. Other banks alluded to 
some or all these themes, or used different terms, like care, guard, and guarantee, to describe 
identical or similar aspects. We can also observe appeals to many different types of depositors, 
whether commercial or savings, or large or small. The advertisements for savings banks, 
private banks, and trust companies are much the same, though it is true that savings banks in 
particular tend to be more informative and argumentative, likely because they were appealing 
to people that were the least inclined to use or trust banking institutions (such as workers and 
immigrants).51 Regardless of their differences, however, the book demonstrates that many 
bankers of different kinds from different sections of the country were beginning to appreciate 
the importance of conveying strength through advertising, if not explicitly, then at least 
implicitly. 
 Along with relying upon particular words and phrases, the content within 
advertisements could include argumentative statements that stressed institutional strength and 
integrity. These statements could be quite explicit and they demonstrate that some banks 
clearly acknowledged the need to convey that they were trustworthy. It is here that we can 
really see that these banks were responding to their broader cultural context, an aspect which 
Germain neglects. Such statements were presented in a number of ways, which can be 
observed within advertisements that were actually published. One way was to detail precisely 
what it was that made the particular bank a safe one. A 1911 advertisement for the Bank of 
Colville, Washington, listed three reasons in as to why it was safe. It highlighted that it was 
‘carefully’ examined by state bank authorities at ‘regular intervals’, that the interest of 
depositors were ‘protected first, before anybody or anything else’, and that the directors were 
men of ‘unquestionable integrity’.52 Another way was to emphasise that a bank was, as a matter 
of fact, the safest place to keep one's money. The First National Bank of Clovis did this by 
                                                
51 For terms relating to safety, private banks produce 90 results, savings banks 59, and trust companies 40; for 
terms relating to conservative, private banks produce 38 results, savings banks 21, and trust companies 12; for 
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detailing the benefits of banking services, private banks produce 25 results, savings banks 72, and trust companies 
20. Again, many of these terms are featured within the same advertisement. It should also be noted that interest 
rates for savings accounts are featured prominently.  
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featuring an image of a man finding that the money he had stored within a hole in the ground 
had disappeared. It then claimed that the ‘papers’ contained ‘accounts almost daily of where 
people lose their money by hiding it in unsafe places’. To prevent this from occurring, it 
instructed its readers to ‘hide’ their money behind the bank's ‘thick walls and strong locks 
where it will be SAFE’ [See Figure 12].53 
 
 
Figure 12. Advertisement for the First National Bank of Clovis, New Mexico, 1913. From the Library 
of Congress’ Chronicling America digital collection. 
 Banks could also stress the legal privileges and advantages afforded to particular banks 
and their patrons. National banks could highlight that they were under ‘Government 
Supervision’, which guaranteed ‘safety to every depositor’.54 The American National Bank of 
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Clovis News (New Mexico), 28 August, 1913, 6. 
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Pendleton, Oregon, did so by featuring an imagine of Uncle Sam leaning over a national bank, 
surrounded by the headline, ‘THIS IS WHO GUARDS MONEY THAT IS IN A NATIONAL 
BANK’.55 After deposit guarantees were introduced in certain states, banks chartered within 
them advertised that they were covered by these systems. The State Bank of Ardmore, 
Oklahoma, did this by claiming that should a depositor lose their savings after having placed 
them within another, non-guaranteed bank, then ‘HE HAS BUT HIMSELF TO BLAME’. 
Instead, they should have been adhering to the ‘SAFETY FIRST’ principle, which would have 
resulted in them depositing their money within their bank [See Figure 13].56 Whatever form 




Figure 13. Advertisement for the Guaranty State Bank of Ardmore, Oklahoma, 1911. From the 
Library of Congress’ Chronicling America digital collection. 
 
 Furthermore, banks commonly asserted their ‘conservatism’ and their ‘progressivism’, 
often simultaneously. Though these terms appear to be at odds, banks that utilised them sought 
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55  ‘THIS IS WHO GUARDS MONEY THAT IS IN A NATIONAL BANK’, advertisement for the American 
National Bank of Pendleton, Oregon, in the East Oregonian (Oregon), 17 January, 1911, 4. 
 
56 ‘SAFETY FIRST’, advertisement for the Guaranty State Bank of Ardmore, Oklahoma, in the Daily Ardmore 
(Oklahoma), 8 June, 1913, 7. 
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to explain their meaning and how they could be reconciled. Conservatism referred to the 
bank's careful and cautious nature. This is what was expected of a banker – it was their duty 
to manage and loan the funds held in their custody in a sensible manner, not in a reckless or 
speculative manner. Progressivism referred to the bank's willingness to keep abreast of new 
advances in banking methods and technologies. A mock advertisement featured within Bank 
Advertisements demonstrates this well. The First National Bank of Santa Maria, California, 
asserted that its ‘cornerstone’ was ‘CONSERVATISM’ and its ‘motto’ was ‘PROGRESSION’. 
Together, it claimed, these were the ‘best working team a bank can have [underlining in 
original]’. It then went on to explain that conservatism was ‘the necessary safeguard for our 
customers’, but noted that ‘that alone can mean only old, antiquated methods and inadequate 
facilities for the holding of business under present conditions’. Progression, on the other hand, 
‘stands for constant watchfulness on the part of our officials for the latest and best methods of 
transacting business appertaining to banking, and the keeping of our facilities and equipment 
up to date in every respect’. Thus, combining the two resulted in ‘Strength, Safety, Promptness 
and Accuracy’.57 For a bank to be sound, then, it had to conduct its business in a diligent 
manner while also keeping with the times. 
 Although all such content may have been merely alluding to confidence issues, 
advertisements, much like the specialists, could also explicitly identify and respond to issues. 
They could demonstrate a thorough understanding of very specific problems. The harm 
inflicted by individual banking malfeasances upon other banks could be addressed. A mock 
advertisement for the First National Bank of Napa, California, for instance, addressed how 
news of a troubled bank would be amplified by the press and disseminated across the nation, 
in turn arousing suspicions everywhere. It observed that ‘[o]nce in a while one of the twenty 
thousand banks in the United States falls into dishonest hands, or goes wrong in some way’. In 
response, ‘newspapers from Maine to California give it big headlines, and some timid depositor 
wonders if his home bank is alright’. 58  Within its large Christmas message, the Citizens 
National Bank of Great Bend, Kansas, sought to tackle the issue of bank wrecking and its 
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resonance within the popular imagination. It opened by outlining a major reason why ‘quite a 
number of people’ were afraid to deposit their money within a bank. Assuming the voice of 
one of these people, it claimed that they were afraid because it appeared that there were ‘so 
many bank failures, so many officers robbing the bank and skipping to Canada or Mexico’. It 
then acknowledged that this was a legitimate observation, though went on to detail how the 
Citizens National Bank was immune from such problems.59 
 Systemic problems were also mentioned. Panics, for example, were addressed within 
advertisements. The First National Bank of Alliance, Nebraska, highlighted how it had ‘stood 
the strain of the panic of 1893 without a dollar of loss to any depositor’ and how ‘[d]uring the 
panic of 1907’ it ‘met the Burlington pay days with cash and all checks were paid in full upon 
request’. This was evidence enough that one could not ‘find a safer place for your money or a 
better bank for your business needs’. 60  Further, banks saw advertisements as a means to 
disassociate themselves from popular notions that they were reckless and unduly powerful; 
that they were engaging in ‘Frenzied Financing’ (a reference to muckraker Thomas Lawson's 
famous expose of financial mischief on Wall Street) or a part of ‘The Money Power’. 61 
Advertisements like these demonstrate that bankers could be highly conscious of specific 
confidence issues and that they recognised that they had to respond to them. 
 
* * * 
 
 In addition to using advertising to convey strength and reliability, the medium was also 
used to present banks as community oriented institutions. This was another way of dispelling 
popular suspicions and, in turn, gaining confidence. By stressing that they were local 
institutions that were owned, operated, and run by respected local people with a concern for 
and a stake in their communities, banks sought to challenge any notions that they were distant 
to the people and were acting against their interests, or that they at least were indifferent to 
                                                
59 ‘A Merry Christmas’, advertisement for the Citizens National Bank of Great Bend, Kansas, in the Barton County 
Democrat (Kansas), 21 December, 1906, 5. 
 
60 ‘Why is 1913 the Best Year of Our History?’, advertisement for the First National Bank of Alliance, Nebraska, 
in The Alliance Herald (Nebraska), 11 December, 1913, 28. 
 
61 For ‘frenzied financing’, see ‘Modern Methods’, mock advertisement for the Farmers State Bank of Milaca, 
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them. Instead, these banks were a part of the people and were working with them; they were 
‘of, by, and for the’ people. This was so much so that they sought to highlight that they were 
pillars of their communities. They utilised advertisements to emphasise that they were driving 
the progress, vitality, and even existence of their locales. In doing so, this conveyed that they 
were indispensable institutions that could not be done away with. Banks were presented as 
permanent, essential fixtures of their communities, which was ultimately an attempt to 
legitimate and naturalise their existence. 
 Banker Harvey J. Hollister asserted during an 1897 speech to the ABA titled ‘Privileges 
and Duties of Organized Capital’ that the public did not realise the importance of banks to 
their general welfare. Contrary to popular opinion, responsible and dignified bankers acted 
out of the ‘principles of the Good Samaritan’, and were benevolent capitalists concerned with 
the overall state of their communities. According to Hollister, bankers thus had to publicise 
that they were ‘keenly alive to everything that bears upon the welfare of society, acting as a 
unit for its highest integrity!’ The importance of doing so was reflected by the ‘fact’ that: 
The favourite bank in the community may be no stronger, or as strong 
as its neighbours, and yet it be generally known that in some way it 
does have some of the ‘milk of human kindness,’ that it is a helper and 
not a wrecker, that it desires to give as well as get, and its continued 
prosperity is assured.62 
 
By this view, the best thing a bank could do to win over the public was to demonstrate that it 
was deeply involved with their affairs, and was very much concerned with the general welfare. 
Though acknowledging that the bank was still a business that expected to receive something 
in return for its efforts, its relationship to the community was reciprocal. The bank did not 
operate to parasitically extract wealth and drain the vitality of its surrounding community. It 
did precisely the opposite – it bolstered the prosperity of that community.63 
 In order to convey this message, bankers themselves acknowledged that they needed 
to inculcate civic mindfulness firstly amongst themselves, which was to be achieved through 
internal education programs. In other words, they needed to be properly taught appropriate 
values and behaviours. This was a part of the drive to ‘professionalise’ banking which sought 
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to standardise ideas and behaviours and to ensure that their industry was (and was seen to be) 
operated by suitably qualified ‘experts’, rather than potentially ignorant and insecure 
amateurs.64 In order to be such an expert, one had to be aware of their social function and thus 
had to have a benevolent streak. Within his address on the ‘Scope of Banking Education’ before 
the New York Chapter of the American Institute of Bank Clerks, C. W. Haskins claimed that 
such education entailed everything from economics, accountancy, and administration to 
history, relationships, and patriotism.65 Moreover, the ABA established the American Institute 
of Banking in 1907. I. B. Tigrett's presentation before their Jackson chapter in 1908 asserted 
that the ‘educated, charitable, sacrificing banker of sound judgment’ was ‘entitled to as much 
credit for the construction of this American commonwealth as belongs to any profession’. 
After briefly detailing the historic contributions of leading bankers, he later extrapolated from 
this the essential virtues of banking, stating that ‘[h]onesty, virtue, intellect, patriotism, [and] 
charity’ were all ‘required’. Such characteristics were necessary as ‘commerce, agriculture and 
manufacturing’ depended upon banking, and so too did ‘the extension of education and the 
maintenance of national integrity’.66 Bankers thus needed to understand both the role that 
they played within their communities, local or national, and the particular values needed to 
fulfil that role. 
 In terms of their education directed outwardly towards the public, various banks were 
keen to assert their local nature, their civic contributions, and their economic importance 
through their advertising. Through these advertisements, they sought to convey that they 
were a vital, inseparable, and core component of their communities that had not only grown 
with them, but had and were enabling that growth. The First National Bank of Canton, Ohio, 
for instance, claimed that it itself was a ‘convincing advertisement for Canton’, stating that its 
‘amount of deposits, its capital and its surplus’ represented not only the strength of the bank 
but also the ‘prosperity of the city’. The bank and Canton, then, were inseparable.67 The Utah 
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State National Bank claimed that is was ‘vitally interested in the upbuilding and development 
of the success of this state of Utah and the West, and realizes that this can be best accomplished 
by protecting the business interests of its citizens’. It was thus identifying with the interests of 
not only the state but the entire region, and was suggesting that it was a, if not the driving 
force of the region's economic development.68 Likewise, the Ronan State Bank declared that it 
had ‘grown with the country’ and that its deposits had ‘been utilized to aid in the development 
of the reservation region’. Through its ‘conservative’ loaning policies, it made it ‘possible for 
settlers to continue their development’.69  Further, banks could also stress that they were 
directed by local people that were esteemed citizens with an interest in their communities. 
The Bank for Savings in Seattle claimed that its directors were ‘enormously interested in the 
upbuilding of the entire commonwealth’ and that they were ‘men of large affairs’ whose ‘own 
welfare’ was ‘best cared for through the betterment of each and every town, village and hamlet 
throughout the entire Northwest’.70 In their various ways, these banks were all emphasising 
their local nature, their regard for their communities, and their importance to them. They 
were also suggesting that a bank, by its nature, could continue to thrive only if their 
communities did too – this was a symbiotic relationship. 
 Moreover, scores of banks began emphasising that they were institutions that were run 
for ‘the people’ and that they welcomed patrons from various backgrounds and of various 
means. They attempted to convey that they were inclusive institutions that could offer 
something for everyone. Segmentation was, of course, one way of demonstrating this, as it 
enabled them to highlight what services they could provide to very specific people. If a bank 
had a ‘ladies room’, then it would advertise to women, if it had a savings department, then it 
would advertise to middle and working class people, if it accepted school savings, then it would 
advertise to parents, and so on.71 Other times, banks would attempt to convey that they were 
open to all people within a single advertisement. For instance, the Union Bank of Savings of 
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Los Angeles stated that the ‘mechanic, the office man, the school child, and the little newsboy’ 
all deposited there and then charged that it was ‘wise’ for others to do so too.72 Similarly, the 
Munsey Trust Company of Washington, D.C., announced within an advertisement that its 
‘policy’ would be a ‘human policy’, meaning that it ‘would give to the small man, according to 
his means, every advantage it gives to the big man, according to his means’.73 They could also 
stress their social role, positing that the banker was the appropriate expert for people to consult 
concerning their financial matters. After claiming that it was ‘AS SOLID AS A ROCK’, the 
First National Bank of Cheraw, South Carolina, declared that it was ‘here to serve our patrons’ 
and was ‘willing, at any time, to advise those who need our advice’. It then stated that ‘You go 
to the doctor when you are ill, you go to the lawyer to straighten out your legal difficulties; 
when you are in financial perplexity why not go to the BANK? The banker is the one man 
who gives his advice free and cheerfully’.74 The banker, then, was a friendly professional that 
was intent upon helping others. They were concerned about their clients and their 
communities and together they could all prosper. 
 There were a variety of other ways that banks could represent that they went hand-in-
hand with their communities and with the people. McGregor highlighted that ‘community 
boosting’ was a popular method. Anything a bank could do to ‘boost’ or support the city in 
which it was located would ultimately benefit the bank. He subsequently noted that bankers 
‘realized this’ and were thus ‘active in efforts to promote the growth and best interests of their 
communities’.75 Another method was the ‘bank historical’, or an authorised history of a bank. 
McGregor commented that any ‘financial institution’ was ‘fortunate’ when it was ‘in a position 
to call attention to its long and successful service to the community’. Historicals became a 
popular way to do so. Through them, banks could demonstrate their permanency within and 
utility to their communities. 76  One more approach was through the ‘Geographical Idea’. 
Advertisements could sometimes feature maps which outlined a bank's geographical span and 
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how far it rendered its services. An advertisement for the Planters National Bank of Richmond, 
for example, featured an image of its building above a map of the Southern states, claiming 
that through their ‘Strength, Location and Facilities’, they served the ‘Entire South’. This was 
clearly an attempt to instate themselves as not only financial bastions of the entire region, but 
as a natural part of it [See Figure 14].77 
 
 
Figure 14. Advertisement for the Planters National Bank of Richmond featured within McGregor's 
Bank Advertising Plans, 1913. From the Internet Archive’s collection of digitised books. 
 
 Whatever form this particular kind of advertising took, the goal was to establish and 
maintain popular confidence by representing the bank as a vital institution that was attune to 
common interests. Using advertising as an educative medium, banks were beginning to not 
only assert their strength and reliability but also to portray themselves as community oriented 
institutions. They were not distant from the people and were not out to exploit them. Instead, 
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they were working with and for the people, and were very much a part of their communities, 
even bedrocks of them. In this way, they sought to establish they were necessary and 
indispensable social and economic institutions; that they were the appropriate authorities to 
manage financial matters. They were professionals that people could trust to bolster their 
interests. 
 
* * * 
 
 These various approaches had been embraced by sizeable numbers of banks by the end 
of the twentieth century's first decade. Many more continued to do so into the 1910s. It is true 
that this occurred during the ascent of professionalised advertising and that the turn to the 
medium by banks was driven by the recognition that they had to compete for depositors, 
particularly given the individualistic and unitised nature of banking at the time. Regardless, 
deposit banks had turned to advertising at a rather late stage compared with other businesses. 
This turn occurred largely in the wake of the 1890s depression and escalated after the 1907 
panic, therefore suggesting that heightened distrust and derision were influential. Moreover, 
the discussions and ideas presented by bankers and others interested in bank marketing are 
illustrative, demonstrating a fixation with arousing and sustaining ‘confidence’, and so too are 
advertisements themselves. Both make it abundantly clear that the timing was not merely 
coincidental. Bankers knew that they had to inspire confidence, as it was not a given – far from 
it. They knew that it had to be acquired and sustained. Advertising was the response of 
individual banks, which was beginning to aggregate into a trend. It was increasingly 
considered a means to ‘educate’ the public as to why banks were essential institutions and why 
it was safe for people to deal with them. This is not to suggest that the advertisements 
necessarily worked. Rather, they demonstrate that bankers were aware of their poor public 
image and the broader confidence issue, and that they thus sought to wrest control of that 
image by taking to the public-sphere. 
 The fixation with ‘confidence’ as both an explanation and solution for banking issues 
did attract criticism. In 1908, scholar Frederick A. Cleveland criticised what he saw as a 
‘Hopeless Philosophy of Panics’. He saw the obsession with arousing and sustaining confidence 
as vague and as an inadequate remedy, in and of itself. He asked, ‘May we hope to correct a 
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financial disease that is diagnosed as the result of a mental attitude of persons who may not be 
located and specifically treated?’ He also wondered whether ‘such an analysis’ suggested that 
the ‘philosophy of banking’ was ‘still surrounded by the ignorance and mysticism of the dark 
ages’ and whether public inquiry was ‘still lacking in method of scientific research’. According 
to Cleveland, then, attributing the health of the banking system merely to mental states was 
superficial and unacceptable. There had to be something more substantial, like the reformation 
of the nation's banking system.78 
 In all of this, Cleveland was, of course, referring to the way panics were perceived 
(particularly the 1907 Panic), but the charge could easily apply to any notions or measures 
which merely sought to boost confidence without addressing underlying issues and without 
offering more concrete solutions. This includes the turn to advertising. Again, however, 
advertising was the response of individual banks. Especially in the wake of the 1907 panic, the 
majority of bankers acknowledged that fundamental structural transformations were not only 
required but were unavoidable. They knew that in order to prevent panics and sustain systemic 
confidence, there had to be some kind of mechanism that could unite them and ensure their 
collective liquidity. A reserve association of some kind that could centralise reserves and 
provide an ‘elastic’ currency – an exchange medium that could expand and contract according 
to economic conditions – came to be seen as the solution. Those that embraced such an 
association, however, had to sell this to an apprehensive public. In attempting to do so, the 
nation's leading bankers turned to propaganda. 
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Promoting a Reserve Association as a People's Banking System and the End of 
the ‘National Banking Era’ 
 
 
In these days when the ‘Progressive’ is much in evidence, it may not be amiss 
to indicate that the cause of the common people is one which should be kept 
in mind in all our discussions.  
 
  - J. Laurence Laughlin, Banking Reform and the National Reserve  
       Association, 1911.1 
 
According to the National Citizens' League for the Promotion of a Sound Banking System, the 
‘national reserve association’ advanced by Senator Nelson Aldrich was thoroughly democratic 
and was the outcome of a broad, nationwide discussion. This was, the League asserted in 1911, 
a banking system tailored to meet the interests of all people, bankers and non-bankers alike. 
In a bid to demonstrate this, the League included an address by A. C. Bartlett within its series 
of pamphlets advocating its brand of banking reform. Spoken in Chicago before the Western 
Economic Society in late 1911, Bartlett, of the hardware company Hibbert, Spencer, Bartlett 
and Co., supposedly represented the nation's ‘commercial interests’. Bartlett, also the League’s 
treasurer, praised the Aldrich plan's civic engagement, declaring that following its initial 
release for public consultation in January 1911, it had since been ‘promptly nationalized’ and 
went on to become a ‘product of a national mind’. It had come to incorporate the ideas and 
interests of not only bankers, economists, publicists, and the press, but also ‘large numbers of 
intelligent men and women who belong to none of these classes’. All had ‘given their minds 
to this important subject to a degree scarcely anyone would have thought possible’. Such broad 
input demonstrated to Bartlett that the plan had been ‘democratized’ and had been ‘made the 
interest and affair of everybody’. That those outside of banks apparently supported the plan 
was enough evidence for Bartlett and the League to conclude that a national reserve association 
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would be a people’s banking system.2 
 The League was established in 1911 to promote and advocate a new, confidence-
inspiring banking system in an environment where many Americans were suspicious of 
bankers. Though it did not necessarily advocate the Aldrich Plan explicitly (and later even 
tried to distance itself from it), the League agitated for a reserve association that contained the 
Plan’s key features. In the aftermath of the 1907 panic, bankers, commercial interests, 
politicians, and society at large came to see the need to reform the nation's banking system as 
necessary and unavoidable. The Federal Government established the National Monetary 
Commission in 1908, headed by Aldrich, which was tasked with studying and remedying the 
faults of the national banking system. After several years of intensive domestic and 
international research, the Commission identified seventeen major problems and concluded 
in 1911 that a national reserve association was the best overall solution. Such an association 
would centralise the reserves of member banks, would act as a lender of last resort when 
solvent but temporarily illiquid members faced demands for currency and credit, and would 
issue an ‘elastic’ currency that could expand and contract according to trade conditions. This, 
advocates believed, would thwart banking panics. Thus, a reserve association would function 
as a device that could inspire and sustain systemic confidence. By 1911, most of the nation's 
bankers agreed that such a system was needed. In order to bring about its creation, however, 
supporters had to sell their reform platform, including even to other bankers that were 
sceptical or concerned about the idea. Therefore, to bring about a confidence-inspiring 
banking system, they first had to arouse confidence in the idea of a reserve association itself - 
confidence that it would in fact prevent panics and that it would actually be consistent with 
the public interest. The League was organised to achieve this end. 
 The League marks a significant and foundational moment in the history of banking 
related propaganda efforts. This chapter argues that it was the first sophisticated and intensive 
campaign supported by bankers that explicitly concerned banking reform, and was among the 
first that sought to systematically portray itself as a ‘people's’ movement. 3  Through this 
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movement, we can again see that bankers were aware of their poor public image, here so much 
so that they had to downplay their involvement in their push for reforms considered ‘sound’, 
particularly those that limited state intervention. They sought to convey this movement as one 
advanced by the people, and that banker involvement was at most ancillary; that it was 
supportive, though far from directive. Towards this objective, the League stressed not only the 
merits of a national reserve association, but also persistently asserted that such a system would 
be democratic and independent from domination, especially from Wall Street, observable 
through repeated emphasises upon notions of ‘Democracy’, ‘Co-operation’, and ‘De-
centralization’. This was of course necessary due to the politics of the Progressive Era and the 
general suspicions held towards banks, both historic and contemporary – the ‘Money Trust’ 
investigation, for instance, was occurring simultaneously.  
Eventually, Aldrich's plan was rejected. The idea of a banker-controlled system proved 
to be far too unpopular. Nevertheless, the Wilson administration accepted the general idea and 
subsequently revised the plan to bolster Federal oversight and direction. Consequently, the 
administration democratised the plan in a way that was vastly different to the League's 
conception of democracy, one which minimised the role of the state. The administration's 
efforts culminated in the creation of the Federal Reserve System, the apex of Progressive Era 
banking reform and what brought about the end of the national banking era. Still, the League's 
ultimate goal of ensuring the creation of a reserve association was fulfilled. As historian 
Laurence J. Broz has argued, this suggests that it was at least partly successful in selling the 
idea.4 Key progressive reformers bought that such an institution could in some way serve ‘the 
People’. 
 
* * * 
 
Prior to the creation of the National Citizen’s League, there had been banking related 
propaganda efforts. The pro-gold, single-standard currency campaign of the 1890s and early 
1900s was likely the first significant, nation-wide campaign supported by major banking 
interests. The movement’s mouthpiece was the Reform Club, a lobby group that advanced a 
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gold standard and opposed the free-coinage of silver. In 1891, the Club claimed that it had 
been ‘called upon to undertake an educational campaign throughout the country in behalf of 
a sound currency’.5 This ‘educational campaign’ began with the establishment of a ‘semi-
monthly’ journal in 1891 entitled Sound Currency, which was sent to members and the press, 
and continued to be published until 1905 (changing to a monthly and later a quarterly 
publication). The Club also published a book in 1896 based upon materials within the journal, 
entitled Sound Currency 1896: A Compendium of Accurate and Timely information on 
Currency Questions intended for Writers, Speakers and Students. A contemporary observer 
noted that the campaign’s efforts in 1895 constituted ‘the most complete system of distribution 
of pamphlets, leaflets, broadsides, plate matter, and the like that has ever been witnessed in 
this country’.6  
Additionally, the American Bankers’ Association (ABA) established a Public Education 
Committee in 1898, which was ‘appointed for the purpose of endeavoring to dissipate the 
prejudice existing against banks’ and also to ‘distribute information which would, as far as 
possible, educate those who were uninformed or misinformed as to what a bank did in the 
community, in order to do away with the hostility which we all know exists in this country’. 
The Committee immediately sent out a pamphlet intended for the public to 10,000 of the 
nation’s banks. It was received so well that 1,250,000 copies allegedly were ordered by these 
banks for popular distribution. One banker even playfully dubbed it ‘The Prejudice Killer’. As 
a result, the Committee concluded that this demonstrated that ‘the bankers of this country’ 
believed that ‘the people did not understand’ what banks were, though at the same time also 
demonstrated that they believed that ‘the people’ could be ‘made to understand’ what they 
were. It then asserted that the ‘sooner’ an educational campaign was conducted, the ‘sooner’ 
people would know that they were not ‘monopolists or oppressors, but that a bank is a machine 
and is operated by brains, for the benefit of the community’.7 Quite clearly, bankers had 
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supported and advanced propaganda campaigns intended to ‘educate’ the public as early as the 
1890s. 
However, regarding the currency campaign, this was a movement chiefly concerning 
currency reform. Undoubtedly, this entailed banking, especially the national banking system, 
and much was said about the role of banks and banking within Sound Currency.8 Nevertheless, 
the issue of banking reform in itself was secondary – this was a campaign explicitly about 
‘sound money’ instead of ‘sound banking’. Furthermore, while the content was intended to be 
educative, it was technical and inaccessible, at least at first. This fact was recognised by the 
Reform Club itself, which issued an illustrated edition of Sound Currency in 1895 (which was 
later included as a chapter within the book of the same name). The illustrations were a 
response to the hugely popular pro-silver tract, Coin’s Financial School. An earlier attempt 
had been made to attack the book in the form of a textual rebuttal entitled Coin’s Financial 
Fool. Campaigners decided, though, that the best way to fight Coin Harvey and his pro-silver 
illustrations was through their own anti-silver imagery.9 Nonetheless, these images did not 
constitute the bulk of their efforts and they were essentially supplementary. And finally, while 
the movement did attempt to appeal to ‘the people’ and demonstrate why a gold-standard was 
in their best interest, the campaign did not attempt to depict itself as a grassroots movement 
that reflected a broad popular consensus. Instead, it was blatantly adversarial and openly 
sought to putdown a popular movement.  
It is true that currency reformers continued their efforts following the 1896 election 
and through to the establishment of the gold standard in 1900. As Historian James Livingston 
has demonstrated, through the National Sound Money League and the Indianapolis Monetary 
Convention, they had engaged in intensive lobbying and educative efforts to secure a gold 
standard and also to reform the banking system.10 Further, Murray Rothbard has claimed that 
in doing so, these reformers sought to convey their movement as one stemming from the 
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grassroots, by which he means anywhere other than Wall Street.11 Both of these facts are 
important and show that the League was not totally unprecedented in its approach. It no doubt 
based its strategy upon this campaign. The League was, however, a highly sophisticated 
campaign that stressed explicitly that it was about banking reform over currency reform 
(though it was both), and was from start to finish portrayed as a grassroots movement in the 
sense that it had popular support and consisted of ‘the people’. 
Regarding the Public Education Committee, the ABA’s efforts here did constitute an 
early attempt to conduct a broad public-relations campaign which directly related to banking. 
As historian Wilbert Schneider has demonstrated, however, the Committee and its activities 
fizzled early into the 1900s, as the ABA decided to instead focus its efforts upon internal 
education programs.12 These campaigns were no doubt formative, though were indirect or 
incomplete. As we shall see, this was in stark contrast to the League, which was directly 
concerned with banking reform and continued to operate until it was satisfied that its mission 
had been achieved. 
 The League owed its origins to the intensified reform sentiment that followed the panic 
of 1907. As we have seen, the panic spurred popular agitation for particular reforms, resulting 
in the creation of the postal savings system and the various state deposit insurance schemes. 
Simultaneously, the panic also drove politicians, bankers, economists, and commercial elites 
to seriously consider systemic reform. These figures had of course previously debated and 
agitated for reforms since the early 1890s, particularly over the prospect of an asset based 
currency (which would allow banks to issue their own currency based upon their financial 
assets),13 though now they recognised that the system was undeniably broken and that reform 
was unavoidable. Measures had to be taken in order to prevent the entire banking 
infrastructure from periodically breaking down and halting the entire economy. The 
government’s immediate response was to pass the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908. The Act 
created the National Monetary Commission and enacted a temporary provision that authorised 
national banks to issue an emergency currency in case another crisis erupted before the 
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Commission could release and implement its findings. While the Commission was 
investigating the nation’s monetary and banking woes and potential remedies, various bankers 
started to entertain the idea of establishing a central bank of some kind. Paul Warburg, a 
partner of the private investment bank Kuhn, Loeb, and Co., had even advanced the idea 
publically in January 1907, months prior to the panic. The appeal of such an institution 
proliferated in its aftermath.14 
The idea took on a range of forms, though a national system that functioned in a 
manner similar to a clearing house received broad support from bankers. Through such a 
system, independent banks could be unified through their membership of a central financial 
body. This collectively owned institution could hold their reserves and could mobilise them 
when members were faced with increased demands for currency and credit; the institution 
could loan to members in need of currency and could act as a lender of last resort when 
required. In a national system, this would prevent banks from running on each other, like they 
did under the national banking system, and in turn would prevent the broader banking public 
from assuming that their deposits were in jeopardy. Furthermore, this would prevent the 
suspension of cash payments and credit issuance, and would thus prevent sudden interest-rate 
hikes and the overall paralysis of trade. It would thus prevent a systemic banking panic. 
Though such a system involved commercial banks rather than savings banks, it is fair to assume 
that by panic-proofing the system all banks were expected to be theoretically protected. The 
central bank would ultimately ensure that the financial system remained liquid and 
functional.15 While various banks at first advocated instead for an asset based currency, an idea 
particularly strong in Chicago, a majority of bankers eventually came to express support for 
such an institution. According to a survey conducted by the Banking Law Journal in 1909, 
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sixty percent of the approximately 5,000 banks that responded supported the establishment of 
a central bank, so long as it was ‘not controlled by Wall Street or any other Monopolistic 
element’.16 A majority of the nation’s bankers, then, appeared to be in favour of a centralised 
institution so long as it could be established on agreeable terms. 
After years of research and consultation, including with elite Wall Street bankers 
during a secret meeting held on Jekyll Island in 1910, Aldrich and the National Monetary 
Commission concluded in 1911 that a National Reserve Association was the best solution 
suited to American conditions. The Association would be owned by member banks, 
headquartered in D.C. and divided into fifteen branches that would be situated across the 
nation. The Commission charged in its 1912 report that its provisions, ‘taken together’, would 
‘enable the banks to adopt the policy of simultaneous strengthening of reserves and extension 
of credits’, which had been ‘successful in every instance for half a century in the prevention 
of panics or serious financial disturbances in the commercial nations of Europe’. It then added 
that its plan provided for not only the ‘concentration and mobilization of cash reserves’ but 
also for the ‘decentralization of control by means of the powers over distribution granted to 
local and national associations’. 17  Subsequently, most of the nation’s bankers went on to 
support the proposal, which became popularly known as the ‘Aldrich Plan’. As Broz highlights, 
by ‘the end of 1911, a fragile consensus among all classes of bankers’ had been forged in favour 
of the Plan. This included an endorsement from the ABA in November, and official approval 
from twenty-nine of the nation’s forty-six state banking associations.18 Aldrich and a large 
portion of the nation’s bankers, then, believed that they now had a plan that would put an end 
to financial stringencies and to banking panics. 
Advocates were aware that such a system had to be sold to what they knew would be 
an apprehensive public. There was, as we have seen, an established tradition of distrusting 
large, privately-owned, and interstate banking institutions, and the politics of the Progressive 
Era ensured that any suggestion of financial consolidation was kept firmly in the spotlight. If 
any such proposal was to be introduced without explanation and was seen by the public to 
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stem from the nation’s banks, especially those of Wall Street, then it would be immediately 
rejected without hesitation. Thus, in order to win over the public, advocates took to the public 
sphere with a campaign that they believed would educate the masses on the importance and 
necessity of ‘sound’ banking reform. This was the National Citizens’ League for the Promotion 
of a Sound Banking System. 
 
* * * 
 
The League began operating in April 1911, shortly after the National Board of Trade 
passed a resolution in favour of such an organisation, a move influenced by Warburg.19 The 
League declared that its function was ‘to give organized expression to the growing public 
sentiment in favor of, and to carry on a campaign of education for an improved banking system 
for the United States of America’.20 Claiming to be a ‘Non-Partisan Association of men of All 
Occupations’, the organisation was headquartered in Chicago and went on to have branches 
in forty-four states. 21  It was officially directed and conducted by leading businessmen, 
economists, and respected citizens, such as merchant John V. Farwell Jr and economist James 
Laurence Laughlin. Warburg later commented that these ‘officers constituted a strong group 
of independent and energetic men who assumed full responsibility for the League’s activities’, 
who ‘immediately embarked upon a very ambitious program’ that ‘provided for the 
organization of local committees all over the country, for the dissemination of literature, and 
for the sending of speakers throughout the United States in order to awaken interest in, and 
to promote a general understanding of, the principles upon which a sound monetary reform 
would have to be based’.22 As Broz demonstrates, the campaign itself was strategised by lawyer 
and public-relations specialist George F. Parker and much of the content was produced by 
Laughlin.23 The League produced 15,000 copies of a textbook entitled Banking Reform that 
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outlined the League’s arguments and also distributed a semimonthly journal of the same name 
with a circulation of 25,000. Both were produced and edited by Laughlin. On top of this, 95,000 
pamphlets were created, public addresses were organised, and letter-writing campaigns were 
conducted. All were directed at influential institutions and organisations, including the press, 
which went onto to reproduce much of the material verbatim. Major interest groups and 
members of Congress were also targeted.24  
Though the League of course was supported by various non-banking interests, it was 
essentially a movement devised, directed, and supported by elite bankers. For one, it was the 
brainchild of Warburg, who was behind the League’s creation and continued to play a large 
role in directing its affairs, albeit unofficially and behind the scenes. He later considered 
himself to be a ‘god-father’ of the League.25 For another, it was financed almost entirely by 
banks. Warburg noted, ‘[a]mong the most liberal contributors were the banks’.26 This was an 
understatement. The campaign raised essentially all its funds by receiving contributions from 
several of the nation’s largest clearing houses, especially the New York Clearing House, the 
largest contributor.27 Furthermore, bankers were actively involved in the broader push for a 
reserve association. A. Barton Hepburn, chairman of the ABA’s Currency Commission, noted 
in 1912 that all ‘bankers throughout the country’ were ‘actively engaged in this campaign of 
education, manifesting their activity through boards of trade, merchant’s associations, 
chambers of commerce, civic forums, economic clubs, and more especially through the 
National Citizens’ League of Chicago’.28  
At the same time, in explaining why the ABA did not defend the idea as vehemently 
as it could have, Hepburn also acknowledged that the organisation had to downplay or conceal 
its involvement, stating that if it ‘were to dominate the campaign, or predominate in it, it 
might create the impression that it was a movement altogether in the interest of bankers and 
prejudice to a certain extent the efforts being made’.29 Here, Hepburn captured the precise 
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reason that the broader movement and the League itself could not be considered bankers’ 
movements. Though this was a campaign driven primarily by bankers, it could not appear as 
such. 
Towards this end, the League’s promotional activities went far beyond disseminating 
educative materials to the press and the broader public. Knowing that the public would 
outright reject lessons given by bankers, the League sought to create the impression that it 
itself was a popular movement composed of and endorsed by ‘the people’. In other words, the 
League promoted itself at all times as a grassroots movement, one national in scope and 
composed of citizens. Historians have stressed that the League sought to distance itself from 
the impression that it was a front for Wall Street. This explains why the League’s headquarters 
were based in Chicago rather than New York and why it was directed by prominent 
Chicagoans.30  However, it is also true that the League sought to distance itself from the 
impression that this was a front for bankers generally. Laughlin stressed that it ‘should be 
distinctly understood that we are today looking to a fundamental reorganization of our 
banking system, not because it will favour bankers, but because it will favour the business 
public and the borrowers, whoever they may be, merchant or producers [emphasis added]’.31 
Likewise, Farwell, the League’s President, made it abundantly clear that he considered the 
League to be a people’s movement, not a banker’s movement. Addressing League delegates 
from 23 states, he asserted in early 1912 that: 
The National Citizens’ League, with organizations in forty-four States 
of the union, with its members drawn from all our agricultural, 
manufacturing and mercantile interests, is the strongest organization of 
its kind ever enlisted in a great public service. I know of no more 
important duty now before the people of this country than the reform 
of our banking and currency system. We have suffered too long from 
the weaknesses of our antiquated banking system. It is time for reform. 
The people of the country, the plain people who bear the burdens of 
money panics, have come to realize that the question of legislative 
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reform is not a banker’s question so much as it is a business question.32 
 
He went on to remark that ‘the people, through this League, are demanding that this legislation, 
so vital to the interests of every man who earns wages or who pays wages, must be provided 
in the early future by their representatives in Congress [emphasis added]’.33 Thus, according 
to Farwell, the League was not only advancing the interests of ‘the people’, it was in fact driven 
by them. Bankers were not at the helm - the people were. 
Having established itself as a ‘people’s movement’, the League stressed that such a 
system would benefit society as a whole. It did so by appropriating reformist language and 
emphasised that a reserve association would be democratic and equitable, and thus consistent 
with popular interests and also with Progressive Era ideals. This was particularly pertinent 
after concerns regarding financial concentration erupted into the Money Trust Investigation 
beginning in 1912. Resultantly, the League needed to demonstrate that is was not advocating 
a system that would facilitate a gigantic money monopoly that would pit an elite group of 
financiers against the entire Republic. In order to convey this message, the League repeatedly 
emphasised the ‘co-operative’ and ‘decentralized’ nature of a reserve association. The League’s 
very first goal was to advocate ‘Co-operation, not dominant centralization, of all banks by an 
evolution of our clearing-house experience’. Its following two goals were to protect the credit-
system from ‘the domination of any-group of financial or political interests’ and to ensure the 
‘Independence of the individual banks, national or state’.34  
Regarding ‘co-operation’, this meant creating a system that would encourage banks to 
work together through a collectively owned institution. This would repair the national 
banking system’s tendency to encourage individual banks to compete for reserve deposits in 
times of panic. In this way it, it would end an era of ‘individual self-preservation’.35 Banks 
would remain independent, but would nevertheless gain strength through association. Banks 
would deposit to and borrow from each other through a single body. Regarding ‘De-
centralization’, this meant ensuring that the system would be exactly that – decentralised. The 
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League persistently asserted that is was not advocating a central bank, which would centralise 
all the nation’s reserves, but rather a system of reserve associations that were to operate in 
different regions. This would prevent money and credit flowing to and from financial centres, 
especially Wall Street, and would keep money within their respective regions. Consequently, 
the League argued that such a system would in fact destroy a ‘money trust’ rather than bolster 
one. It would actually free banks from vast financial webs so that they could be truly 
independent. 36  Considerable attention was given to addressing the issue, particularly 
observable within Banking Reform.37 Taken together, according to the League it was thus 
apparently ‘obvious that the National Reserve Agency [was] not a central bank, but simply a 
cooperatively-owned machine for rendering liquid the good current commercial paper of all 
banks’. Furthermore, ‘through concentration of the reserves’, the nation would be establishing 
‘a bulwark against any possibility of a lack of confidence in the system’.38 
However, a reserve association was democratic in so far as it was intended to be a 
banking system exclusively of, by, and for bankers. In other words, it was intended literally to 
be a bankers’ bank, a bank owned and operated by bankers and for bankers. The League made 
this entirely clear. It asserted in a pamphlet addressed to ‘small banks’ that 'We now have 
before the country a proposal for a coöperative [sic] banking system’, a system that was free 
from the ‘features of branch banking and central banking objectionable to American 
democratic ideals’. At the ‘head’ of this system was the National Reserve Association, which 
was to be ‘owned by all the banks of this country’.39 This was, of course, appealing to bankers 
that remained sceptical or hostile to the plan, of which there were many, particularly in the 
South and West. It is also important to note that there were internal tensions within the 
League itself, particularly between ‘La Salle Street’ Chicagoan reformers and Wall Street 
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reformers.40 Advocates stressed that the system would belong to all banks precisely because 
they needed to convince these doubtful or competing bankers that such a system would not 
dominate them. In doing so, however, Laughlin demonstrates that the League’s lofty 
democratic ideals applied primarily to banks and banking. A reserve association may well have 
benefited the people, but the people would play no meaningful part in its management, beyond 
minimal governmental supervision.41 As such, a reserve association was democratic in a very 
limited sense – it was incidentally for the people, but it was not to be of or by them.  
Still, in dealing with the broader public, the League emphasised the former and 
downplayed the latter. Apparently all that the people desired was a functioning and 
decentralised banking system, no more, no less. To the League, this alone was enough to 
qualify a reserve association as a kind of people’s banking system. Ultimately, a reserve 
association would inspire confidence in the banking system, both in terms of its democratic 
credentials and its stability. 
 
* * * 
 
For all the emphasis the League placed upon ‘the people’ and upon notions of 
democracy, however, various critics were unconvinced that a system run by bankers could be 
consistent with the public interest and that it actually could be democratic. Fearing that the 
Aldrich Plan would bolster a money trust and thwart democracy, Alfred Crozier, critic and 
author of the Magnet (1908), described the Plan as the ‘most daring and dangerous scheme 
ever introduced into Congress’. It was so menacing, Crozier asserted, that to ‘a greater extent 
than during any national crisis since 1776 the republic is now in danger’.42 In a slightly soberer 
tone, Louis Freeland Post, who would become the Assistant Secretary of Labor in 1913, 
charged in March 1912 that the Aldrich Plan was proposing a system ‘of Bankers and for 
Bankers’. He went on to criticise the Plan’s alleged democratic nature, stating that to ‘say that 
an organization of bankers to be given power over public interests is “democratic” because 
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banks are federalized among themselves, or because individual banks are the voting units, or 
because the central body represents banks instead of overshadowing them, is to trifle with 
public interests in a play upon words’. While acknowledging that this may have been a 
democracy for the nation’s banks, Post certainly did not consider this to be socially or 
politically democratic. Instead, this was a ‘plutocracy’.43 Even Edwin Kemmerer, an economist 
in favour of a reserve association, expressed astonishment over this aspect of the Plan. Noting 
that ‘a large element in the country believes the interests of bankers to be in conflict with 
those of the general public on a great many vital questions’, Kemmerer argued in late 1911 that 
advocating this kind of banker control was the surest way to kill the proposal. Any plan that 
involved placing ‘control so largely to the banking fraternity’ would face fierce resistance.44 
Evidently, the Plan’s and the League’s conception of democracy was not universally embraced. 
Largely for this reason, the Aldrich Bill did not survive in Congress when it was 
introduced in early 1912. It was presented in an environment that was entirely unfavourable 
to the idea of gargantuan bankers’ banks. For one, momentum had been gathering for a money 
trust investigation since mid-1911. By February 1912, such an investigation had been 
manifested in the form of the Pujo Committee. The question of financial concentration and 
monopolisation therefore was already under the political spotlight. For another, various 
politicians, including both Republicans and Democrats, saw through claims that the proposed 
National Reserve Association would be a people’s banking system. The mere fact that it was 
proposed by Aldrich, who had connections with elite financiers, was enough to suggest that 
the Bill was a big bankers’ bill generally and a Wall Street bill specifically. Aldrich’s very name 
was a liability.45 In such circumstances, the Bill had no chance of surviving. 
The death of the Aldrich Plan did not deter the League from advocating a new banking 
system, though. The League continued to push for a reserve association, even after the Bill fell 
flat. Immediately, the League sought to distance itself from Aldrich, and stressed that it had 
never explicitly endorsed the Plan itself. Instead, it maintained that it had been advocating a 
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‘sound’ banking system which was built upon the general principles featured within the Plan. 
It subsequently pushed on with its mission to implement such a system.46 This was especially 
important, given that 1912 was an election year. Throughout the year, the League attempted 
to ensure that the reserve association idea was not disbanded. It also monitored and responded 
to the financial policies advanced by the major Presidential candidates, particularly those of 
Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt – progressive candidates with strong financial 
populist streaks.47 Following Wilson’s victory at the end of 1912, the League then embarked 
on an intensive letter writing campaign to urge the Wilson administration not to abandon a 
reserve association.48 In its bid to popularise and legitimate the idea, the League indeed appears 
in this way to have been successful.  
While the conception of democracy advanced by the League and the Plan had been 
thoroughly rebuffed, the idea of some kind of reserve association had been embraced by 
various populist and progressive reformers. Those in favour of such an institution were in turn 
tasked with demonstrating how a reserve association could be democratic. This was typically 
through governmental or popular intervention. Collier’s magazine reflected this approach. 
Within a 1912 editorial, it announced that it was in their ‘opinion that it would be far better 
if the American people would stop voting for Andrew Jackson, and accept the fact that they 
themselves, through the Federal Government, are the proper authorities to regulate banking 
[emphasis original]’. It then charged that the Aldrich Plan was ‘in principle sound and the way 
to protect it from abuse’ was to ‘give the government a dominating representation in the 
directorate, or the power of regulation by a commission at least as powerful as the Interstate 
Commerce Commission’.49 Herman Myrick, a popular author and magazine editor, proposed 
what he considered to be an ‘American method to co-operative finance’ in 1912. His plan 
included establishing an ‘American Reserve Union’ that would consist of representatives from 
forty-two ‘leagues’ or banking districts, all of who would have equal voting power. This 
facilitated a democracy among bankers. In order to facilitate social and economic democracy, 
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however, the ‘national government’ would ultimately hold ‘the balance of power therein’ and 
the ‘whole institution’ would be ‘subject to the Congress as representing all the people’.50 
Crozier surprisingly also believed that a reserve association could be democratic and insisted 
upon the establishment of a ‘United States Monetary Council’, which would be a ‘responsible 
public institution’ and ‘Controlled by Congress’.51 
Importantly, such thinking had also permeated Capitol Hill. In 1913, the likes of 
Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan came to accept that a reserve association was 
necessary and that it could be democratised. So too did Louis Brandeis, an advisor to Wilson.52 
Prior to this embrace, it is true that several Republicans and Democrats had expressed support 
for the League and its ideals. Now with Bryan and Brandeis on board, however, the idea had 
the backing of a leading populist voice and a leading progressive voice. A reserve association 
could now appear to be cast legitimately as a kind of people’s banking system. Subsequently, 
the Democrats introduced their own bills in 1913. To further drum up its democratic 
credentials, Wilson announced in June of that year that it was ‘absolutely imperative that we 
should give the business men of this country a banking and currency system by means of which 
they can make use of the freedom of enterprise and of individual initiative which we are about 
to bestow upon them’. Echoing the rhetoric of Bryan, he then made it clear that the ‘control 
of the system of banking and of issue which our new laws are to set up must be public, not be 
private, must be vested in the government itself, so that the banks may be the instruments, not 
the masters, of business and of individual enterprise and initiative’.53 In July, Bryan claimed 
that when the Democratic bill was ‘considered upon its merits’, observers would ‘at once 
[realise] that it [was] written from the standpoint of the people rather than from the standpoint 
of the financiers’.54 True to his populist roots, Bryan was particularly focused upon ensuring 
that a Government controlled reserve association would be responsible for issuing money, 
rather than banking institutions.55 Whatever their particular objectives, powerful populist and 
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progressive political figures had clearly been sold on the idea of a reserve association. One can 
see that these ideas had been popularised inside and outside of the legislative sphere. Given its 
efforts, the League was probably in part responsible for this. 
Following months of intraparty debating and after undergoing various revisions, the 
Democratic version of a reserve association - the Federal Reserve System - was enacted into 
law by President Wilson on the 23rd of December, 1913. When first introduced, the Act 
strongly resembled the Aldrich Plan.56 Dissatisfied with the level of banker control, major pop-
ulist and progressive Democrats sought to increase governmental control. At one point, the 
Act even included a national deposit insurance scheme, though this was eventually scrapped. 
By this point, however, the debate centred upon the extent of governmental intervention ra-
ther than whether a reserve association should actually exist.57 Reflecting this, the League’s 
attention turned towards attacking any revisions or amendments it considered unfavourable 
or onerous, such as deposit guarantees. Ultimately, it sought to minimise the role of the State.58 
In the end though, and much to the chagrin of major banking interests who considered that 
the reforms had been hijacked by Bryan,59 the final version of the Act established a Federal 
Reserve Board that would oversee twelve individual reserve banks that were to be situated 
across the country. The Board, to be based in Washington D.C., consisted solely of govern-
mental figures, like the Treasurer and the Comptroller, and other members selected by the 
President. No positions were reserved for bankers. The individual reserve banks were to be 
governed by nine directors. Bankers could assume no more than three of these positions, as 
three were reserved for business people and another three for ‘public’ figures selected by the 
central Federal Reserve Board.60  
Historians Laurence Broz, James Livingston, and Allan Metzler describe this outcome 
as a compromise – elite bankers got a reserve association and populists and progressives got 
governmental oversight.61 While true, this understates the extent to which the latter believed 
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they had actually created a banking system that would end panics and bolster financial de-
mocracy. They were convinced that the Federal Reserve could be a people’s banking system. 
Tellingly, after the Act was signed into law, key governmental figures went on to 
celebrate the enactment as a grand triumph for financial stability and economic democracy. 
The age of panics would now be over, the money trust weakened, if not vanquished, and the 
people, through the Government, would have control over the banking system. John Skelton 
Williams, the Comptroller of the Currency, declared in 1914 that the Federal Reserve was 
‘democratic essentially’. It looked to ‘decentralization of distinct financial control, to 
FINANCIAL LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT so far as is consistent with stability and the 
general safety’. Furthermore, its provision for an elastic currency would create a ‘system fitted 
for any emergency’ and would move ‘smoothly and noiselessly for the ordinary uses of business 
in tranquil times’.62 Likewise, Democrat William McAdoo, who had been instrumental in the 
System’s creation, asserted that ‘Assuming wise administration, and that, I think, is certain, 
the new system ought to prove a successful preventive of financial panics’. Confident that the 
system would operate as intended, he then stated that he looked ‘forward to a wonderful 
period of financial stability, with its inevitable complement of undisturbed confidence, and to 
an era of unequalled prosperity for this country under the new federal reserve system 
[emphasis added]’. 63  By 1916, the Federal Reserve had become political capital for the 
Democrats. Their party platform for the 1916 Presidential elections stressed that the Federal 
Reserve was their creation and that they had ended the National Banking Era – an ‘archaic 
banking and currency system, prolific of panic and disaster under Republican administrations’ 
and one that was ‘long the refuge of the money trust’. They had therefore provided a ‘true 
democracy of credit under government control’ and had made a currency panic impossible 
[emphases added]’.64 It appeared that advocates of stability and democracy had prevailed and 
they wanted the public to know it. 
These governmental figures were not alone in celebrating the enactment of a reserve 
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association, however. The League also considered this a triumph and was satisfied with its 
efforts. Indeed, the League was so sure of its efficacy that it effectively wrapped up its 
operations before the Federal Reserve Act was even passed. In the final edition of Banking 
Reform, released in November 1913, the League informed its readers that its work had been 
‘completed’. It went on to note that although an ‘acceptable banking law [had] not yet been 
passed’, enough ‘legislative progress [had] been made that there [was] no shadow of doubt that 
legislation [was] certain’. There was now, according to the League, a ‘unanimous opinion that 
there must be a reform and that it must be comprehensive, effective and satisfactory’. The 
League conceded that there remained the ‘issue of the extent of the government’s participation 
in banking and control over the banking system’. In this way, the League was admitting that 
it had not satisfactorily convinced legislators that governmental intervention should be 
minimal. Its version of democracy had not been accepted. Nevertheless, it remarked that there 
was ‘seldom even a hint that the object outlined by the League as those to be attained [were] 
not the essence of soundness’. This therefore was enough for the League to consider that its 
ultimate objective of establishing a reserve association had been successful. It had convinced 
legislators that such a system did have a place within a democratic nation.65 Later reflecting 
upon the League’s efforts, Warburg commented in 1930 that there was ‘no doubt that its 
campaign enjoyed a high measure of success’. It had ‘converted’ most of the nation’s bankers, 
businesspeople, and the press to ‘the thought’ that the ‘principles of the Aldrich Plan should 
be embodied in legislation’.66 Thanks to its efforts, America, so it went, would now have a 
‘sound’ banking system, one that was consistent with the public interest. The League and its 
backers believed their work had been done. 
 
* * * 
 
The Federal Reserve System, with its enactment in December 1913 and its eventual 
establishment in November 1914, was both a landmark reform of the Progressive Era and a 
watershed moment in the history of American banking. Historians mark the Federal Reserve’s 
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establishment as one of, if not the most profound reform of the Wilson Administration.67 As 
we have seen, various progressive contemporaries thought so too. The System, they believed, 
would supplant an ‘antiquated banking and currency system’, would make panics a thing of 
the past, and would thwart financial monopolisation. It would therefore put an end to two of 
the age’s major banking issues, ones that had been undermining popular confidence in banks 
and bankers. The ‘National Banking Era’ was now over. 
In this way, given its significance, the System contributed to what historian Robert 
Wiebe has described as the ‘illusion of progressive fulfilment’: progressives incorrectly saw 
such reforms as final and triumphant. 68  Of course, the Federal Reserve was not the last 
financial reform of the era. The Federal Farm Loan Act was signed in 1916 which aimed to 
provide credit to agrarians through a system resembling the Federal Reserve, and states 
continued to implement their own reforms, such as Illinois which abolished private, 
unchartered banking in 1917.69 Furthermore, it is important to highlight that not all critics 
were convinced. Republicans Elihu Root and Charles Lindbergh remained deeply sceptical and 
critical of the Federal Reserve.70 Moreover, while national banks were obliged to join, other 
banks were not. As a result, non-national banks did not immediately get on board with the 
System. 71  At the very least, though, major populist and progressive figures, like William 
Jennings Bryan and Louis Brandeis, had been satiated. To them, the creation of the Federal 
Reserve System was a progressive triumph.  
These figures believed that they had successfully democratised the reserve association 
idea. Their emphasis upon governmental intervention contrasted sharply to the conceptions 
of democracy advanced by the Aldrich Plan and the National Citizens' League for the 
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Promotion of a Sound Banking System. At the same time, they had been won over to the idea 
of a reserve association of some kind. This chapter has in part sought to advance Broz’s claim 
that there is reason to believe that the League may well have been influential. Its conception 
of democracy was rejected, but a reserve association was not. It had inspired confidence in the 
notion that such a system did have a place within a democratic nation and that it could be 
amenable to the people. The League’s mission, then, was at least somewhat fulfilled.72 Beyond 
this, however, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that the League ultimately represents a 
foundational moment in the history of banking-related propaganda efforts. It was the first 
sophisticated campaign supported by bankers that explicitly emphasised banking reform, and 
was among the first that systematically portrayed itself as a grassroots movement comprised of 
‘the people’. The downplaying of banker involvement shows again that bankers were aware of 
their generally poor public-image. The stakes were too high to portray this as a bankers’ 
movement. 
This was not the case for other major propaganda efforts that began throughout the 
decade, though. Bankers started to initiate or participate within campaigns that did not involve 
them having to hide their involvement. Instead, these other efforts allowed them to situate 
themselves in the foreground and to demonstrate their civic and economic value. As will be 
seen in the next chapter, the Liberty Bond and War Savings campaigns of the First World War 
were the most profound of these efforts. 
                                                







 War, Banking Patriots, and Connecting with the People 
 
The War was a stimulus to bank advertising. The banks and the trust 
companies co-operated very efficiently with the government in financing our 
share in it. The Liberty Loan and the War Savings campaigns opened the eyes 
of many bankers to the possibilities of advertising. 
 
 - Theodore D. McGregor, 1921.1 
 
America's bankers fought on the financial front line during the First World War. In order to 
finance America's participation in the conflict between April 1917 and November 1918, the 
US Treasury sold financial securities to the American public in the form of four Liberty Bond 
issues and War Savings Stamps.2 The nation's deposit banks - national, state, savings, and trusts 
- played a large part in buying and retailing these securities to the American public. Following 
the Armistice in November 1918, various prominent figures not only recognised this fact but 
celebrated it. Referring to bankers, Irving Fisher, a then respected Yale economist, declared 
during the American Bankers’ Association’s (ABA) 1919 convention that no ‘class of business 
men [had] tried more conscientiously, during the war, to render patriotic service and few if 
any other classes in civil life [had] played a more indispensable part in winning the war’.3 
Likewise, John Skelton Williams, the Comptroller of the Currency, announced during the 
convention that ‘[w]ithout the prompt, the resourceful and self-sacrificing aid which was 
given by the bankers of this country from that fateful day in April, 1917, when we declared 
war, until after the signing of the armistice on November 11 last year, our victory would have 
been impossible’.4 While the troops and sailors had done their part in winning the war on the 
battlefront, the banks, by this view, had done their part on the home-front. America's banking 
                                                
1 Theodore McGreggor, McGreggor's Book of Bank Advertising (New York: Bankers Publishing Company, 1921), 
iii. 
 
2 The Treasury floated a further ‘Victory Loan’ in 1919 and continued to sell Stamps until 1924. 
 
3 Irving Fisher, ‘A Monetary Remedy for the High Cost of Living’ in Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual 
Convention of the American Bankers' Association (New York: American Bankers Association, 1919), 147. 
 
4 John Skelton Williams, ‘America as Atlas’ in Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Convention of the American 
Bankers' Association (New York: American Bankers Association, 1919), 553. 
  VIII. 185 
 
patriots had helped make the world ‘safe for democracy’. 
 The War, this chapter argues, provided bankers with an opportune moment to develop 
such an impression, to acquaint many Americans with banking institutions, and to fully 
appreciate the power of advertising and propaganda. By taking a leading, vital role within the 
domestic war effort, banks were thus connected to the Government’s propaganda efforts to 
popularise and support the nation’s involvement within the conflict, amounting to one of the 
largest publicity campaigns in the nation’s history. Regarding finances, the Government not 
only promoted the sale of Liberty Bonds and War Savings Stamps (WSS), but also advanced 
the value and practice of thrift as a civic and patriotic obligation. Being thrifty during the war 
largely meant purchasing these securities. Banks were not the only institutions involved (post 
offices, for instance, were also vitally important to the WSS campaign), though they were 
highly active and probably the most important. Through their participation, they were given 
an opportunity to demonstrate their utility and their worth to the American people, including 
to many individuals that had never before utilised banking facilities.  
As a result of the Governmental campaign and of banking efforts, many American 
people did come to see America’s banks differently and began to utilise them. Ultimately, 
America's war effort brought the people and the banks closer together and helped to create a 
public more receptive to banking. It also consolidated the importance of advertising and 
propaganda. Taken together, it helped dismantle the barriers between bankers and the general 
public and confirmed to the former that publicity was an effective means to continue this 
process. In this way, the War therefore helped to pave the way for a new age of improved 
relations and increased confidence between bankers and the public. 
 
* * * 
 
Before the US declared war on Germany, bankers had been active in collective endeavours 
to connect with the public. Beyond the National Citizens’ League, bankers made several other 
forays into propaganda campaigns during the 1910s and prior to America’s entry to the War. 
Various initiatives were established and undertaken between 1911 and 1917. Unlike the 
League, however, these campaigns did not downplay the role of bankers. Instead, they brought 
them to the foreground. Advertising, for instance, not only continued to be embraced by 
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individual institutions, but also culminated in the establishment of the Financial Advertisers’ 
Association in 1916, which was a professional organisation that sought to advance the medium 
and to improve relations between bankers and the public. The Association was apparently so 
effective that Fred Ellsworth, a New Orleans banker, asserted later in 1920 that the 
Association’s activities were ‘producing definite results in acquainting Mr. Average Man with 
the essential part that the banker plays in the commercial and industrial and agricultural 
program of the community’.5 Additionally, the ABA, through its Savings Bank Section, had 
started to insert itself within the thrift movement. As historian Andrew Yarrow has 
demonstrated, the ABA established a specialised thrift department in 1912, initiated a 
campaign in 1913, and intensified this campaign in 1916 to coincide with and to celebrate the 
hundredth anniversary of savings banking in America. Yarrow has shown that this was a 
national campaign held within forty cities and entailed ‘speakers and presentations including 
lantern slides and films, a Monday thrift luncheon, a thrift exhibit, children’s programs, and 
rallies with bands’.6 Such a campaign was obviously intended to encourage people to enter 
banking institutions and to deposit their money within them.  
Another major effort conducted by the ABA was the establishment of the Banker-Farmer 
magazine in December 1913. As the title suggests, this was a periodical that sought to improve 
relations between bankers and farmers and was distributed to banks who were in turn 
expected to then pass copies on to patrons and the local presses. The Banker-Farmer was 
produced by the ABA’s Agricultural Commission, and reviewed ‘the Banker’s Activities for a 
Better Agriculture and Rural Life’ by featuring articles that demonstrated what bankers were 
doing for rural people.7 At the end of its first year, the magazine declared that it had ‘worked 
for the big, broad, human side of things’ and had sought to prove that bankers were ‘vastly 
more human and public spirited than some persons would have you believe’. It had ‘tried to 
drive home the idea that the real banker should be as well and as favourably known in front 
of his counter as he is behind it’. Accordingly, it then declared that through continued efforts, 
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relations could be further improved.8  All such measures sought to achieve this end – to 
transform how people saw banks and to win over their confidence. However, it took the War 
and the governmental campaign to stimulate this process. 
 When the War broke out in Europe in 1914, it affected the United States in a number 
of ways and came to dominate the public’s attention. Immediately, the outbreak almost 
triggered a stock panic. However, a generalised banking panic was thwarted by the issuance 
of emergency currency, allowing the national banks to remain liquid in the face of an increased 
demand for cash. In turn, the entire banking system was secured. The War also came to 
dominate the public sphere, pushing most other matters aside. Regarding the media, historian 
Leonard Ray Teel has noted that ‘[a]lthough the press devoted extensive space to domestic 
reforms during Wilson’s first term, troubles in Europe gradually stole attention from domestic 
affairs’.9 Moreover, by this point, the era of muckraking was by and large over, having been at 
its height between 1902 and 1912. The subsequent decline represented the changing social and 
political environment – general business malfeasances were increasingly out of the spotlight. 
There were several reasons for this, including declining interest due to overexposure, 
advertising pressures, the corporate buyout of magazines, and possibly even banker influence. 
The war helped to finalise this process.10  
Indeed, between 1914 and 1917, politics and discussion were fixed largely upon what 
role America was to play within the conflict. America was officially neutral at first, and 
favoured isolation rather than involvement (though commitment to both was questionable). 
Most people at this time considered this a European War and wanted no part in it. Woodrow 
Wilson even contested and won the 1916 presidential election in part on the grounds that he 
had kept America out of the conflict. However, from as early as 1914, prominent figures like 
Theodore Roosevelt began agitating for America to prepare for conflict, and after the sinking 
of the Lusitania in 1915 it started to become clear to leaders, including Wilson, that the nation 
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would likely be drawn into the War on the side of Britain and the Allies. They subsequently 
sought to prepare materially and mentally for doing so, under the banner of ‘Preparedness’. In 
mid 1916, Congress passed the National Defence Act, which authorised the expansion of the 
nation’s military. America was readying for conflict (though Wilson still pressed for a 
diplomatic solution). On 6 April, 1917, Congress declared war on Germany. As Wilson put it, 
American was entering the conflict in order to ‘make the world safe for democracy’. America, 
so it went, was setting out on a mission to smash autocracy and to secure liberty and democracy 
on a continental, if not global scale. War, then, was on the American mind. 
Enthusiasm and support for the war, however, had to be manufactured. Despite 
Wilson’s grand proclamation, America’s entry was controversial and not everyone at first 
bought the message. Even before the declaration, the prospect of American participation 
offended isolationists and neutralists, and even resulted in an antiwar bombing attack in San 
Francisco in July, 1916. Moreover, the radical left accused Wall Street of pushing the nation 
into the conflict in order to protect their financial interests.11 American participation, then, 
was polarising and dominated the public sphere. Recognising this, the Government knew that 
the War had to be sold to the American public, or at least significant portions of it. In order to 
do so, Wilson created the Committee on Public Information (CPI) on 14 April, eight days after 
declaring war. The Committee was chaired by George Creel, a journalist and public relations 
expert, and sought to arouse popular support for the war.  
In doing so, Creel and the Committee stressed that America was not just fighting a war 
for democracy, but fighting a war as a democracy. According to Creel, they had to secure the 
‘conviction that the war was not the war of an administration, but the war of one hundred 
million people’.12 In other words, this was a war fought by the people. This message was 
subsequently delivered to the American public through a publicity blitz that included the 
feeding of pro-war content and articles to the press, the production of posters, the staging of 
parades, and the deliverance of speeches given by celebrities and respected citizens at cinemas 
and theatres, known as ‘four-minute men’. Such content came to saturate the public-sphere 
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and quickly went on to constitute the largest publicity campaign that had been conducted up 
to that point in the nation’s history.13 
For this to be a people’s war, it had to be financed by the people. Conducting America’s 
war effort required an unprecedented amount of resources and thus the government was faced 
with expenses in excess of its capacity to immediately pay for them. In order to raise the nec-
essary funds, debate emerged between politicians, financiers, and commercial leaders as to 
whether taxation or borrowing was the best means to finance the war.14 Either way, through 
force or encouragement, Adolph C. Miller, a member of the Federal Reserve Board, noted that 
it was clear that ‘saving on a scale of unprecedented intensity’ would be ‘an essential prelimi-
nary under any effective scheme of national finance we may adopt’. 15 American people, in 
others words, would have to pay for the war and this could be achieved either through the 
government taking their money or borrowing their money. Though a combination of the two 
was settled upon, the primary means to finance the war came to be from domestic borrowing 
in the form of the four interest-bearing Liberty Bonds and the War Savings Stamps and Cer-
tificates, both of which were issued by the Treasury, and sold to banks and other purchasers 
and distributors.16 Referring to the Liberty Bonds, which were facilitated by the Federal Re-
serve banks and by far the greatest source of funds, campaigner J. Herbert Case later asserted 
in 1922 that their floating was the ‘paramount financial undertaking of the War’.17  
Beginning in May 1917, the sale of Liberty Bonds, inspired by the bond drives of the 
Civil War and Spanish-American War, were designed to raise funds from wealthy institutions, 
like banks and businesses, and from upper and middle-class people. Issue were as low as $50 
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and as high as $100,000. Beginning in December 1917, the Stamps, inspired by Britain’s expe-
rience with them, were issued to raise funds from lower middle-class and working-class peo-
ple, either through 25c Thrift Stamps, or through $5 Certificate Stamps that were sold for $4.12 
and later $4.23 (the Thrift Stamps were designed to be built up into Certificate Stamps). Indi-
viduals could own no more than $1000 worth of Stamps, a restriction implemented to prevent 
these securities from being purchased by those that could afford Liberty Bonds. Together, both 
were designed to foster patriotism by giving all people, whether rich or poor, man or woman, 
black or white, citizen or immigrant, an opportunity to not only contribute to the war effort, 
but to have a stake in it. Moreover, it was designed to instil the impression that, through their 
contributions, this was indeed a war supported by all American people, not just the nation’s 
elite.18 
Furthermore, the securities aimed at middle and working-class peoples were also in-
tended to instil thrift, both to support the war effort and to inculcate the savings habit gener-
ally. Thrift education was not, of course, directed towards wealthy investors, but instead to-
wards small investors. The WSS campaign in particular was tasked with preaching the ethic, 
given its focus upon lower middle-class people, workers, immigrants, and children. Frank 
Vanderlip, the director of the Treasury’s War Savings Division, insisted in 1917 that this was 
the best thing about it, superseding even its role in raising funds for the war effort. Vanderlip 
charged that the campaign was ‘going to teach Thrift to America’, which was ‘the great thing’. 
America, according to Vanderlip, was a nation of spendthrifts. The WSS campaign would rec-
tify this by instead creating a nation of savers. Consequently, unnecessary purchasing would 
be curtailed.19  
There was, of course, resistance to the emphasis placed upon saving and reduced pur-
chasing. Manufacturers and retailers of consumer goods protested that the campaign was di-
minishing their sales, which in turn was harming the national economy. They responded by 
insisting that people go about their ‘business as usual’ and continue to freely consume as they 
had before the war.20  
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The WSS campaign, however, tied thrift to the war effort and thus conveyed the ideal 
as a grand patriotic gesture. Thrift, the campaign argued, facilitated the conservation of vital 
resources; it restricted the consumption of unnecessary goods that were needed to fight the 
war. A WSS pamphlet from 1918 intended for school children made this clear by instructing 
that ‘[i]f we go on buying as we did before the war, our Government will not be able to get 
enough material to provide clothes, ammunition, guns, ships, food, and other necessary sup-
plies for our Army and Navy’.21 Thus according to thrift advocates, people had to stop spending 
and start saving in order to win the war, and the best way to save was by investing in war 
bonds.22  
 For the campaigns to work, the Treasurer and the directors had to secure institutions 
that would first purchase these securities and then retail them to the masses. As mentioned, 
the Treasury had the Federal Reserve Banks to purchase its Liberty Bonds. However, to raise 
more funds and to facilitate broad participation, directors and campaigners had to encourage 
commercial and savings banks to participate. In order to do so, they stressed the potential 
benefits of engaging in the campaigns. This is particularly evident in the WSS drive. A WSS 
pamphlet asserted in 1918 that the ‘national development of thrift and savings’ would mobilise 
‘financial resources heretofore untouched by the American banker'. The pamphlet then 
insisted that the ‘incorporated banking institution, whether National or state, [was] a most 
effective agency for furthering the Government’s campaign for thrift and economy’, and thus 
hoped that ‘every banking institution’ would ‘become an agent for the sale of War-Savings 
Stamps’. 23  Vanderlip also made this point. He highlighted that the campaign would be 
particularly relevant to the nation’s savings banks. While he believed that the campaign would 
‘somewhat decrease new deposits’, as funds would be redirected into the securities, it would 
nevertheless teach ‘thrift to the community’, which would be ultimately beneficial to savings 
banks - they would be the ‘greatest gainers of all in the end’.24 Though the campaign attributed 
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the lack of a savings habit to needless spending rather than an underlying confidence problem, 
it still acknowledged that many people were not in fact depositing their funds within banks. 
Therefore, to encourage banks, the campaign promised it would get these people into the banks 
and convert them into depositors.  
 
* * * 
 
It is hard to measure how effective these specific appeals were. However, it is clear that 
banks were highly active within both campaigns. Banks of all kinds signed on to buy and sell 
Bonds, Stamps, or both to the general public.25 The ABA also vowed to offer its full cooperation. 
Upon doing so, it immediately established a committee to advance the war effort consisting of 
1,000 bankers. The committee subsequently sent out some 30,000 circulars to banks and trust 
companies advising them on all things to do with the first Liberty Bond issue, which 
occasionally also included ‘model advertisements, sermons for preachers, editorials for 
newspapers, talks for employers, and other valuable information and data’.26 It continued to 
do so thereafter for the other bonds, and, through its various committees, also went on to 
endorse the WSS campaign. 
Beyond purchasing and selling the securities, bankers also literally took a leading role 
in directing the campaigns themselves. The Central Liberty Loan Committee of the Second 
Federal Reserve District, for example, featured among its directors not only the Governor of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, but also several of the nation’s leading bankers.27 As 
Case noted, the Committee was, among various other things, responsible for organising the 
publicity department that campaigned to promote the Bonds and the war effort. Their message 
was featured in ‘newspapers and magazines, on the billboards, houses, lamp-posts, vehicles, 
flagstaffs, and in the store and the householder’s window’. Moreover, ‘[f]requent Liberty Loan 
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meetings were held and many hundred men and women delivered the message in public 
addresses’.28  
Furthermore, the War Savings Organization, the agency responsible for the sale and 
dissemination of the Stamps, was directed by Vanderlip, the former President of the National 
City Bank of New York City who stood down to assume the role. Similarly, bank directors, 
presidents, and senior employees directed twenty-seven of the WSO’s fifty-two state-based 
branches (D.C. had a branch and California, New York, and Pennsylvania each had two).29 
Bankers, then, were to a large degree the war effort’s financial leaders and in this way they 
became facilitators of patriotism – if the securities were expressions of patriotism, then the 
banks were its agents. The Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, even described them as 
‘clearing houses of patriotism’ in 1918.30 
In addition to having a strong presence within leadership positions and organising 
campaign efforts, various banks ensured that the public knew about their contributions. 
Generally, banks no doubt benefitted from the broader publicity campaigns which extensively 
promoted Liberty Bonds. Posters, for instance, encouraged people to ‘SEE YOUR BANK 
TODAY’, ‘SUBSCRIBE AT YOUR BANK TODAY’, and to sign up to bond payment instalment 
plans ‘AT ANY BANK’.31 Advertisements for the War Savings Stamps also routinely informed 
people that they could purchase them at ‘Banks, Trust Companies, Post-Offices and Other 
Authorized Agencies’.32 Specifically, banks sought to link themselves directly to the campaigns. 
This was both to inform people which banks were offering their services and to highlight that 
those banks were supportive of the war effort. As Henry Hsu noted in his 1920 study into the 
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war services of American banks, ‘[p]age advertisements jointly or severally put up by banks 
located in the same community were to be found in practically every newspaper in the 
country’. Banks also sent out letters to ‘depositors and customers appealing to them to do their 
bit’ and ‘in general’ they were ‘very active in spreading the propaganda in behalf of 
government loans by sending out literatures, furnishing liberty loan speakers, and by giving 
personal information and advice to prospective buyers’.33  
The ‘page advertisements’ encouraging the sale of Bonds and Stamps not only included 
lists of donors that had paid for their appearance, which frequently included banks, but often 
instructed readers to purchase the securities from banks. One advertisement encouraged 
readers to ‘Make the World Safe for Democracy’ by filing for bond subscriptions ‘at one of 
These Banks TODAY’, including the Boone County National Bank, the Central Bank, the 
Columbia Savings bank, the Boone County Trust Company, and the Exchange National Bank.34 
Another advertisement, featuring the headline ‘What the Banks Will Do to Help You Buy 
Bonds’, asserted that ‘THE UNDERSIGNED BANKS PLEDGE THEMSELVES’ to help people 
(or ‘clients’) to purchase Bonds, which included allowing them to borrow from the bank in 
order to do so. It then listed twelve banks that had made that pledge, including national and 
savings banks and trust companies.35 Similarly, one other advertisement that encouraged the 
public to borrow from banks to finance bond purchases, this time for the Fourth Liberty Bond, 
commanded readers to ‘GO TO YOUR BANK AND BORROW!’. It then notified prospective 
purchases that there were ‘355 banks and branches conveniently located in all sections of this 
city’, all of which were ‘open to you for Liberty Loan purposes [underlining in original]’. It 
went on to charge that: 
It is your duty to avail yourself of the borrowing facilities freely offered. 
This applies to men and women all over New York, whether they are 
of large means or small. It applies to you, whether you have ever 
borrowed from a bank or not. This is no time for hesitation. If you act 
promptly this loan will be a success. GO INTO A BANK AND ASK – 
THEN ACT!36 
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The advertisement subsequently ended by listing the eighty-six banks that had ‘contributed to 
winning the war’ by paying for the advertising space [See Figure 15].37 These banks, and many 
others like them, made it clear that they were the avenues through which people on the home 
front could fulfil their civic and national duty to assist those on the battlefront.  
 
 
Figure 15. Advertisement for the Fourth Liberty Loan, October 1918. From the Library of Congress’ 
Chronicling America digital collection. 
 
Banks also connected themselves to the WSS' crusade for thrift, particularly by 
emphasising the link between the war effort, the ethic, and their role in advancing both. 
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Financing a victorious war required not only monetary contributions, but also fiscal and moral 
restraint. Citizens could achieve both by purchasing Stamps, which could be purchased at ‘any 
bank’. After declaring that ‘LIBERTY CALLS’, an advertisement paid for by the ‘Banks of 
Bridgeport’ stated that the ‘only answer for the patriotic American to make’ was ‘a pledge, not 
only to SAVE for the duration of the war but to loan such savings to your government’. It also 
announced that ‘THRIFT WILL WIN THE WAR’, that a ‘DOLLAR WASTED IS A DOLLAR 
SPENT for the KAISER’, and that the ‘BEST WAY TO BE THRIFTY’ was to ‘Buy War Savings 
Stamps’.38 Other advertisements targeted particular demographics, such as women. One such 
advertisement, contributed by five major Virginian banks in conjunction with ‘the Woman’s 
Committee of the Richmond War Savings Campaign’, insisted that it was a ‘WOMAN’S DUTY’ 
to ‘Preach Patriotism’ and ‘Practice Thrift’. Again, this could be achieved by purchasing 
Stamps.39  
Moreover, a 1917 advertisement within the Evening World, sponsored by 120 New 
York banking institutions, stressed the importance of thrift generally. The ad, featuring the 
headline ‘Save and Have’ and accompanied by an image of Benjamin Franklin, proposed that 
thrift was essential to winning the war, though also stressed that it was equally important to 
post-war America. It claimed that the ‘future of the United States, after the war, [would] be 
more secure if every American [would] spend carefully, save carefully and invest carefully’. It 
went on to claim that ‘[i]nvestment follows saving’ and that ‘Banks, trust companies, and 
savings banks have made it easy to invest’ [See Figure 16].40 By this view, America’s banks 
would assist the American public to pour their savings into securities, which would bolster the 
nation and the general welfare. It is unclear whether the War Savings Organisation officially 
endorsed this particular advertisement. It makes no specific mention of the Stamps and does 
not feature the official WSS logo. The advertisement thus represents an instance of banks 
actively attempting to insert themselves to the broader thrift campaign. In either case, whether 
through the WSS or through unofficial, independent advertising, banks clearly saw the 
benefits to advocating thrift and to connecting themselves to the war effort.  
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Figure 16. Advertisement encouraging Americans to ‘Save and Serve’, 1917. From the Library of 
Congress’ Chronicling America digital collection. 
 
There were various other social and political influences driving people to purchase 
securities that likely benefited banks. Religion was one such influence. America’s participation 
in the war was sometimes conveyed as a moral and a divine cause. In 1918, for instance, 
Reverend Walter Laidlaw, the Executive Secretary of the New York Federation of Churches 
(NYFC), claimed that following reports of German atrocities, many Americans, including 
himself, ‘realized that this was a crusade to save Christian civilization’. In turn, various church 
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authorities began to sermonise against anti-war sentiment and pacifism. Upon America’s 
entrance and participation within the war, these authorities, organised through the NYFC and 
the National Committee on the Churches, actively sermonised in support of the Liberty Loan 
campaigns, likely encouraging sales.41  
An additional measure of support came from the Sedition Act of 1918. The Act 
prohibited the expression of any sentiment deemed hostile to the war effort, including 
statements or efforts made against the bond drives. In other words, among other things, the 
Act criminalised the critique or discouragement of bond purchasing. In at least one case, a 
Washington labourer named Rudolph Peterson received a three-year prison sentence for 
attempting to discourage his colleagues from buying a Liberty Bond.42 The Government thus 
sought to ensure the success of the campaigns by repressing attitudes that could potentially 
inhibit sales. Put another way, the campaigns did not have to openly compete with 
antagonistic views. They had a monopoly over the public sphere.  
The Government could not, however, prosecute people for failing to purchase securities. 
It could seek to stigmatise such people, however. Those that did not purchase securities or 
contribute their savings were labelled as ‘slackers’ or even traitors. According to campaign 
managers, slackers shirked their citizenry duty to support America in times of need, whereas 
traitors actively worked against America. Vanderlip made it clear how both applied to the WSS 
campaign. ‘An idle dollar’, he claimed, was a ‘slacker’. Such a dollar, and by implication its 
holder, was contributing nothing to the war effort. Conversely, a dollar that was spent 
‘needlessly’, one that was used to consume unnecessary and nonessential goods and services, 
competed with the Government and was therefore ‘an ally of the enemy’ and a ‘traitor dollar’. 
Money used for purchasing anything beyond essentials and Stamps was treachery.43  This 
theme was featured within the campaigns, including within bank-sponsored advertisements.44 
Combined, the positive and negative support for the bonds created a national fervour that 
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identified their issuance and purchase as a grand patriotic gesture and also identified resistance 
or even indifference to them as un-American. Americans were now duty-bound to purchase 
Liberty Bonds and Stamps. Banks could help them do so. 
 
* * * 
 
Between May 1917 and November 1918, millions of Americans purchased these 
securities. Combined, the four Liberty Bonds raised close to $19 billion. The Third and Fourth 
Bonds were by far the most popular, with 18,376,815 and 22,777,680 individual subscriptions 
respectively. Adding the Victory Loan of 1919, a total of 66,358,360 bonds were purchased, 
amounting to $24 billion.45 This is not to suggest that sixty-six million people purchased bonds. 
Individuals could, for instance, update their old bonds for new bonds and more than one could 
be purchased. In reality, some twenty million Americans purchased bonds, which, as historian 
Julia Ott notes, made up for about twenty percent of the total population. Simultaneously, the 
WSS raised around $1 billion. This fell short of the Treasury’s $2 billion target. Nevertheless, 
between twenty and thirty-four million people purchased a War Savings Stamp of some kind 
during and just after the conflict. It is thus possible that up to a third of all Americans did so.46 
Combined, the campaigns clearly succeeded at getting millions of ordinary American people 
to financially contribute to the war effort. It is very probable that they also played no small 
part in pushing many people through the doors of a bank for the first time, given that the 
banks were major retailers. 
Recognising the success of the campaigns and the financial and moral benefits they 
could supposedly generate, the Government sought to continue selling securities to the 
American public following the Armistice. As mentioned, the Government issued the Victory 
Loan in May 1919, which was intended to finance ongoing expenses resulting from the war 
effort and to rebuild a peace-time economy. The Government also continued to operate the 
WSS campaign, which was to eventually become a National Thrift Campaign. In the process, 
War Savings Stamps became Thrift Stamps. Like their predecessors, both campaigns were 
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initiated and supported by the Federal Government.  
At the same time, the Government and the campaign directors knew that they needed 
to ensure the continued cooperation of independent and private institutions, with banks being 
vital. Acknowledging both the importance of banks to the former campaigns as much as to the 
new ones, campaigners sought to maintain their involvement. In their bid to do so, frequent 
appeals were made to banks, which stressed the benefits that they could accrue through their 
continued participation. This was particularly so regarding the Savings campaign. A 1919 
message intended for banks, for example, addressed the question, ‘How does the Government’s 
Thrift Campaign Help the Banks?’ It considered this a ‘fair’ question for ‘any banker to ask’, as 
it recognised that it took ‘time and expense for a bank to sell W.S.S. and to look after the duties 
occasioned by the holding of those securities’. The message then sought to outline what banks 
would ‘receive in return for this labor and expense’.47 Another included testimony from an 
unnamed banker, who claimed they were in favour of the ‘government savings campaign and 
the WSS’, as the ‘more thrifty and prosperous the government helps to make the people of 
[their] city, the more [they] will flourish’. The banker then added that participation was a good 
thing simply because everyone held ‘kindly feelings towards Uncle Sam’.48 Such appeals thus 
demonstrate that although these were Governmental campaigns, banks had been and were 
indispensable to their success. 
Bankers hardly needed to be reminded of their importance. They were well aware of 
how significant their war-time efforts were. They themselves had come to celebrate their 
activities. Speaking before the ABA during the 1919 convention, George M. Reynolds declared 
that ‘I am glad that I am a banker’. He then congratulated his audience for ‘being members of 
this profession’ as it could be ‘found’ that the ‘conduct of the average banker during the war, 
and the willingness with which he has gone to sacrifice and the patriotic endeavour which he 
has put forth to help the government in every possible way was no small factor in the 
wonderful achievements of this country’.49  
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Outside actors praised bankers too. As highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, 
Irving Fisher and John Skelton Williams lauded their efforts. Moreover, even during the 
conflict, Woodrow Wilson commended ‘the splendid spirit and efficiency with which the 
bankers of the country were assisting the Government in the all-important matters of the loans’ 
and Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, expressed what he knew to be the ‘thought of the 
country’ and asserted that were it not for the ‘efficiency and unselfish patriotism of the bankers 
of America’, then the Government ‘could not have financed the Liberty loans’.50  Daniels 
subsequently thanked bankers for their ‘great sacrifices’ and proceeded to ‘congratulate’ 
them.51  Bankers, so it went, had done their bit, and both people inside and outside the 
profession knew this. 
There was also a general awareness that the campaigns had quite drastically helped to 
improve relations between bankers and the public, both in terms of getting people into banks 
and in reconfiguring how people saw them. The war, in other words, brought many people 
closer to banking institutions and various figures recognised this fact. In 1921, Alexander 
Dunbar, a banker from Pittsburgh, asserted that the war had ‘guided the footsteps of millions 
of people through the front doors of American banks who otherwise never would have 
thought of a bank’. These millions of people had ‘discovered, by the accident of the great 
catastrophe, the need and protection of a banking institution in their daily activities’. 52 
Moreover, in attempting to highlight ‘What the New Savings Habit Has Done for the Banks’, 
the War Loan Organization of the Fifth Federal Reserve District stressed that deposits had 
grown dramatically between December 1916 and December 1918. Total deposits within the 
district, including demand and savings deposits, had grown by $428,950,000 (or 43.33%), 
which the Organization considered ‘nothing less than remarkable’. This growth no doubt had 
resulted largely from war-time inflation and higher wages, a fact the Organization recognised. 
Nevertheless, it maintained that the ‘newly acquired habit of saving’ was still a principal 
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factor.53  
Furthermore, Hsu observed that the war had indeed transformed popular attitudes, 
commenting that ‘[w]ith the return of peace there comes to the American people a new vision’. 
Hsu detailed this vision as follows: 
A more generous recognition of the importance of bankers and banking 
institutions to society has come as a result of our war experiences. Peo-
ple begin to appreciate more and more the services rendered and the 
sacrifices made by banks. The educational campaigns for the liberty 
loans has produced, among many others, one important result in trans-
forming the public’s former questioning attitude toward the banking 
profession to its present favorable opinion of them.54  
 
Here Hsu captured the impact that war had upon the relationship between ordinary people 
and banks. This was more than a matter of an increased appreciation towards the services and 
contributions provided by banks. Instead, the War cast bankers in an entirely new light, one 
that displaced the negativity that prevailed before the War. Hsu backed this view with an 
anonymously quoted person who charged that people had ‘now entirely reversed their opinion 
of the banker’ and had ‘become convinced that they were not apart and aloof from the 
community, but were part and parcel of it, and that they were living, human patriotic 
institutions’. This demonstrates that contemporaries seriously believed that war had ‘reversed’ 
popular opinion, so much so that people were now starting to see banks as essential institutions 
that were on board with common interests.55 
This is not to suggest that this transition was whole or complete. Those newly 
acquainted with banks and those that had come to appreciate their services could just have 
easily changed their minds and reverted to previous habits and ways of thinking. Further, 
many people remained detached from banks. There thus came an acceptance that banks had 
to take advantage of their improved status and had to ensure that people continued to utilise 
them. William Morehouse, a leading specialist in financial advertising, claimed that he was 
‘beginning to think that, as a result of the war, the bank idea [was] half sold to the great 
American public’. By this view, banks had not yet entirely closed the sale. However, he 
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stressed that they could do so by continuing to court their new patrons. There was not the 
‘least doubt’ in Morehouse’s mind that if ‘these war-savers [were] shown every courtesy, they 
[would] eventually become bank depositors’. It was thus up to banks to ensure that they did 
so.56 Dunbar agreed, charging that bankers were responsible for sustaining relations with the 
public. By their ‘act of coming to the banker’, the people had indicated that they were 
‘potentially desirable’. As such, Dunbar advised that ‘[n]o short-sighted policy should guide 
the banker in the handling of this important situation’. Avoiding such policies was vital, as the 
handling of this ‘new crop of bank depositors’ would shape America’s future economic 
development.57 Banks therefore had to carefully manage their behaviours in order to sustain 
their newfound clientele and to continue attracting new depositors. 
Advertising would play no small part in their attempts to achieve this end. Whatever 
doubts remained regarding the effectiveness of the medium prior to the War, these were 
swiftly put to to rest upon its conclusion. Morehouse considered advertising so effective and 
powerful that he claimed that the ‘history of the war’ would be ‘incomplete without due 
recognition of the part financial advertising played in the great struggle’. Upon observing its 
power, financial advertising would in turn ‘be very popular from now on, and the man who 
opposes its use because he regards it as undignified’ would be ‘out of harmony with the scheme 
of things’.58 Theodore McGregor similarly noted in 1921 that the War ‘was a stimulus to bank 
advertising’ and that the ‘Liberty Loan and the War Savings Campaigns opened the eyes of 
many bankers to the possibilities of advertising’.59 Most banks, at least according to these 
specialists, had come to appreciate this as a matter of fact and had almost universally embraced 
the medium. Bankers had by now fully established and adopted a medium which they believed 
or at least hoped would continue to acquaint people with banks. 
 
* * * 
 
 In the immediate aftermath of the War, participating banks were convinced that they 
                                                
56 William Morehouse, ‘Relating Financial Advertising to the War’, The Bankers Magazine, vol. 98, no. 1 (January, 
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had done their bit to help make the world safe for democracy. They had played a large role in 
financing America’s war effort, both by buying and selling Government securities. Bond 
purchasing was conveyed as a grand patriotic gesture and, as distributors of those bonds, banks 
were by extension directly associated with this gesture. In this way, they were facilitators and 
even bastions of patriotism. The campaigns were, of course, primarily Governmental. Thus, it 
took the War and the Government to create conditions that would bring people and the banks 
closer together, or at least drastically stimulate this process. The Government even continued 
to sell securities following the war, both in the form of a final Victory Loan in 1919 and the 
continuation of the WSS campaigns until 1924. In doing so, it sought to keep private 
institutions involved, especially banks.  
However, with the war over, the impetus to participate dwindled. The general 
population started to lose interest and so too did the banks. Undoubtedly, many banks did stay 
on board for both campaigns, and the Savings Division of the ABA pledged their continued 
cooperation with the Treasury’s thrift campaign in 1919.60 Nevertheless, banks and the people 
started to move on.61 For the banks, this involved continued efforts to independently connect 
with the broader public, particularly through advertising and propaganda that had now been 
consolidated. Banks, along with the YMCA, also gradually became leaders of the thrift 
movement, displacing the Government.62 In a way, the movement had been privatised. Thanks 
to the War, banks were now in a favourable position to acquire and sustain popular confidence 
on their own terms. 
At the same time, post-war conditions were by no means perfect. In fact, they were 
highly volatile. With the return of peace, American society faced a host of social, political, and 
economic challenges. Generally, labour strife erupted, anarchists committed acts of terrorism, 
and racial tensions flared. Major strikes occurred across the nation in 1919, particularly in 
Seattle; militant anarchists bombed the residences and buildings of various governmental and 
business figures, likely including Wall Street in 1920; and race riots occurred, like they did in 
Chicago in 1919. Additionally, economic and financial conditions were fraught with 
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complications. Industry had to be totally reconfigured for post-war needs. Inflation had also 
soared between 1917 and 1919 due to the expansion of credit. Fearing that continued inflation 
would eventually undermine the national economy, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
sharply increased interest rates in 1919, subsequently pushing its regional counterparts to do 
the same. Such a measure arguably contributed to the recession that followed between early 
1920 and mid-1921.63 As a result, the Federal Reserve system was attacked by a number of 
actors, including Senator Robert Owen, who had been instrumental in its creation. In 1921, 
Owen accused it of advancing the interests of bankers over those of ‘all the people’.64 It was 
also the subject of sharply critical diatribes, such as those authored by Henry Cutting in 1921, 
‘Jim Jam Jems’ in 1922, and Charles Lindbergh in 1923.65 Moreover, conditions also inspired 
renewed reform efforts. The Comptroller of the Currency recommended the introduction of a 
deposit insurance system for national banks within his 1920 report.66 The Postmaster General 
sought to improve the postal savings system in 1921 in order to draw out even more hoarded 
money.67  Additionally, the Federal Reserve Board was altered in early 1922 to include a 
member that represented agricultural interests.68 Clearly then, the post-war environment was 
turbulent, including for banks. 
Still, various bankers were confident that better times were ahead. Craig Hazlewood, 
President of the ABA’s State Bank Section, thought so. Although noting that ‘our present 
economic and financial position is fraught with danger’ and that he would ordinarily be 
‘somewhat pessimistic’ in such circumstances, Hazlewood announced in front of the ABA in 
1919 that he was confident that the people and the banks would prevail. He had ‘confidence 
in the resourcefulness of the American people, confidence in the sound position of our banks, 
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both national and state, and confidence in the proven ability of the Federal Reserve … to take 
up the slack or absorb the shock of a great financial reaction’. Indeed, he was so confident that 
he believed that there would never be ‘another currency panic’ and that it was ‘perfectly safe 
to say that the banks in our country of all classes are in better condition than ever before’.69 
For Hazelwood, even in the face of ‘danger’, America’s banks would safely weather any storm. 
Within his 1920 article on ‘Bank Advertising’ within the Bankers Magazine, Frederick Gehle 
similarly observed that America’s bankers were in a favourable position, even though ‘[p]ublic 
thought’ was in need of ‘capable guidance’ and though ‘[e]conomic and social conditions’ were 
‘confused’. In this instance, Gehle was referring to the newfound respectability of bankers and 
their capacity to guide public opinion. According to Gehle, people were now confident in the 
banker’s ‘fundamental integrity and strength’, so much so that they were ‘turning to the 
banker’. The banker was ‘looked to continue his leadership, and he [was] now, more than any 
time before, qualified to assume it [emphasis added]’.70 Thus, while conditions may not have 
been perfect, these bankers accepted that the public was now generally more receptive to them. 
With their new status and their near universal embrace of advertising and propaganda, the 
path was paved for bankers to continue connecting with the people into the 1920s.  
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  Into the 1920s and Beyond 
 
There is need of a more sympathetic attitude and co-operation between the 
banks and the people. … This condition has not yet been universally 
established, but it is being established. 
 
  - Calvin Coolidge, 1921.1 
 
The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our 
civilization. 
 
 - Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933.2 
 
 Entertainer and comedian Will Rogers likely spoke as an after dinner speaker at the 
American Bankers’ Association’s (ABA) annual convention held in New York City in late 1922. 
If he did, this was presumably to create a spirited and jovial atmosphere. Within a recording 
of his monologue recorded for Victor in 1923, Rogers opens by greeting his audience of ‘Loan 
sharks and interest hounds’ – apparently the ‘most disgustingly rich audience’ he had ever 
addressed – and proceeds to poke fun at not only himself but also the banking profession. He 
jokes that bankers are frauds, usurers, corrupt, and evil. The clergyman that opened the 
convention with a prayer, quipped Rogers, did not need to inform the Devil of their presence, 
as he had done for the ‘Almighty’. This was because the priest must have known that the devil 
knew where bankers ‘were all the time anyhow’. He also wonders where ‘depositors held their 
meeting’. Later, he remarks that with the ‘10,000’ attendees apparently in attendance, their 
membership, when accounting for what they had in ‘federal prisons’, had to be ‘around 30,000’. 
He subsequently closes his speech by saying goodbye to these ‘paupers’, who he declares are 
the ‘finest bunch of Shylocks that ever foreclosed a mortgage on a widow’s home’.3 
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 Here Rogers drew upon most of the epithets and tropes that had been levelled at 
bankers over the past fifty years. In this way, the monologue serves as a nice summary of 
popular attitudes. Nevertheless, if Rogers did in fact present this monologue to the ABA, then 
it is noteworthy that it was made within the safe confines of a bankers' convention. Perhaps 
Rogers had double-crossed his audience and was harsher than anyone realistically could have 
anticipated. Maybe they had been set-up by whoever booked him. Still, bankers must have 
known that having a comedian speak before them, especially Rogers, would invoke at least 
some barbs.4 Although few background details are available on the speech, and although it is 
impossible to know precisely how his audience reacted, that it was allowed to occur in the first 
place suggests a change in outlook. After many years of being subject to popular distrust and 
derision, bankers may have been willing to now literally face a joke made at their expense. 
What was once serious was now a laughing matter. This incident, then, can be seen to be 
reflective of a turning point for America's banks and bankers. Anti-banking sentiment and 
popular suspicion had lost their potency. 
 By 1922, the Progressive Era was by and large over. The intense conflicts and the push 
for reform that had characterized the previous five decades had lapsed, or had at least been 
driven from the foreground. At a national level, conservative, pro-business presidencies 
reigned from 1921 to 1933 under Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover 
respectively (conservative Republicans had taken over Congress earlier in 1918). Further, 
economic prosperity swept much of the nation between 1922 and 1929, as America embraced 
its new role as a creditor nation, production boomed, and consumer culture blossomed - cars 
and radios became the must-have items and their sales exploded, financed by an emerging 
consumer credit industry. This is not to suggest that America transitioned smoothly into 
prosperity. Getting to this new age had been rather turbulent. Major strikes occurred in 1919, 
in 1920 a cart carrying dynamite exploded on Wall Street, and the nation fell into a recession 
between 1920 and 1921. Taken together, however, these events amounted to something of a 
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grand finale for the Progressive Era. By this stage, radical movements had been repressed 
during the War and the First Red Scare, many of the Era's reform goals appeared to have been 
achieved, muckraking was over, and economically ‘good times’ eventually took off in the 1920s. 
Ultimately, the problems of yesteryear seemed to have been resolved. This may have been the 
‘roaring twenties’, but the vehicle for reform was quiet. America, so it appeared, had entered 
an age of prosperity.5 
 This was equally true for most of the nation's banks and bankers. By the mid-1920s, 
widespread public attention and criticism had waned. The popular fascination with runs, 
panics, wreckers, and plutocrats appears to have largely subsided. As historian Charles Geisst 
observes, ‘While the public and the government alike were often cynical of bankers' motives 
before the war, the tension subsided and the bankers again began to tighten their grip on the 
credit system, despite the presence of the Federal Reserve. Prosperity in the 1920s brought 
with it a tolerance of bankers' actions that had not been witnessed before’. Geisst is referring 
to the nation's elite Wall Street banks, though this still captures the general situation.6 Runs 
and panics no longer had the same cultural presence, the sensation surrounding ‘wreckers’ 
declined, the currency debates were long since over, the ‘money trust’ had faded from view, 
and popular reforms had been instated.7 This is not to say that these disappeared entirely. It is 
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undoubtedly true that commentary and critics remained in the 1920s. This can be observed 
through various films (Western melodramas featured bankers as villains, such as the 1925 films 
The Trail Rider and Flying Hooks, and bank embezzlement featured in some form within 
several films, such as The Shock (1923), Not a Drum Was Heard (1924), and The Man Who 
Found Himself (1925)); through Henry Ford's denunciations of Wall Street financiers (1922); 
through criticisms of the Federal Reserve during and immediately following the 1920-1921 
recession; and through the debates surrounding the McFadden Act of 1927, which largely 
concerned branching. For the most part, though, these were lingering remnants of a fading 
era, marginalised, or concerned with technical matters. Cultural materials such as these films 
appear to have lacked the specificity and directness characteristic of Gilded Age and 
Progressive Era materials, like The Modern Banker, The Bank Defaulter, and The Teller’s Tale; 
Henry Ford eventually withdrew his attacks due to popular backlash and commercial and 
political pressures; and the politics largely concerned issues with existing legislation and 
institutions instead of implementing entirely new systems. 8   
The most significant national issue and legislation regarded branching, as reflected by 
the McFadden Act. Though the Act restricted nationwide, interstate branching, it nevertheless 
permitted national banks to branch within states that allowed their chartered banks to do so 
(albeit only within the cities they were located within). It thus sought parity between national 
and state banks.9 Additionally, the Act also gave Federal Reserve member banks greater powers, 
like expanding their loaning abilities, and it rechartered the Federal Reserve, this time 
permanently. Compared to the reform proposals and enactments of the late Gilded Age and 
the Progressive Era, the Act increased the power of banks (even if this was not to the extent 
desired by advocates of branching). And though still controversial at the time, particularly 
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among competing interests including bankers and populist politicians, it was also relatively 
tame. 10  The Act amounted to a series of amendments rather than the creation of new systems. 
With the establishment of the Fed, and also the creation of the postal savings system and state-
specific deposit guarantees, the most profound and sweeping reforms had been already devised 
and implemented by the start of the 1920s. It is true that the Postmaster General sought to 
improve the postal savings system in 1921, that there was a drive to reform the Federal Reserve 
in 1922, and that bills for national deposit insurance schemes continued to be introduced to 
Congress during the 1920s. 11 These, however, were products of the Gilded Age and Progressive 
Era, and it appears that they did not receive the kind of popular attention they did previously. 
The former two occurred just as the Progressive Era was ending, and after 1922 all were now 
minor, background concerns, rather than national crusades or election platforms. Wholesale 
banking reform was out of the spotlight. 
 Further, not only had commentary declined, bankers had emerged from the War as 
respectable citizens. They had assumed financial leadership during America's war to make the 
World ‘safe for democracy’ and had become highly involved with the thrift movement. 
Historian Julia Ott notes that the ‘financial industry’ had an ‘enhanced image’ following the 
war. Like Geisst, Ott is primarily referring to Wall Street. Nonetheless, given that banks all 
over the nation were involved in this effort, it seems fair to extend this observation to include 
them.12 They had thus come out of the war, and indeed the Progressive Era, in a favourable 
position to convey their social and economic worth to the broader public. Klebaner highlights 
that by ‘1920 a bank director enjoyed as much prestige as a member of the local school board 
or a 32d degree Mason’. 13  Subsequently, many people that had avoided banks previously came 
to utilise them for the first time during the 1920s, and deposits grew. This is not to suggest that 
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everyone instantaneously entrusted bankers and started depositing. Garon has noted that the 
majority of Americans did not have a savings account even until after the Second World War.14 
Still, deposit banking increased in popularity during the decade.15 Looking at savings depositors, 
by 1929 there were 52,226,115 individual accounts. With a population of now roughly 121.8 
million, this meant that up to 42.8 percent of the population now had an account. Though this 
was still not a majority, this was a significant improvement from 1913’s 18 percent.16 Beyond 
depositing, banks also eventually became extremely active in brokering stocks and bonds for 
upper and middle-class people (and, of course, underwriting them for themselves). Taken 
together, it was during the 1920s that banks, primarily of the commercial variety, consolidated 
themselves as ‘department stores of finance’, with something for everyone, from savings 
departments to brokerage services.17 On the surface, things were looking upwards for a large 
amount of bankers and those using them. 
 Simultaneously, bankers also continued to embrace advertising and propaganda to 
‘educate’ the public and to bolster confidence, and both were in full swing. Drawing from their 
earlier experiences from the Progressive Era, the effectiveness and necessity for such mediums 
were by now generally accepted. Even by 1918, William Morehouse, author of Bank Deposit 
Building, noted that through ‘continuous newspaper advertising’ banks had ‘corrected to a 
large degree the mistaken notion that there is a great mystery about them, and that they are 
in business “just to make money”’. Indeed, people had ‘been convinced that banks are not 
unfriendly to them because they may have a few dollars to deposit’. This was beneficial, as 
‘wherever the people have been enlightened on the subject of banking, confidence is 
strengthened, and the result is an era of better business’.18 Many banks had also outsourced 
their advertising to agencies in order to take advantage of their professional 
                                                
14 Sheldon Garon, Beyond Our Means: Why America Spends While the World Saves (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 204-10. 
 
15 See Garon, Beyond Our Means, 191; Klebaner, American Commercial Banking, 128; Lizabeth Cohen, Making 
a New Deal, 75-83. 
 
16 The figure of 52,226,115 comes from the Comptroller’s 1929 report. Comptroller of the Currency, 1929 Annual 
Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), 54-5. 
 
17 As Klebaner highlights, this had started developing prior to the 1920s, though it was ‘after 1920 that the practice 
became widespread’. Klebaner, American Commercial Banking, 127. 
 
18 William Morehouse, Bank Deposit Building: Practical and Proved Methods of Increasing Your Business and 
Holding It (New York: Bankers Publishing Co., 1918), 36. 
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expertise. 19 Additionally, the turn to propaganda activities culminated in the official 
establishment of the ABA's public relations department in the year immediately following the 
War. The department sought to ‘popularize the profession of banking, making known to the 
average man just how necessary are the banker and his activities to the firm, the corporation, 
the community, and the nation’.20 
 Clearly, it was and is premature to consider promotional efforts as triumphant or even 
fully established. Bankers acknowledged that they still had a large amount of work to do. 
Suspicions and doubts did of course linger. Addressing New England bankers, Calvin Coolidge, 
then Vice President, declared in 1921 that there was ‘need of a more sympathetic attitude and 
co-operation between the banks and the people’. Regardless, he also noted that though this 
‘condition’ had not yet ‘been universally established’, it was ‘being established’.21 Bankers 
continued to believe that advertising and propaganda were the best way to achieve this, and 
so they pushed on with their efforts into the 1920s. Full page advertisements appeared within 
major newspapers which featured extensive argumentation as to why banks were safe and why 
people should utilise them. In 1921, the New York Tribune published an advertisement for 
the National City Bank which sought to inform readers on ‘Some things about Banking you 
should understand’.22 Likewise, in 1922 the Evening World published an advertisement for the 
Corn Exchange Bank which detailed ‘How a Bank is Managed and Examined’.23 Regarding 
propaganda, or what was increasingly being called public relations, the ABA's Public 
Education Committee sought to engage with the broader public, as reflected by their plans to 
present ‘Talks on Banking and Elementary Economics’ in 1922 and 1923. These talks were to 
be ‘delivered by the banker’ before not only the ‘higher grades of grammar schools, high school 
colleges and universities’, but also ‘parents' associations, teachers' institutes, farmers' institutes, 
chambers of commerce, boards of trade, men's and women's clubs, Kiwanis clubs, Lions clubs, 
                                                
19 Richard N. Germain, Dollars Through the Doors: A Pre-1930 History of Bank Marketing in America (Westport; 
London: Greenwood Press, 1996), 189-91. 
 
20 Ellsworth, ‘The Banker's Relation to the Public’, 56. 
 
21 Coolidge, ‘The People and the Banks’, 52. 
 
22 ‘Some things about Banking that you Should Understand’, advertisement for the National City Bank in New 
York Tribune, 23 June, 1921, 22. 
 
23 ‘How a Bank is Managed and Examined’, advertisement for the Corn Exchange Bank in The Evening World 
(New York), 6 October, 1922, 17. 
 
  Epilogue 214 
 
Civitas clubs, and so forth’.24 The Banker-Farmer continued to be produced until 1927, and 
thrift activities carried on.25 Evidently, bankers were attempting to get in touch with everyone, 
and were doing so by continuing to apply the lessons and practices that had emerged and 
developed earlier. They were not starting from scratch and were now in a good position to 
maintain their efforts. 
 Despite this, all was not entirely well. Though America had started to prosper and 
though major progressive reforms had been implemented, it had certainly not overcome many 
of its significant social and economic problems. The belief that they had done so amounted to 
what Historian Robert Wiebe calls an ‘illusion of fulfilment’.26 Of course, businesses had been 
regulated, redistributive policies had been introduced, women had been enfranchised, and 
greater democratic measures had been instated within the Federal Government by the end of 
the Era. At the same time, little had been done to curb racial inequalities (especially regarding 
Jim Crow), xenophobia proliferated (culminating in the growth of the Ku Klux Klan and the 
anti-immigration acts of 1921 and 1924), economic inequality endured, and vast sectors of the 
economy were left vulnerable – agriculture, for instance, was devastated by the early 1920s. 
Prosperity was not universal.27  
The ‘illusion of fulfilment’ and the continuation of problems also applied to banks. True, 
America had a new banking system that was supposed to end systemic banking problems. 
Various states also had deposit insurance systems. However, the 1920s went on to experience 
an enormous amount of bank failures. Indeed, more banks failed during the 1920s than they 
had in the previous fifty years, coming to average over 600 a year. Consequently, state-based 
deposit insurance schemes collapsed as their funding was exhausted. Florida and Georgia also 
began to experience a banking collapse in 1926. Banks, then, were still vulnerable 
institutions.28 
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 Yet, bizarrely, other than those directly affected by these failures (and those in their 
immediate vicinity), few else appear to have paid attention. These banks were overwhelmingly 
small country institutions in the South and West that had mushroomed over the past decade 
due to lax entry requirements, and they were failing largely due to the agricultural crisis – they 
had made loans to farmers, for land and equipment, who could not pay them back – and 
because there was simply too many of them.29 Regarding national banks, the Comptroller 
stated in his 1925 report that ‘It will be observed that a large majority of these failures were 
small banks and that the total assets of all were materially less than assets of any one of many 
of the urban national banks’.30 Instead of inducing nationwide distress and arousing concern, 
these failures were actually seen to be a good thing by some observers – the ‘market’ was 
purging itself of excessive and unproductive institutions.31 Given they were in rural areas (as 
Lee Alston, Wayne Grove, and David Wheelock have shown, 79 percent of these failures 
occurred within towns with populations of less than 2,500 people),32 their failure does not 
seem to have resonated within urban areas, where most people now lived.33 This is reflected 
partly by the fact that there was no nationwide banking panic during the 1920s. Indeed, this 
had not occurred since 1907. Any panics that did occur were minor and were local in nature.34 
The banking system survived even during the decade's economic downturns (1923-1924, 
1926-1927). Wholesale panics were a phenomenon by now apparently considered a thing of 
the past. Moreover, the low resonance is further reflected by the decline of popular discussions 
and movements explicitly pertaining to banking problems. For much of the population outside 
of rural areas, banking problems were remote and unimportant; they were out of sight and out 
of mind. Banking simply was no longer a popular issue, at least not to the extent it had been 
during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. For the moment, the heat was off banks and 
bankers.35 
                                                
29 See George G. Kaufman, ‘Bank Runs: Causes, Benefits, and Costs’, Cato Journal, vol. 7, no. 3 (1988): 567. 
 
30 Comptroller of the Currency, 1925 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1926), 5. 
 
31 Klebaner, American Commercial Banks, 136-7. 
 
32 Lee Alston, Wayne Grove, and David Wheelock, ‘Why do banks fail? Evidence from the 1920s’, Explorations 
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33 See Kaufman, ‘Bank Runs’, 567. 
 
34 Davison and Ramirez, ‘Local Banking Panics’, 164-177. 
 
35 See Richard K. Vedder, ‘The Impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Banking Stability’, 
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 This was all to change after the 29th of October, 1929. The Wall Street crash abruptly 
ended the roaring twenties, and marked the beginning of hard times that would quickly 
develop into the Great Depression, at home and abroad. The crash had occurred in large part 
due to the fact that commercial banks had been fuelling a speculative bubble in securities and 
real estate, which the Fed facilitated by keeping interest rates low. Shortly after that bubble 
burst, beginning in 1930, America experienced its worst ever banking crisis. Between 1930 
and 1933, the nation underwent four waves of banking panics, and over 9,000 banks failed 
over this time, including national and state banks and even savings and loans. Additionally, 
the Fed failed to fulfil its function as a lender of last resort. By 1933, confidence had collapsed 
and, unlike during the 1920s, major cities had been affected, including New York and 
Chicago.36 Hoarding increased and the postal savings system became more popular than ever 
as many people redeposited within them (it should also be noted that many people in the East 
also turned to mutual savings banks, which they generally considered safer).37 Bank runs, 
failures, panics, frauds, and villainy were no longer peripheral problems affecting people in 
faraway places. They were now very close to home. This was both in reality and in 
representation – banks had a strong cultural presence, as represented by Frank Capra's 1932 
film, American Madness, Archibald MacLeish's 1935 play, Panic, and, later, John Steinbeck's 
1939 bestselling novel, The Grapes of Wrath. Banking was now once again a popular issue and 
people were redirected to banking problems. Whatever gains bankers had made earlier in 
winning over the public, their efforts were by now completely undermined. 
 President Franklin Roosevelt's very first ‘fireside chat’ in March 1933 concerned 
America's ‘bad banking situation’. He used it to explain the rationale behind the 1933 ‘bank 
holiday’ and to address the ‘undermined confidence on behalf of the general public’. This lapse 
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of confidence, Roosevelt asserted, stemmed from the activities of a minority of ‘incompetent’ 
or ‘dishonest’ bankers and the public's failure to discriminate between them and the majority 
of good banks. As a result, it became the ‘Government's job to straighten out this situation and 
do it as quickly as possible’.38 The governmental response was manifested in several ways 
beyond the bank holiday. The villainous money trust again came under the spotlight, as 
represented by the Pecora Commission (1932-1934), which sought to expose its misdeeds, and 
by the republication of Brandeis' Other People's Money in 1932 for a contemporary audience.39 
Moreover, the Glass-Steagal Act was introduced in 1933. This was a landmark Act that 
fundamentally transformed the banking system. It instated measures both to prevent another 
depression and to attempt to restore popular faith in the nation’s banks and bankers. Regarding 
the former, banks were restricted from engaging in both commercial and investment activities. 
Commercial banks could no longer be investment banks and vice versa. Regarding the latter, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established. The FDIC guaranteed 
depositors within commercial banks that they would not lose their funds in the event that 
their bank failed (the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was created a 
year later in 1934 to guarantee deposits within savings and loans). There was resistance to this 
measure from bankers, conservatives, and also those that had experienced the implosions of 
state-based insurance schemes. The president himself even rejected deposit insurance. 
However, it differed to the state-based schemes in that the Federal Government itself 
guaranteed to cover losses, rather than merely enforcing or encouraging banks to do so through 
an insurance fund (the FDIC still requires banks to contribute to such a fund). Due to this, the 
scheme was a tremendously popular reform that went a long way in regaining the public's 
confidence.40 In all instances, the state had to intervene to expose and thwart the nation's 
financial villains, resolve the calamity, and to prevent it happening again. What had not been 
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fulfilled during the Progressive Era had now been fulfilled during the New Deal. 
 Bankers and their marketing specialists also realised that their work had been 
incomplete and that they had to reconsider their approaches. In the wake of such renewed 
public agitation, authorities on advertising and propaganda (or public relations) called for the 
nation's bankers to increase and strengthen their promotional activities, both individually and 
collectively. In their 1933 book, Constructive Public Relations: For the Banker Who Meets the 
Public, the ABA's Public Education Committee noted that although ‘Bank advertising has 
made progress in productiveness and in its informative value to the general mass of people 
during the past twenty years’, that ‘evolution’ was ‘still far from complete’.41 Gurden Edwards, 
the ABA's director of Public Relations, concurred and remarked in 1937 that ‘Public relations 
policies of banks, to be effective, must go much deeper than publicity, propaganda, and 
advertising’. Both agreed that bankers had embraced advertising and public relations, though 
asserted that banks had to go further. They had to convey their sympathies with the broader 
public and demonstrate their utility to them.42 The Public Education Committee stated that as 
depressions gave ‘ruthless proof of how invaluable prestige is for any bank, and how desirable 
it is to foster sound public opinion through a carefully directed and articulate public policy’, 
bankers needed to control their image and their message at every level, from the ‘relations of 
employee and customer across the counter’ to ‘the broader fields of publicity and advertising’.43 
Edwards recognised that banking practices could vary widely between banks and between 
regions, and that the relations between banks and their local communities could also differ. 
He thus called for individual banks to respond in a manner that was appropriate to their own 
conditions. This, however, had to occur nationwide.44 Despite their differences, all banks had 
to step up their bid to regain the public's confidence, which had been obliterated during what 
remains the nation's worst economic catastrophe. 
 As this thesis has shown, though, it was during the late Gilded Age and Progressive Era 
when such a scenario first emerged. As outlined in Chapter I, this thesis has sought to 
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contribute to the broader discussion on economic confidence by comprehensively exploring 
popular confidence issues in American banking over this period. It has argued that by taking 
a social and cultural approach that favours qualitative analyses we can begin to see that there 
existed a pervasive and persistent popular distrust of banks and bankers, which began to 
escalate in the 1870s and became endemic by the turn of the century. This distrust was caused 
by actual problems in banking, though it was amplified by the development of a ‘mass media’ 
that could disseminate bad news and criticisms all over the country. In turn, banking issues 
resonated within the popular imagination, and large amounts of people lacked confidence in 
the nation's banks, including national, state, savings, and private banks. This was reflected, 
reinforced, and even instilled via the public sphere. In response, bankers also took to the public 
sphere and turned to advertising and propaganda in a bid to challenge negative views, to 
represent themselves favourably within the public sphere, or to advance reforms that they 
believed would bolster confidence. 
Regarding popular confidence, Chapter II has shown how despite the growth of banks 
and deposits, confidence could be fragile, which was reflected within and reinforced by 
cultural mediums that conveyed runs and panics to be normal; Chapter III has shown how 
‘bank wreckers’ aroused intrigue and outrage inside and outside times of panic, which in turn 
helped to undermine confidence; Chapter IV has shown how some bankers could be ‘othered’ 
and seen as actively or inadvertently working against the interests of ‘the people’, thus creating 
a theoretical and likely physical distance between the two; and Chapter V has shown how 
popular reform movements sought to wrest control of banking from bankers in one way or 
another, ultimately representing a lack of faith. Regarding the banking response, Chapter VI 
has shown how individual banks turned to advertising in a bid to convey security and civic-
mindedness; Chapter VII has shown how elite bankers turned to propaganda in order to inspire 
confidence in a reserve association that was itself intended to sustain systemic confidence; and 
Chapter VIII has shown how bankers participated within America’s domestic War effort 
which subsequently reconfigured how many Americans saw banks. Taken together, all of this 
demonstrates that a broad, overarching confidence issue existed within American banking – a 
fact that bankers themselves eventually came to recognise. By the end of the Progressive Era, 
the popular fascination with banking had waned and banks had embraced strategies that they 
believed could win over the hearts and minds of ‘the people’. 
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 Again, this is not to suggest that they had completely achieved this. Nonetheless, they 
were in a favourable position to carry on with their efforts. In reality, this was in large part 
due to governmental intervention and the bond and savings drives of the First World War. 
Bankers, though, focussed instead upon advertising and propaganda, and would proceed to 
take the lessons they had learned into the 1920s and the 1930s. The former carried on these 
efforts, whereas the latter sought to expand and revise them. Either way, it was believed that 
confidence was something that could and would be gained by crafting the right message. 
 Today, the nation's banking system exhibits serious flaws and we can observe quite a 
significant degree of popular distrust and disdain directed towards American banks. Of course, 
banking conditions are very different now and many of the confidence issues are unlike those 
of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. For instance, thanks to the FDIC, traditional bank runs 
and panics are a thing of the past, and people no longer fear losing their deposits. Nevertheless, 
there is some form of popular outrage and suspicion. This is particularly evident following the 
Sub-Prime Mortgage collapse and the Global Financial Crisis that followed. The latter was the 
largest international economic calamity since the Great Depression, and American banks 
played a large part in its onset. Despite this, executives generally avoided prosecution, and 
reckless banks were bailed-out by taxpayers.45 In turn, confidence has plummeted. A 2016 
Gallup poll reveals that those expressing ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in banks 
has declined from 49 percent in 2006 to 27 percent in 2016.46 American bankers have also 
again became pariahs, as seen through the emergence of popular movements like Occupy Wall 
Street, the popularity of outspoken progressive politicians Elizabeth Warren and Bernie 
Sanders, and the increasing presence of banking issues within popular culture, including 
within films and television programs like Capitalism: A Love Story (2009), Inside Job (2010), 
Too Big To Fail (2011), and The Big Short (2015).  
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Amidst this, a dismayed Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan-Chase, has complained about 
a ‘blanket blame of all banks’, which he has considered a form of ‘discrimination’.47 By this 
view, people needed to know the difference between the good apples and the bad. Various 
banks tried to convince the public that they were among the former. In order to inform the 
public that they were dutiful corporate citizens, many turned to advertising and propaganda 
campaigns as if by default. They hoped to steer through the mess by promising the public that 
they were not like those other bad banks and that they could successfully provide all the 
services expected of them.48 US Bank initiated a campaign that sought to demonstrate that they 
were cruising safely above the storm clouds. 49  Bank of America, a particularly troubled 
institution, launched a campaign that sought to emphasise its contributions to society. They 
may have been involved in wrecking the global economy, but now they were back to being 
community oriented.50 
 This approach will continue to be relied upon so long as banking problems occur and 
appropriate regulatory measures are avoided. Detailing what those measures may be exactly is 
beyond the purpose of this thesis. However, many American people of the past did not fully 
trust private actors, whereas they did trust the state, or at least recognised its democratic and 
regulatory potentials. Rather than continue with deregulation and with blaming the state, as 
many now insist upon doing,51 perhaps a page needs to be taken from these Americans of 
yesteryear and present day Americans must realise that making banks accord with the public 
interest requires active popular and democratic involvement. Americans must also ensure that 
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they commit fully to reforms and avoid succumbing to an ‘illusion of fulfilment’, or, worse, 
tolerate the undermining of even mild measures, as observed by the attacks upon the post-
GFC Dodd-Frank Act, which imposes restraints upon the activities of Wall Street and the big 
banks.52 Ultimately, steady and meaningful popular confidence within banking depends upon 
adequate social input, supervision, and control. It does not alone depend upon convincing 
imagery or assuring phrases. 
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Newspaper Coverage of Major Banking Panics 
 
Newspapers from essentially every region, city, and town covered events. To illustrate this 
with examples: 
 
The 1873 panic was covered by major newspapers including the New York Times (19 Septem-
ber, 1873, page unspecified) and the Chicago Tribune (21 September, 1873, 2), along with var-
ious other newspapers such as Texas' Dallas Daily Herald (23 September, 1873, 1), Montana's 
Helena Weekly Herald (2 October, 1873, 5), South Carolina's Daily Phoenix (28 September, 
1873, 2), Vermont's Rutland Daily Globe (27 September, 1873, 3), and Washington's Wash-
ington Standard (27 September, 1873, 2). 
 
The 1893 panic was covered by major newspapers including the New York Tribune (30 June, 
1893, 1) and the Los Angeles Herald (30 June, 1893, 1), along with various other newspapers 
such as Kansas' Kinsley Graphic (23 June, 1893, 2), North Dakota's Jamestown Weekly Alert 
(20 July, 1893, 8), North Carolina's Progressive Farmer (22 August, 1893, 3), Michigan's 
Weekly Expositor (25 August, 1893, 4), and Oregon's Daily Morning Astorian (27 July, 1893, 
1). 
 
The 1907 panic was covered by major newspapers including the New York Sun (23 October, 
1907, 1) and the Boston Daily Globe (23 October, 1907, 1-3), along with various other news-
papers such as Missouri's Butler Weekly Times (24 October, 1907, 5), Utah's Salt Lake Herald 
(23 October, 1907, 1), Florida's Live Oak Daily Democrat (26 October, 1907, 1), Pennsylvania's 
Cameron County Press (3 October, 1907, 3), and Arizona's Daily Arizona Silver Belt (30 Oc-
tober, 1907, 1).  
 
This is, of course, a very limited sample and is far from being exhaustive, but does serve to 
demonstrate that press coverage was extensive and expansive. It does not seem unreasonable 




State Directors of the National War Savings Committee that were bankers or had direct con-
nections to banking institutions. 
 
State   State Director Connection to Banks/Bankers 
     
California (north) 
 
 John S. Drum 
President of the Savings Union Bank and 
Trust Company. Later became President of the 
ABA (1920) and the American Trust Company 
(1927). 
     
California (south) 
 
 G. A. Davidson 
President of the Southern Trust and Com-
merce Bank. 
     
Utah 
 
 Geo. T. Odell 
Directorships in the First National Bank of 
Montpelier and Bank of Garland. 
     
Washington 
 
 Daniel Kelleher 
Director of the Bank for Savings in Seattle; 
Chairman of the Seattle National Bank. 
 
 
   
Arkansas   Moorehead Wright Union and Mercantile Trust. 
     
Colorado   John Evans President of the International Trust Company. 
     
Kansas   P. W. Goebal President of the ABA, 1916. 
     
Missouri   Festus J. Wade Mercantile Trust Company. 
     
New Mexico   Hallett Reynolds Secretary of New Mexico Bankers Association. 
     
Oklahoma 
 
 Asa E. Ramsey 
Former cashier for the National Bank of Com-
merce. 
     
New Jersey   Dwight Morrow Investment Banker.  




 Frederic W. Allen Lee, Higginson, and Co. 
     
Delaware   Henry P. Scott Scott and Company. 
     
Kentucky   Jas. B. Brown President of the Bank of Commerce. 
     





 Robert K. Cassatt Investment Banker. 
     
West Virginia   Robert L. Archer First National Bank of Huntington. 
     
Mississippi   J. T. Thomas President of the Grenada National Bank. 
     
South Carolina   Robert G. Rhett People’s National Bank of Charleston. 
     
Tennessee   Thomas R. Preston Hamilton National Bank of Chattanooga. 
     
Virginia   Thomas B. McAdams Merchants’ National Bank. 
     
Illinois 
 
 Martin A. Ryerson 
Director of Continental Illinois National Bank 
and Trust Company. 
     
Iowa   Homer A. Miller Iowa National Bank. 
     
Michigan 
 
 Frank W. Hubbard 
Vice-President of Bankers’ Trust Company of 
Detroit. 
     
Minnesota   Arthur R. Rogers Director of Northwestern National Bank. 
     
North Dakota   George H. Hollister Northern Trust Company. 
     
Wisconsin   J. H. Puelicher Marshall and Isley Bank. 
     
Maine 
 
 Herbert J. Brown 
President of Maine Savings Banks and the 
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